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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Africa1’s GDP growth varies considerably across time but appears to be generally 
poor. The region’s growth performance is disappointing in absolute terms, and is even 
gloomier when set against that of other developing regions. Economic growth was so 
weak in the continent that Africa’s per capita GDP was lower in 1997 than 30 years 
before. The decline was even stronger in some countries, where per-capita output fell by 
more than 50 percent (World Bank, 2000). As a result of this poor growth, the average 
income2 in Africa in 1997 stands at just a third of that of South Asia3, making the region 
the poorest in the world (World Bank, 2000). Similarly, the big income divide between 
African countries and developed countries continues to widen as the latter group of 
countries has grown steadily, albeit at a moderate pace, over the past three decades 
(United Nations, 2006).  Africa’s poor performance is perhaps an important part of 
Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002)’s finding that attributes growing disparities in 
welfare between the world’s citizens more to differences in inequality between countries 
than inequality within countries.  
 
In addition to this dismal economic performance, the continent lags behind in 
terms of human development. Africa’s social indicators do not compare favourably with 
those of other regions despite some improvements recorded in the continent. For instance, 
life expectancy in Africa stood at only 52 years in 1997 compared to an average of 65 
                                                 
1
 Africa means Sub-Saharan Africa in the rest of the dissertation. 
2
 The figure used is the per capita GNI measured through the Atlas Method.  
3
 Many African countries were wealthier than their South Asian counterparts in the 1960s. 
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years in the developing world and 77 years in the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries. This reflects, in part, high infant and 
maternity mortalities in Africa as well as the toll taken on lives in the region by the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Ninety African out a thousand die before reaching 5 years 
compared to 77 in South Asia and 6 per 1 000 in the OECD countries. High maternal 
mortality is also pervasive in the continent: of the 12 countries in the world with rates 
above 1 000 deaths per 100 000 live births in 1997, 10 were located in Africa.  Similar 
patterns emerge also in the area of education. Africa saw its gross primary enrolment 
rates stagnate at 74 percent from 1982 to 1997 while South Asia managed to increase its 
rates from 77 percent to more than 100 percent throughout the same period (World Bank, 
2001). As far as the HIV/AIDS prevalence is concerned, Sub-Saharan Africa is home to 
over 70 percent of the total world HIV-positive population. And, such countries as 
Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Zambia have HIV seroprevalence rates above 20 percent 
while South Africa has the fastest growing epidemic of HIV in the world, with 10% of its 
population, or 4 million people, are infected, placing it first in the world in number of 
infected individuals (United Nations, 2000). 
 
The above trends clearly show that African countries are increasingly diverging 
compared to other developing countries with respect to economic and social 
development. The United Nations (2006) finds growing income inequality among 
countries, in general, to be worrisome for three reasons. First, countries that have better 
“endowments” are more likely to enjoy preferential access to capital markets, which 
make them more immune against commodity market disturbances. The underlying reason 
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for such phenomena is to be found in the “inequitable” world markets. For instance, 
investment tends to be concentrated in countries with favorable endowments in terms of 
wealth and institutions. Second, economic might and political clout tend to move hand-
in-hand. In other terms, the rules governing global markets may not always reflect the 
interests of the poorest nations mainly because these countries tend to have difficulties 
making their voice heard during the negotiation processes preceding the adoption of those 
rules. Third, growing global divergences can impair economic growth and hamper the 
ability of poorer countries to fully take advantage of opportunities unleashed by 
globalization. Lackluster growth limits poverty reduction efforts. And, in some instances, 
this has proved to be a leading factor to civil conflicts, regional tensions, and social 
instability (Collier, 2006: Murshed, 2006)  
 
Generating high and sustained economic growth and more generally fostering 
economic and social development in Africa is arguably the most important challenge in 
global development. Accordingly, Africa has been at the centre of major development-
related initiatives launched by the international community in recent years. The United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), drawn from the Millennium 
Declaration, set quantitative targets for eradicating poverty and related human 
deprivations worldwide and places a particular emphasis on Africa. Similarly, the 
Monterrey Consensus, which highlights the mutual responsibility of developed countries 
and developing countries in achieving the MDGs, also gives due consideration to the 
special needs of the region. The philosophy of mutual commitment and accountability is 
an essential element of the content and process of the New Partnership for Africa's 
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Development (NEPAD). NEPAD is an African-inspired plan for the development of the 
continent. It was designed to tackle current challenges facing Africa, including issues 
such as peace, security, good governance, political and corporate governance, thus 
creating an enabling environment for private investment, both domestic and foreign, and 
economic and social development. NEPAD was formally approved by the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) and subsequently endorsed by the Group of Eight4 (G8) and the 
United Nations General Assembly, as the main strategic framework to address the 
challenges facing Africa. At the heart of this plan is the concept of partnerships, which 
emphasises mutual commitments and obligations by African countries and the 
international community. On the one hand, African governments are expected to adopt 
measures aimed at ensuring greater accountability to their citizens and efficient and 
effective use of their resources. On the other hand, the international community must do 
their part to ensure increased and effective aid, more debt relief, and fairer trade rules.  
 
Calling for mutual commitment and accountability of developed and developing 
nations in addressing poverty and other development challenges is an implicit recognition 
of the role played by both endogenous and exogenous factors in shaping the development 
paths of many developing countries, especially those in Africa.  This view reflects also 
some of the findings of the growth literature on Africa. In fact, many explanations have 
been offered to account for Africa’s dismal growth performance. They can be 
summarised into three main interrelated arguments.  
 
                                                 
4 The Group of Eight (G8) consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States.  
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The first places a great importance on deep-rooted structural constraints in 
explaining Africa’s poor performance. Those constraints are typically associated with 
climate and geography, and beyond the control of African policymakers. Sachs and 
Warner (1997), for instance, link the disappointing growth performance of the region to 
its tropical location, its position in global markets, and its resources.  
 
The second emphasises institutional factors. Some, such as Easterly and Levine 
(1997), attribute Africa’s slow growth to ethnic fragmentation. Others, such as Acemoglu 
et al. (2001), point to the lack of institutions that enforce the rule of law and promote 
investment as the main explanation of poor growth performance of African economies. 
They suggest that these institutions were shaped by colonisation strategies, which in turn 
were guided by the feasibility of settlement or in other words by geography. There are 
few settlements in countries that have inauspicious climate and high mortality rates. 
Accordingly, institutions that were developed in these countries tend to promote 
extractive states, with little enforcement of property rights and few checks and balances. 
More importantly, these institutions endured after independence, and African countries 
are some cases in point.  
 
The third argument lies on policy mistakes. Africa’s economic crisis is explained 
by poor public policies, including the lack of openness and macroeconomic instability 
(high inflation, unsustainable fiscal and current deficits, and real exchange rate 
misalignments). This view has dominated the economic thinking and served as the basis 
for policy prescription for the continent since the 1980s. Most of the policies that have 
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been prescribed and implemented are grounded in the dependent economy model or 
“Australian model”, in which clearing internal and external imbalances requires an 
increase of the relative price of tradable to nontradable goods, defined as the depreciation 
of real exchange rate, and a reduction in domestic absorption. One persuasive strand of 
this literature explores the effects of policy instabilities on economic growth. For 
instance, Guillaumont et al. (1999) uncover a negative relationship between economic 
growth and investment and real exchange rate instabilities and presents evidence that 
these policy-related instabilities are ignited by exogenous shocks or “primary 
instabilities” such as terms of trade instability, political disturbances, and climate shock. 
Chapter I will build on the aforementioned work. But, it differs from it in two respects. 
Firstly, it concentrates in real exchange rate and public spending, the two key variables in 
the dependent economy model. Secondly, the analysis and conclusions in this chapter are 
based on dynamic panel data rather than the commonly use of cross-country data. While 
acknowledging the critical role played by institutional and structural factors in Africa’s 
poor performance, Chapter I will explore how instabilities in public spending and real 
exchange rate have constrained economic growth in Africa.  Chapter I will then 
investigate the transmission channels through which these relationships operate.  
 
The impact of policies, largely inspired by the dependent economy model, on 
poverty has been the subject of a lot of controversy. Some, such as Ali (1998), find 
successful macroeconomic reforms implemented in African countries to have increased 
poverty. Others, such Demery and Squire (1996), disagree and show that improved 
macroeconomic environment moves, to a large extent, hand-in-hand with poverty 
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reduction. Chapter II will explore the relationship between economic policies and poverty 
by using again the dependent economy model as the main theoretical framework. 
Accordingly, it will focus on two variables: the real exchange rate and the absorption, 
more on the first than the second, and explores the links between these two variables and 
poverty. In line with the vast empirical literature on poverty reduction, Chapter II will 
highlight economic growth as the major indirect channel through which economic 
policies, captured through real exchange and absorption, influence poverty.  However, it 
will underscore direct channels that are at work as well. In fact, the reduction of the 
absorption generally achieved by tightening public spending can be detrimental to the 
poor if the cuts in government expenditures target social programmes and other transfers 
and subsidies to the poor. Moreover, by assuming that the tradable sector is labour 
intensive and that the main asset at the disposal of the poor is their workforce, any 
depreciation of real exchange rate may result in the increase of returns to labour and thus 
improve the poor’s well-being. But, this relationship critically depends on a third set of 
factors, which include the income distribution and the quality of institutions. The level of 
income inequality may determine the extent to which the poor benefit from the 
depreciation of the real exchange rate. Higher price of tradable relative to nontradable 
goods increases the profitability of the tradable sector. The poor may reap this 
opportunity only if they have full access to production factors, including capital. In the 
presence of credit market imperfections as it is the case in most developing countries, 
access to production factors is based upon the ownership of collateral, which the poor 
lack if the distribution of income is skewed. Equally important is the quality of 
institutions. Efficient institutions could not only facilitate the transmission of price 
te
l-0
01
16
96
1,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 2
9 
No
v 
20
06
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
18 
 
signals to the poor but also help them respond to these signals. In sum, the additional 
argument put forward is that real exchange rate depreciation favours the poor, provided 
that income is fairly distributed and institutions are sound.  
 
One common structural weakness of many African economies is their great 
vulnerability to terms-of-trade shocks, which heavily influence economic cycles and the 
cyclical properties of economic policies. During boom periods, many countries 
implemented very expansionary fiscal and monetary policies that led to real exchange 
appreciation and increasing fiscal and external imbalances.  At the other hand of the 
spectrum, bust times forced many of these countries to adopt tight monetary policies and 
indiscriminate fiscal adjustments. Such policies, which are obviously procyclical, might 
result in important losses in many valuable social and infrastructural projects, impairing 
the accumulation of  both physical and human capital as well as productivity and thus not 
only leading to short-term protracted recession but also lessening the potential for long-
term growth. However, institutions can play an essential role in shaping policy responses 
to exogenous shocks, therefore contributing to mitigating the adverse effects of 
exogenous shocks on economic activity. Many African countries have embarked, since 
the early 1990s, in bolder political reforms, which coincide with a wave of economic 
reforms. These countries experienced significant political transformations, moving from 
one-party systems to multipartite regimes. In line with the literature that links policy 
choices to political regimes, Chapter III will explore the implications of such changes on 
the cyclical properties of fiscal policy. In particular, the main question that will be raised 
in that chapter is whether democratic institutions have been conducive to more 
te
l-0
01
16
96
1,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 2
9 
No
v 
20
06
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
19 
 
countercyclical fiscal policies in the region. Additionally, Chapter III will look at the two 
dimensions of democratic systems, electoral competition and checks and balances, and 
will attempt to uncover the channel that explains why democracies can smooth business 
cycles better than autocracies. 
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CHAPTER I: 
 
 
 
PUBLIC SPENDING AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
INSTABILITIES AND GROWTH IN AFRICA: EVIDENCE FROM 
PANEL DATA5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
5
 A condensed version of this chapter is forthcoming in the United Nations’ Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs Working Paper Series. We would like to thank Jean-Louis Arcand, Jean-Louis Combes, 
Pingfan Hong, Jules Tapsoba, and one anonymous referee for helpful discussions and pertinent comments 
on an earlier draft, along with the participants at the “Seminaire des Doctorants” organised by CERDI and 
held in Clermont-Ferrand in April 2006. 
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I-INTRODUCTION 
 
African economic performance has been very uneven over time and across 
countries but appeared to be generally disappointing. GDP growth was relatively robust 
until the 1973 oil shock, averaging 5.2 per cent during 1966-73. Growth then decelerated 
significantly, with an annual average rate of 1.6 percent during 1974-93. Finally, growth 
recovered from 1994 to 1997, averaging 4.1 per cent during this period. These regional 
patterns are very much similar to country level record on growth. Indeed, the vast 
majority of countries in the continent have experienced many short-lived growth 
episodes, which seem to be closely associated with positive exogenous shocks such as 
terms of trade improvements, large capital inflows, and favourable weather conditions.  
Boom periods have been characterised by accommodative fiscal and monetary 
policies in many countries. Booms often resulted in relatively higher government 
spending and exchange rate overvaluation. Prolonged unfavourable times, on the other 
hand, forced countries to adjust by tightening monetary and fiscal policies, and 
depreciating real exchange rate. This alternation of boom and bust cycles triggered severe 
instabilities in public spending and real exchange rate6, which, in turn, have hampered 
capital accumulation, productivity, and consequently economic growth. There are two 
schools of thoughts in the literature that offer explanations for the poor economic 
performance of African countries. The first emphasises deep-rooted institutional and 
structural constraints in explaining Africa’s poor performance. Those constraints are 
                                                 
6
 Heavily inspired by the conclusions of the dependent economy model, policy makers in developing 
countries tend to focus on the level of absorption and the real exchange rate.  
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typically geographical, demographical, political, and social in nature. The second stresses 
inadequate policies, including the lack of openness and macroeconomic instability (high 
inflation, unsustainable fiscal and current deficits, and real exchange misalignments) as 
the key driving forces behind slow growth in Africa. Some of the extensions of this 
strand of literature highlight the potential impact of policy instabilities on economic 
growth7. For instance, seminal work by Guillaumont et al. (1999) uncovers a negative 
relationship between economic growth and investment and real exchange rate instabilities 
and presents evidence that these policy-related instabilities8 are ignited by exogenous 
shocks or “primary instabilities” such as terms of trade instability, political disturbances, 
and climate shock. While this chapter builds on Guillaumont et al, it differs from them in 
two respects. Firstly, it focuses on real exchange rate and public spending, the two key 
variables of the dependent economy model. Secondly, the analysis and conclusions in this 
chapter rely on dynamic panel data rather than the commonly use of cross-country data. 
While acknowledging the critical role played by institutional and structural factors in 
Africa’s poor performance9, this chapter assesses how instabilities in public spending and 
real exchange rate played a determinant role in the dismal performance of African 
economies.  
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 sets the context by providing an 
overview of descriptive statistics comparing African countries to other developing 
                                                 
7
 The work of Ramey and Ramey (1995), Hnatkovska and Loayza (2003), which focuses mostly on output 
volatility, can be considered as part of this literature too.  
8
 Real exchange rate can not entirely be considered as policy variable because it could be influenced by 
exogenous factors.  
9
 To some extent, the delimitation policy versus structural and institutional factors can be considered as 
artificial because of the intertwining between these two set of factors. Further discussion on this issue is 
presented in annex I-3 
te
l-0
01
16
96
1,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 2
9 
No
v 
20
06
Chapter I: PUBLIC SPENDING AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE INSTABILITIES AND 
GROWTH IN AFRICA: EVIDENCE FROM PANEL DATA 
  
 
  
 
24 
 
countries. The variables of interest in this analysis are average growth rate, real 
investment rate and instabilities in real exchange rate and government spending. Section 
3 presents the models that are used in the discussion, notably the neoclassical growth 
model and the endogenous growth framework. The latter helps capture dynamics such as 
the role of policies. Section 4 reviews the existing econometric methodologies and 
identifies the best suited approach for the estimation strategy. Section 5 presents the 
empirical results. Section 6 concludes with policy implications based on the results of the 
empirical work. 
 
II-DATA: AFRICA VERSUS OTHER DEVELOPING REGIONS  
 
2.1 Instability Measurement 
 
Before presenting the descriptive statistical analysis, it is important to specify the 
measurement of instability in operation in the chapter. Following (Combes et al., 1999), 
we start with the following equation: 
titiiiiti XctbaX ,1,, ε+++= −          (1) 
where Xi,t is the variable of interest in country i and in period t . This equation suggests 
that variables can potentially have two components: stationary (ai) and non-stationary (bit 
+ ciXi,t-1 ). The non-stationary component could display a deterministic or/and a stochastic 
trends. Instability is then captured by the square of the error term (εi,t)2 . This implies that 
the standard deviation captures accurately instability when the series are stationary 
around a constant.  
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Recent developments in panel data econometrics facilitate panel-based unit root 
tests. There are two set of panel unit root tests. The first set assumes that the unit root 
process is the same across cross-sections, meaning that ci is the same across individuals 
or countries (ci =c ). In contrast, the second category of tests assumes different unit root 
processes, implying that the constant varies across individuals or countries.  Levin, Lin, 
and Chu (2002) test is part of the first category of tests while the Im, Peseran and Shin 
(2003) test and the Fisher-type tests (Maddala and Wu, 1999: Choi, 2001), which use the 
Augmented Dicker-Fuller (ADF) approach, belong to the latter.  
Panel unit root tests are conducted on the following 
equation: titiiiti XcaX ,1,, ε++= − , which assumes the absence of a determinist trend
10
. 
The findings are summarised in tables 1, 2, and 3. They reject the null of a unit root, 
regardless of the assumptions on the unit root process. The data used to that effect is a 
panel data from 45 African countries covering a period from 1966 to 1997. The sample 
size in each test varies and is determined solely by data availability.  
 
Table 1: Panel unit root test based on Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) approach 
 
 Real Effective 
Exchange Rate 
Government 
Expenditure to 
GDP ratio 
Government 
Consumption to 
GDP ratio 
Statistic -3.318 -3.38 -2.823 
Probability* 0.000 0.000 0.002 
Cross-sections 33 21 42 
Observations 854 376 1274 
Note: Levin, Chin and Chu (2002) assume common unit process. The test also assumes asymptotic normality 
*Under the null hypothesis, there is a unit root, while under the alternative, there is no unit root.
                                                 
10
 The data reject the specification that allows deterministic trend. 
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Table 2: Panel unit root test based on Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) approach 
 
 Real Effective 
Exchange Rate 
Government 
Expenditure to 
GDP ratio 
Government 
Consumption to 
GDP ratio 
Statistic -1.710 -3.478 -1.432 
Probability* 0.043 0.000 0.076 
Cross-sections 33 21 42 
Observations 854 376 1274 
Note: Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) assume individual unit process. Their test also assumes asymptotic normality  
*Under the null hypothesis, there is a unit root, while under the alternative, there is no unit root. 
 
Table 3: Panel unit root test based on Fisher-Augmented Dicker Fuller approach 
 
 Real Effective 
Exchange Rate 
Government 
Expenditure to 
GDP ratio 
Government 
Consumption to 
GDP ratio 
Statistic 84.17 79.768 101.505 
Probability* 0.065 0.000 0.0939 
Cross-sections 33 21 42 
Observations 854 376 1274 
Note: Madala and Wu (1999) and Choi (2001) assume individual unit process 
*Under the null hypothesis, there is a unit root, while under the alternative, there is no unit root. Probabilities for the 
Fisher test are computed using an asymptotic Chi-Square distribution.  
 
These results indicate that all the series are stationary around a constant, implying that 
standard deviations could reflect accurately the instabilities of real effective exchange 
rate, total government expenditure, and government consumption. 
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2.2 Comparison Africa vs. other developing regions 
 
The comparison of the African and non-African data on the variables used in the 
study yields interesting preliminary lessons.  While these preliminary findings might be 
very arbitrary, they nonetheless provide useful guidance regarding the structure of the 
theoretical model as well as the empirical investigation.  
The comparison is based on a sample that covers 147 countries, including 45 Sub-
Saharan African countries.  The period under consideration spans three decades, from 
1966 to 1997. This data set is structured as a panel with observations for each country 
consisting of four-year averages or standard deviations. Indicators of instability are 
captured by standard deviations while level indicators are represented by four-year 
averages. Each country has eight observations: 1966-1969, 1970-1973, 1974-1977, 1978-
1981, 1982-1985, 1986-1989, 1990-1993 and 1994-1997. The panel is, however, not 
balanced because some observations are missing for a number of countries.  
 Africa is compared to other regions, using the median11. A Wilcoxon/Mann-
Whitney test12 is used to that effect. 
                                                 
11
 The use of median rather than the mean is justified on practical grounds.  Most of the observations are 
geometric averages and standard deviations. This means that the “mean comparison” has to be based on the 
mean of geometric average or standard deviations, which is very hard to interpret.  
12
 The Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney test is viewed as one of the most powerful non-parametric tests. It tests the 
null hypothesis that two samples have identical distribution functions against the alternative hypothesis that 
the two distribution functions differ with respect to the median. Its main advantage lies on the fact it does 
not require the differences between two populations to have a normal distribution.  
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Table 4: The median of some key indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa and in other Developing 
Countries 
 
 1966-1997 
 Africa Other Developing 
Countries 
Growth Rate  0.668* 
{321} 
2.25 
{670} 
Real Investment Rate 8.252* 
{337} 
14.187 
{506} 
REER Instability 11.312* 
{231} 
5.379 
{360} 
Total Government Expenditure Instability 2.211* 
{162} 
1.623 
{377} 
Government Consumption Instability 1.315* 
{304} 
0.849 
{574} 
   
*Statistically significant at one per cent level using Wilcoxon/ Mann-Whitney Test 
Figures in brackets indicate the number of observations 
 
The first observation is that the median per capita GDP growth in Africa is 
significantly lower than that of other developing regions during the period 1966-97. 
Considering only the classical determinants of economic growth, the differences in GDP 
growth between these two groups reflect slower capital accumulation in Africa: the 
median real investment rate in this region is almost half of that of other developing 
regions. The values of the median real exchange rate instability, the median government 
expenditure instability, and the median government consumption instability are also 
statistically much higher in Africa, suggesting that African countries generally 
experienced more pronounced policy instabilities than other developing countries during 
the three decades considered here (1966-1997). It might be interesting to look at the 
evolution of these instabilities in periods of high growth and in times of crisis. This 
would certainly help understand potential interactions between these instabilities and 
economic growth.  
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Table 5: Comparison of the median of some key indicators in Sub-Saharan Africa and in other 
Developing Countries in 1994-1997 and 1974-1993 
 
 1994-1997 1974-1993 
 Africa Other Developing 
Countries 
Africa Other 
Developing 
Countries 
Growth Rate  1.826 
{45} 
2.214 
{107} 
0.211* 
{208} 
1.980 
{440} 
Real Investment Rate 7.930* 
{45} 
13.087 
{95} 
8.356* 
{210} 
14.656 
{310} 
REER Instability 8.490* 
{32} 
4.409 
{47} 
12.568* 
{152} 
5.662 
{227} 
Total Government Expenditure 
Instability 
1.622 
{16} 
1.441 
{71} 
2.308* 
{129} 
1.786 
{273} 
Government Consumption Instability 1.299 
{44} 
0.846 
{95} 
1.367* 
{195} 
0.911 
{380} 
     
*Statistically significant at one per cent level using Wilcoxon/ Mann-Whitney Test 
Figures in brackets indicate the number of observations 
 
 
The 1974-1993 period is arguably the most disappointing era of Africa post-
independence economic history while 1994-1997 can be viewed as one of the most 
promising. The differences in terms of capital accumulation and the instability of the real 
exchange rate between Africa and other developing countries remain significant during 
these two periods. However, the fundamental changes that occurred during 1994-97 had 
to do with government expenditure and real government consumption. More specifically, 
the instabilities of these two policy variables in Africa decreased to the point that their 
levels become roughly identical to those of other developing regions. Consequently, one 
can conjecture that a more stable public spending in Africa might have led to stronger 
growth performance in this region. This assertion could be supported by the experience of 
Botswana, the sustained and fastest growing economy in the region.  
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2.3 The case of Botswana 
 
Botswana is viewed in the literature as the greatest success stories in Africa both 
in terms of economic growth and human development13. Botswana’s real GDP per capita 
grew annually by 6.4 percent from 1966 to 1997. Its record in human development was 
equally remarkable before the HIV infection took a heavy toll on some of the 
achievements, especially the improvement in life expectancy.  
In stark contrast to other African oil and non-oil commodity producing countries, 
Botswana is virtually the only country in the continent to have successfully achieved 
sustained economic growth. Part of this success is attributable to the use of counter-
cyclical fiscal policies to manage booms and slumps in the mining sector, particularly the 
diamond industry, and the effective management of its real exchange rate.  
 One of the greatest successes of the fiscal policy in Botswana was to achieve 
public expenditure smoothing while at the same time allowing sustainable increases in 
public spending. The fiscal policy strategy broadly consisted in running substantial 
budget surpluses and building impressive international reserves in periods of high 
diamond prices. Those reserves were drawn in when the diamond market was weak, thus 
avoiding any drastic cut in expenditures during bust times. The general goal of such 
strategy was to ensure some stability in public spending. It is worth noting that the 
predictability of government spending was made possible thanks to National 
Development Plans. These plans set targets for public expenditures which are in line with 
expected government revenues and the absorption capacity of the economy.  
                                                 
13
 Some of the achievements in human development have recently been reversed by of HIV/AIDS 
pandemic. 
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Botswana also places a major emphasis on the management of the exchange rate 
so as to avoid real appreciation14. Booms usually bring excessive foreign exchange. If 
these flows are not properly sterilised, which it very often the case, they lead to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate and undermine the competitiveness of the tradable 
sector. In light of this, Botswana managed to prevent its currency from appreciating, 
allowing therefore other tradable goods, outside the mining sector, to maintain 
competitiveness in world markets. Additionally, this policy implicitly helped Botswana 
pursue a relatively successful diversification of its economy.  
 
III- THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
 
3.1 Solow Model 
 
This chapter uses the Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992)’s version of the Solow 
model as the main framework to investigate the determinants of growth. This model is 
based on a Cobb-Douglas production function with Harrod-neutral, i.e. labour-
augmenting, technological progress. It is summarised by an approximation of the growth 
rate around steady-state, which takes the following form: 
 

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(2) 
                                                 
14
 There is great deal of evidence associating high instability of real exchange rate with exchange rate 
appreciation. Conversely, relatively stable real exchange rate would equate with the absence of an 
appreciation of real exchange rate. 
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or if human capital is augmented: 
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where lny 
 
is per-capita output, lny0 the initial per-capita output, γ the rate of convergence 
to the steady state, α the share of physical capital in output, β the share of human capital 
in output, n the growth rate of the population, p the rate of technological progress, t the 
time,  d the depreciation rate, s and h the measures of physical and human capital 
accumulation, respectively, and lnA0 the initial level of technology. 
For empirical exercise purpose, relations (2) and (2’) can be transformed into the 
following dynamic equations: 
 
 
(3) 
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Relations (3) and (4) can be transformed into (3’) and (4’)  
 
tititititititi nuWsdpnyy ,,,2,11,0, ln)ln(lnln εωφφφ ++++++++= −        (3’) 
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titititititititi nuWhsdpnyy ,,*,*3,*2,*11,*0, lnln)ln(lnln εωφφφφ +++++++++= −   (4’) 
 
where i denotes country, t the period, ui the country-specific effect, nt the time effects, 
and εi,t the error term. It is also worth noting that Wi,t  is included to capture other 
determinants of economic growth. Additionally, one key assumption underlying the 
structure of the model is the existence of constant returns of scale in a Cobb-Douglas 
function, which could be gauged by testing the hypotheses  021 =+φφ  or 0*3*2*1 =++ φφφ . 
The share of physical capital, α, as well as that of human capital, β, can also be derived 
from the coefficients estimates of equations (3) and (4).  
3.2 Criticisms  
 
It is asserted that the neoclassical growth model15 has two major limitations: the 
model’s conclusion that no growth takes place when the economy reaches the steady 
state, i.e. in the long-term, unless supported by exogenous technological progress and 
changes in the population growth rate, and the prediction that per capita income 
differences among countries should narrow down as time goes on. 
The Solow model is criticised on the ground that it predicts that long-term growth 
is solely driven by exogenous changes in technology or population. This implies that 
long-term growth relies upon factors that are outside the neoclassical setup and 
independent of most elements of the production function, preferences, and policies. This 
                                                 
15
 Use interchangeably The Solow Model and neoclassical growth model 
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conclusion contrasts sharply with recent history that is replete with examples of countries 
that have been successful in maintaining strong per-capita growth rates over long periods 
of time. More importantly, growth experience, in the fastest growing economies, has 
proved to be systematically associated with some of the aspects of production function 
and economic policies. Robust growth rates have been very often associated with high 
capital accumulation and sound economic policies.  
The second strand of criticisms has to do with the issue of convergence. The neo-
classical model, which predicts higher growths in poor countries than in rich countries, 
turns out to be, in some instances, inadequate in explaining the magnitude and persistence 
of income gap between low-income countries and high-income countries. The issue of 
growth divergence among countries is well illustrated by the findings of Bourguignon 
and Morrisson (2002) and Milanovic (2005) that suggest that 70 percent of income 
inequality among world citizens is originated from differences in incomes among 
countries while only 30 percent is explained by income disparities within countries.  
Endogenous models have emerged especially as viable alternatives to explain 
steady-state growth. Romer, Lucas, Robelo, for instance, built models in which long term 
growth can be sustained endogenously at rates that may be tributary to policy choices, 
preferences, and technologies. Endogenous growth models are very often classified into 
two major groups: AK models and R&D models (Jones, 1995). AK growth models such 
as those of Romer (1986, 1987), Lucas (1988) and Robelo (1991) posit that physical and 
human capital accumulation can generate sustained economic growth, even in the 
absence of exogenous technological progress and population growth. The R&D-style 
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growth models of Romer (1990) and Aghion and Howitt (1992) highlight technological 
progress as the means to perpetuate growth at the steady-state. In these models, 
technological change is driven by the activities of economic agents in perpetual quest of 
innovation. 
In some of the AK-styled growth models, especially those involving positive 
externalities, private returns to investment differ from social returns to investment. This 
implies that an entirely market-based solution leads to sub-optimal solutions both in 
terms of growth and capital accumulation.  These models therefore implicitly recognised 
the role of government intervention in eliminating distortions and ensuring ongoing per-
capita growth. The beneficial impact of government intervention is also acknowledged 
when public services are considered as an input to private production16 (Aschauer, 1988: 
Barro, 1990). Public spending, therefore, matters for growth. 
3.3 The role of economic policies:  importance of stability 
 
A close look at the patterns of government expenditures in most African countries 
suggests a procyclical nature. Commodity price booms and/or large capital inflows 
encourage many countries to initiate large expenditure programs. These programs are cut 
back in periods of lower prices and more often in times when external capital flows dry 
up17. Public spending, therefore, tends to be very volatile. Similarly, real exchange rate 
tends to follow the same patterns as public spending. Substantial inflows of export 
                                                 
16
 Evidence from some developed countries rejects this view. Cadot et al. (2002) find a little economic 
return of infrastructure spending, once they account for pork barrel.   
17
 Some categories of public programs, say public consumption, initiated during boom times tend to be 
sustained even when bust times follow.  
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earnings generated by rising commodity prices or/and large foreign capital inflows result 
in the appreciation of the real exchange rate18. This is followed by serious internal and 
external imbalances, which are addressed by depreciating the real exchange rate. This 
clearly suggests some swings in the real exchange rate as well. Public spending and real 
exchange rate instabilities have the potential to hamper economic growth. In fact, they 
have a detrimental impact on capital (human and physical) accumulation while at the 
same time undermining the total factor productivity: the efficiency with which capital and 
labour are combined.  
 
3.3.1 Public spending instability and growth 
 
Public spending instability might incur both direct and indirect costs for economic 
growth. Public spending instability may influence economic growth “directly” through 
the efficiency channel or/and “indirectly” through its effect on the accumulation of 
factors of production, namely capital.  
 
3.3.1.1. The productivity channel 
 
Two lines of arguments are typically put forth to justify a potential negative 
impact of public spending instability on productivity.  On the one hand, intense 
fluctuations in government spending give rise to erratic provision of public services, such 
                                                 
18
 If the appreciation of the real exchange rate endures for some time, it leads to a Dutch disease 
phenomenon: a contraction of the non-commodity economy. 
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as infrastructure facilities, which leads to weak productivity (Calderòn and Servén, 2003). 
On the other hand, public spending instability, which is very often associated with boom-
bust cycles, produces ratchet effects on public spending, notably on public consumption 
(Guillaumont, 2006)19. Ratchet effects eventually result in an upward trend in public 
spending in the long run. If one assumes a heavy fiscal reliance on monetary financing, 
higher government spending leads to high and volatile inflation, the blurring of market 
signals, and ultimately a misallocation of resources and weak productivity. 
 
3.3.1.2 The factor accumulation channel 
 
As mentioned earlier, public sector expands very often in boom periods. The 
expansion turns out not be to be sustainable, especially in bad times or/and when external 
financing dries up.  Public spending is then cut in bust periods. This fiscal adjustment is 
achieved mainly through the reduction of some categories of public investment, such as 
investment in infrastructural facilities, or some specific current expenditures, including 
maintenance expenditures, which are complementary to private investment. Such policies 
affect private investment and constraint economic growth as earlier suggested in the 
endogenous growth model. Moreover, cuts in public spending often lead to protracted 
recession, which can have long-lasting effects. For instance Ocampo (2002) indicates that 
firms, in situation of prolonged recession, may experience irreversible losses of material 
and immaterial assets, which include, among others, the social capital built as well as the 
                                                 
19
 Public wages and other current expenditures increase significantly in good times and do not adjust or 
partially adjust in bad times. 
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institutional and technological settings built within the firms. He also alludes to the 
irreparable damages caused by recessions to human capital: “the human capital of the 
unemployed or the underemployed may be permanently lost; and the children may leave 
school and never return”. 
 Finally, public spending instability may represent an important source of real 
exchange instability, which in turn could constraint growth through direct and indirect 
channels (Ghura and Greenes, 1993: Soderling, 2002).  
3.3.2 Real exchange rate instability and growth 
 
 
Again, we identify two sorts of mediating channels from real exchange rate 
instability to disappointing economic growth: the “direct” or total productivity channel 
and the “indirect” channels through the impact on factor accumulation. 
 
3.3.2.1 The productivity channel 
 
The alternation of real exchange appreciations and depreciations can modify the 
structure of the economy and generate enduring effects on productivity and economic 
growth.  The “Dutch Disease” analysis captures very well these dynamics (Corden, 1982: 
Corden and Neary, 1984 : Gylafason et al., 1999). The analysis considers three sectors, 
namely a booming export sector, a lagging export sector (or traditional export sector),  
and a nontradable sector. A natural resource boom results in the increase of export 
earnings and higher domestic spending. If some of the  windfalls are spent on nontradable 
goods, which is very often the case, higher domestic demand drives up the relative price 
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of nontradables and leads to real exchange rate appreciation20.  The appreciation of the 
real exchange rate undermines the competitiveness of the country’s exports and causes 
the contraction of the traditional export sector. This effect is termed “the spending 
effect”. In addition to this effect, a resource movement effect also takes place, with 
labour and capital moving from the traditional export sector to the nontradable sector, to 
meet the rise in domestic demand, and to the booming export sector. In sum, booms21 can 
potentially bring about important changes in the structure of economies where they occur. 
Some sectors, such as the manufacturing sector, with significant productivity spillovers to 
the rest of the economy, might face severe contractions, which could eventually lead to 
their disappearance. Real exchange rate appreciation might generate “inertia effects” in 
the sense that the end of booms and subsequent deprecations in real exchange rate may 
turn not to be sufficient for the recovery of the manufactory sector. Given potential 
positive externalities of the manufacturing sector, a persistent decline of this sector 
lowers productivity and long term growth.  
Apart from its sector-specific effects on growth, real exchange rate instability can 
be detrimental to productivity in the economy in general. Real exchange rate fluctuations 
distort market signals and lead to an ineffective and inefficient allocation of investment. 
This argument has been largely supported in the literature (Aizenmann and Marion, 1999: 
Ghura and Greennes, 1993: Guillaumont, 1999: Serven, 1997). 
 
                                                 
20
 This basically reflects instances where exchange rate is fixed. If exchange rate is flexible, nominal 
appreciation could be the main cause of real exchange rate appreciation.  
21
 The analysis was initially formulated in the context of natural resource boom but could also well describe 
situations of impressive aid flows (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). 
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3.3.2.2 The factor accumulation channel 
 
The instability of real exchange rate can also impact negatively the level of 
investment because of the uncertainty it creates (Guillaumont et al., 1999). Uncertainty 
may well be perceived by economic agents as a loss of credibility in government policies, 
which can ultimately diminish the expected return on private investment and therefore 
depress growth. Additionally, it is generally argued that under conditions of uncertainty, 
risk-adverse economic agents predict greater instability in expected returns, and may cut 
back in their investments, while risk-neutral agents may adopt a “wait and see” attitude in 
terms of investment strategy (Azam et al., 2002). In any case, the outcome of greater 
uncertainty is a fall in investment rates and lower growth.  
 
IV-ECONOMETRIC METHODOLOGY 
 
The empirical growth literature has until recently relied, to a large degree, on 
Ordinary Least Squares, henceforth OLS, to investigate the determinants of economic 
expansion. This technique has been severely criticised on the ground that it does not 
properly address the problems of measurement error, omitted variables, and endogeneity, 
which are common to growth regressions.  
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4.1 Ineffective OLS 
 
To make easy the discussion on how ineffective is OLS in the presence of those 
problems, we rewrite equation (4) and (4’) as  tiitititi uZyy ,,1,0, lnln εξφ +++= −     (5) 
where Zi,t  represents the vector of all the explanatory variables of economic growth, 
except the natural logarithm of initial per capita income, and ξ  the associated vector of 
coefficients. The issue of measurement error can be illustrated by the following: assume 
that *
,tiy and 
*
,tiZ capture yi,t  and Zi,t, with tiw , and tin , their respective measurement errors: 
tititi nyy ,,
*
,
lnln +=     (6) 
tititi wZZ ,,
*
,
+=            (7) 
 
Combining (5) (6) and (7) yields  
 tiitititi uZyy ,
*
,
*
1,0
*
,
lnln ψξφ +++=
−
 with  tititititi wnn ,1,0,,, ξφεψ −−+= −   (8) 
One of the key assumptions underlying the use of OLS technique is the absence of 
correlation between the regressors, *
,tiZ and 
*
1, −tiy  , and the disturbance tiiu ,ψ+ . That 
hypothesis does not hold as:  
[ ] 0))((
,1,0,,,, ≠−−+++ − titititiititi wnnuwZE ξφε  more specifically because 0)( 2, ≠tiwE    (9) 
[ ] 0))((ln
,1,0,,,, ≠−−+++ − titititiititi wnnunyE ξφε  because 0)( 2, ≠tinE          (10) 
Further, the omission of some pertinent explanatory variables can also make OLS 
estimates biased and inconsistent. In fact, omitted variable, for instance time-invariant 
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country-specific characteristics such as the initial level of technology, will be absorbed 
by the disturbance tiiu ,ψ+  in equation (5), making therefore [ ] 0)(( ,, ≠+ tiiti wuZE .  
 Finally, the endogeneity of some of the regressors leads to results that are very 
similar to those reported in the case of omitted variable. For instance, 1, −tiy  is 
mechanically correlated with isε  in (5) for ts < , [ ] 0))(( 1, ≠− istiyE ε , violating therefore 
the assumption that all the explanatory variables are exogenous.  
 
4.2 Instrumental Variable Estimator of Anderson and Hsiao (1982) 
 
 One way of addressing both the endogeneity and omitted variable is to use the 
methodology suggested by Anderson and Hsiao (1982). This consists in eliminating 
country-specific effects, iu , by time differencing equation (5):   
)()()(ln)(ln
,,1,0, titititi Zyy εξφ ∆+∆+∆=∆ −     (11) 
By construction, )(ln 1, −∆ tiy becomes correlated with )( ,tiε∆ , thus indicating the need to 
instrument suspected endogenous variables. Assuming no serial correlation in ti ,ε , 
2,ln −tiy is not correlated with )( ,tiε∆ and can serve as instrument for 1,(ln −∆ tiy ). The 
Anderson and Hsiao’s instrumental methodology guarantees therefore consistent 
estimates.  
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4.3 First-Differenced Generalised Method-of-Moments Estimator (GMM) and System 
Generalised Method-of-Moments Estimator (SYS-GMM) 
 
 Even though Anderson Hsiao’s instrumental variable estimator provides 
consistent estimates, it is not efficient because additional lagged values of the dependent 
variable, lnyi,t-3 , lnyi,t-4 , lnyi,t-4…lnyi,t-k and Zi,t-1, Zi,t-2…Zi,t-k 22are also good instruments 
under the assumption of no further serial correlation in ti ,ε .  
0)(ln
,,
=∆
− tiptiyE ε  for p=2, 3,..., (T-1)             (12) 
0)(
,,
=∆
− tirtiZE ε    for r=1, 2, 3,…, (T-1)           (13) 
On that basis, Arrelano and Bond (1991) suggest a Generalised Method of 
Moments Estimator (GMM), well-known by “first-differenced GMM estimator” that 
combines the suggested instruments efficiently. However, Blundell and Bond (1998) 
demonstrate that first-differenced GMM have poor finite sample properties, especially 
when lagged levels of the variables are not strongly correlated with subsequent first-
differences. Bond et al. (2001) indicate that this is likely to be the case when the series 
are close to a random walk or when variance of the country-specific effects, ni , rises 
relative to the variance of error term isε .  
In order to address the problem associated with persistent panel data, Blundell and 
Bond (1998) develop a system GMM estimator that is based on a simultaneous system of 
two equations, which are equations (5) and (11). Lagged levels of lnyi,t and Zi,t serve as 
instruments for the differenced equation (11) while their lagged first-differences are the 
instruments for the equation in level (5): 
                                                 
22
 Assuming that some of regressors in Zi,t are endogenous. 
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0)ln(
,,
=∆
− tiptiyE ε  and 0)( ,, =∆ − tirtiZE ε   for p and r=2,…, (T-1)          (14) 
0)(ln
,,
=∆
− tiptiyE ε  and 0)(ln ,, =∆− tirtiZE ε  for p and r=2,…, (T-1)       (15) 
The validity of the system GMM as a consistent estimator can be ascertained by 
showing that the error term is not serially correlated, and the instruments used are the 
adequate ones. The first condition is gauged by Arrelano and Bond (1991) test for 
autocorrelation, which determines whether the first-differenced error term has second-
order. The second condition is verified by a test of over-identifying restrictions, which 
could be either the Sargan (1958) test or Hansen (1982) test.  
 
V-EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The sample used in the empirical analysis includes 45 African countries but the 
sample size in each regression varies and is determined solely by data availability. The 
period covered is from 1966 to 1997. This data set is structured as a panel with 
observations for each country consisting of four-year averages, standard deviations or 
data in levels provided quadrennially.  Real exchange rate and public spending 
instabilities are captured by standard deviations estimated on a four year period. The 
investment to GDP ratio is built by taking four-year non-overlapping averages. Real per 
capita GDP is obtained quadrennially, starting from 1966 and ending in 1997. Each 
country has eight observations: 1966-1969, 1970-1973, 1974-1977, 1978-1981, 1982-
1985, 1986-1989, 1990-1993 and 1994-1997. The panel is, however, not balanced 
because some observations are missing for a number of countries.  
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5.1 Validity of the Solow Model and its augmented version 
 
Regressions (2) and (3) report the results of the estimation of the Solow Model 
and its augmented version.  Just as primary education enrolment rate captures human 
capital accumulation in regression (2), so does secondary school enrolment rate in 
regression23 (3).  
                                                 
23
 We couldn’t use Barro and Lee (2000)’s average years of schooling because these data are provided 
quinquennially, starting in 1960,…and ending in 1990. We would have ended up with a very small sample. 
More importantly, the formulation that is adopted in this chapter uses the rate of accumulation rather the 
level of human of capital. See Mankiw et al. (1992) pp. 417-418. Furthermore, Pritchett (1996) argues that 
school enrolments reflect human capital stock only if constant over time. 
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Table 6: SYS-GMM Estimates of the Solow Model 
 
 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of per capita GDP 
Variables “Basic 
Model” 
Augmented with Human Capital 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Ln(GDPit-1) -0.0947*** 
(0.0250) 
-0.0702* 
(0.0410) 
-0.0619* 
(0.0355) 
Ln(Investment Rate) 0.0840*** 
(0.0227) 
0.1397*** 
(0.0403) 
0.1182** 
(0.0459) 
Ln(ni,t+g+d) -0.2115*** 
(0.0474) 
-0.1965*** 
(0.0601) 
-0.1528* 
(0.0777) 
Ln(Primary)  -0.0599 
(0.0648) 
 
Ln(Secondary)   -0.0443 
(0.0322) 
    
Number of Observations 282 173 166 
Number of Countries 41 41 41 
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id 
test) 
1.00 1.00 1.00 
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation)  
0.296 0.489 0.376 
 P(H0 : Φ1+Φ2=0) 0.0021   
 P(H0 : Φ1+Φ2+Φ3 =0)  0.1195 0.3080 
Implied α 0.6908*** 
(0.0189) 
0.6052*** 
(0.1841) 
0.6214*** 
(0.2152) 
    
Variables that are 
instrumented  
All the 
explanatory 
variables  
All the 
explanatory 
variables  
All the 
explanatory 
variables 
    
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
** denotes significance of the estimates at 5 percent critical level  
* denotes significance of the estimates at 10 percent critical level 
The physical capital share α is estimated using the Delta Method. Time dummies are included and they turn not to be 
significant.  
 
The inclusion of a human capital measure leads to three main results. First, the 
coefficient on investment rate is, in absolute terms, significantly higher in regressions (2) 
and (3) than in regression (1). In other words, the inclusion of human capital helps 
increase the predictive content of physical capital accumulation. In contrast, some 
variables, such as lagged GDP, population growth rate, see their coefficients decline. 
Second, human capital accumulation, captured by primary and secondary enrolments, is 
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negatively associated with per capita growth, albeit not significantly. This finding does 
not mean that human capital accumulation is irrelevant for economic growth. Numerous 
studies found similar result. Pritchett (1996) suggests three explanations. First, the initial 
human capital might have initially been so poor that any improvement in subsequent 
periods resulted in a scant improvement in skills and productivity. Second, marginal 
returns to education might have dropped as a result of the combination of increased 
supply of educated labour and a virtually unchanged demand for educated labour. Finally, 
the institutional setup might have been so deleterious that human capital accumulation 
did not lead to per-capita growth. In addition to these explanations, the lack of 
significance could also be qualified by measurement problems. Arcand and d’Hombres 
(2005) challenge the use of school enrolment indicators as the rate of human capital 
accumulation, arguing that school enrolments in period t do not capture the flux of 
investment in human capital for the same period.  
We test the validity of the Solow Model and its augmented version24 by checking 
if the sum of the coefficients on investment, population growth rate and on human capital 
(if necessary) is equal to 0. In addition, we estimate the magnitude of the share of 
physical capital in total output and compare it to the widely accepted values25. The results 
are reported in the bottom of Table 6. They generally reject both the Solow Model and its 
augmented version. The Solow Model is rejected on two accounts. First, the sum of the 
coefficients on investment and population growth rate turns to be significantly different 
from 0 at the 5 percent level in the regression. Second, the implied share of physical 
                                                 
24
 It is a test on the existence of constant returns of scale in a Cobb-Douglas function. 
25
 The number that comes up in the literature is 1/3 (Mankiw et al., 1992 ). 
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capital is equal to 0.6908, which is well above the usual one-third found in the literature. 
On the other hand, the validity of the Solow Model augmented with human capital can be 
challenged because the estimated share of physical capital in total output varies from 
0.6052 to 0.6214, which again is relatively higher than the norms.  
5.2 Core Model  
 
We turn to the issue of interest of this chapter by investigating the potential 
impact of policy- related instabilities on economic growth. Public spending and real 
exchange rate instabilities are therefore added to the Augmented Solow construct26. To 
ensure that the analysis is robust, we use two measures of public spending, especially 
government consumption and total government expenditure27.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
27
 We try to go further in the breakdown in an attempt to identify current and capital expenditures but could 
not get enough observations to be used in the empirical investigation.  
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Table 7: SYS-GMM Estimates of the Model of Growth and Instabilities of Real Exchange Rate 
and Public Spending 
 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of per capita GDP 
Variables (4) (5) 
   
Ln(GDPit-1) -0.0570* 
(0.0324) 
-0.1112*** 
(0.0333) 
Ln(Investment Rate) 0.1671*** 
(0.0268) 
0.1933*** 
(0.0333) 
Ln(ni,t+g+d) -0.0915 
(0.0833) 
-0.2206** 
(0.1039) 
Ln(Primary) -00161 
(0.0301) 
-0.0050 
(0.0335) 
Ln(Instability of REER) -0.0301*** 
(0.0075) 
-0.0405*** 
(0.0129) 
Ln(Instability of GOVEXP Ratio) -0.0226 
(0.0229) 
 
Ln(Instability of GC Ratio)  0.0025 
(0.0226) 
   
   
Number of Observations 74 105 
Number of Countries 27 30 
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 1.00 1.00 
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation)  
0.267 0.211 
   
Variables that are instrumented All the explanatory 
variables 
All the explanatory 
variables 
   
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
** denotes significance of the estimates at 5 percent critical level 
* denotes significance of the estimates at 10 percent critical level 
REER stands for real exchange rate while GOVEXP and GC stand for total government expenditure and government 
consumption, respectively. 
Nakamura-Nakamura test indicates that both real exchange rate and public spending volatilities are endogenous 
Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant.  
 
 
This exercise is summarised in regressions (4) and (5). Except for population 
growth rate, the other significant explanatory variables used in the Solow construct 
remain significant and appear with the expected signs28. There is a significantly negative 
                                                 
28
 A constant was added in all the regressions presented in the chapter but the main results remain roughly 
unchanged. 
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coefficient on initial GDP and a robust positive coefficient on investment. Population 
growth rate displays a negative coefficient, which turns to be statistically robust in 
regression (5) and not in regression (4). Human capital, captured by primary education, 
remains statistically insignificant. In addition to be broadly consistent with previous 
findings, the results support the prediction that real exchange rate instability exerts a 
direct negative impact on growth while at the same time indicating a lack of a direct 
statistically strong effect of public spending instability on economic growth.  
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Table 8: SYS-GMM Estimates of the Model of Growth and Instabilities of Real Exchange Rate 
and Public Spending based on 8-year sub periods 
 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of per capita GDP 
Variables (6) (7) 
   
Ln(GDPit-1) -0.0653 
(0.0594) 
-0.0638 
(0.0453) 
Ln(Investment Rate) 0.2866*** 
(0.0687) 
0.1978** 
(0.0953) 
Ln(ni,t+g+d) -0.0963 
(0.2061) 
0.2384 
(0.1635) 
Ln(Primary) -0.0469 
(0.1939) 
0.1822 
(0.1154) 
Ln(Instability of REER) -0.0329** 
(0.0156) 
-0.0278** 
(0.0140) 
Ln(Instability of GOVEXP Ratio) -0.0595 
(0.0549) 
 
Ln(Instability of GC Ratio)  -0.0758 
(0.0704) 
   
   
   
Number of Observations 55 69 
Number of Countries 26 30 
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 0.722 0.334 
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation)  
.. .. 
   
Variables that are instrumented All the explanatory 
variables 
All the explanatory 
variables 
   
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
** denotes significance of the estimates at 5 percent critical level 
REER stands for real exchange rate while GOVEXP and GC stand for total government expenditure and government 
consumption, respectively. 
Nakamura-Nakamura test indicates that both real exchange rate and public spending volatilities are endogenous 
Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant.  
 
 
It is worth recalling that the instability measure is calculated on a four-year 
period, which might seem too short to gauge instability. To address this legitimate 
concern, we repeat the same exercise but using an eight-year sub-period instead29. Results 
are reported in table 8 and consistently confirm the previous main finding notably that 
                                                 
29
 Our dataset covers the period 1966-1997. This means that attempt to use 16 year sub-period will lead to 
only two observations per country and therefore could not use the system GMM.  
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among the two instabilities previously identified only real exchange rate instability seems 
to influence directly growth. The magnitude of the coefficients associated with real 
exchange rate instability turns, however, to be more modest, ranging from -0.0278 to -
0.0329, compared from -0.0301 to -0.0405 previously found.   
These results warrant two comments. On the one hand, the direct negative impact 
of real exchange rate instability on growth implies that real exchange rate instability 
influences negatively total factor productivity or suggests that the productivity channel is 
at work30. On the other hand, insignificant coefficient on public spending instability 
means that either such variation does not operate through the total factor productivity 
channel or it unfolds through other factors that have not been accounted for in the 
regressions. This leads us to investigate the mediating channels though which 
government spending instability potentially hampers economic growth. 
 
5.2.1 The potential channels from public spending instability to poor 
economic growth 
 
 
5.2.1.1  The productivity channel 
 
In line with the ratchet effect argument developed in the theoretical construct, we 
introduce the level of public spending in the core regression. The purpose of such an 
exercise is to see if public spending instability leads to higher public spending, which in 
                                                 
30In a growth regression, the significance of additional variable, to the traditional important control 
variables such as investment rate, lagged per capita GDP and human capital, can be interpreted as some 
influence of total factor productivity.  
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turn might lower economic growth through the productivity channel. The results are 
reported in table 9.  
 
Table 9:  SYS-GMM Estimates of the Model of Growth, with a focus on potential ratchet effects  
 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of per capita GDP 
Variables (8) (9) 
   
Ln(GDPit-1) -0.0343 
(0.0487) 
-0.1084*** 
(0.0301) 
Ln(Investment Rate) 0.1361*** 
(0.0285) 
0.1877*** 
(0.0379) 
Ln(ni,t+g+d) -0.0958 
(0.0999) 
-0.2014** 
(0.0841) 
Ln(Primary) -0.0150 
(0.0359) 
-0.0108 
(0.0336) 
Ln(Instability of REER) -0.0262*** 
(0.0065) 
-0.0348** 
(0.0150) 
Ln(GOVEXP Ratio) -0.0395 
(0.0627) 
 
Ln(Instability of GOVEXP Ratio) -0.0173 
(0.0213) 
 
Ln(GC Ratio)  0.0193 
(0.0448) 
Ln(Instability of GC Ratio)  -0.0029 
(0.0185) 
   
   
Number of Observations 74 105 
Number of Countries 27 30 
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 1.00 1.00 
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation)  
0.266 0.2222 
   
Variables that are instrumented  All the explanatory 
variables 
All the explanatory 
variables 
   
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
** denotes significance of the estimates at 5 percent critical level 
REER stands for real exchange rate while GOVEXP and GC stand for total government expenditure and government 
consumption, respectively. 
Nakamura-Nakamura test indicates that both real exchange rate and public spending volatilities are endogenous 
Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant.  
 
Most of the previous significant controls continue to have a predictive content 
over per capita GDP growth while both levels and instabilities of government total 
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expenditure and consumption turn not to have an explanatory power. The lack of 
statistical significance of public spending instability and non-significance of its level 
when included in the same regression do not support a ratchet effect argument31.  
 
Table 10: SYS-GMM Estimates of the Model of Growth and Instabilities of Real Exchange Rate 
and Public Spending 
 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of per capita GDP 
Variables (10) (11) (12) (13) 
     
Ln(GDPit-1) -0.0570* 
(0.0324) 
-0.0683** 
(0.0304) 
-0.1112*** 
(0.0333) 
-0.0871** 
(0.0399) 
Ln(Investment Rate) 0.1671*** 
(0.0268) 
0.2097*** 
(0.0345) 
0.1933*** 
(0.0333) 
0.1873*** 
(0.0399) 
Ln(ni,t+g+d) -0.0915 
(0.0833) 
-0.0503 
(0.0851) 
-0.2206** 
(0.1039) 
-0.1764** 
(0.0822) 
Ln(Primary) -00161 
(0.0301) 
-0.0096 
(0.0312) 
-0.0050 
(0.0335) 
-0.0399 
(0.0326) 
Ln(Instability of REER) -0.0301*** 
(0.0075) 
 -0.0405*** 
(0.0129) 
 
Ln(Instability of GOVEXP Ratio) -0.0226 
(0.0229) 
-0.0387* 
(0.0209) 
  
Ln(Instability of GC Ratio)   0.0025 
(0.0226) 
-0.0402** 
(0.0194) 
     
     
     
Number of Observations 74 93 105 145 
Number of Countries 27 33 30 40 
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation)  
0.267 0.283 0.211 0.521 
     
Variables that are instrumented All the explanatory 
variables 
All the explanatory 
variables 
All the explanatory 
variables 
All the explanatory 
variables 
     
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
** denotes significance of the estimates at 5 percent critical level 
* denotes significance of the estimates at 10 percent critical level 
REER stands for real exchange rate while GOVEXP and GC stand for government total expenditure and government 
consumption, respectively. 
Nakamura-Nakamura test indicates that both real exchange rate and public spending volatilities are endogenous 
Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant.  
                                                 
31
 This result is not surprising insofar as we previously found both government total expenditure and 
government consumption ratios to be stationary around a drift. In other words, public spending to GDP 
ratios are not following an upward trend.  
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We explore another potential productivity channel, that is, the channel via real 
exchange rate instability. Strong evidence from the literature supports the view that 
fluctuations in public spending explain real exchange rate instability and real exchange 
rate appreciation (Ghura and Greenes, 1993: Soderling, 2002). The most straightforward 
approach to uncover this channel is to compare two set of regressions: one that includes 
both public spending and real exchange rate instabilities and the other that accounts for 
public spending only. Results are presented in Table 10. Public spending, either captured 
by government total expenditure or government consumption, turns negative and 
significant when real exchange rate fluctuations are not factored in (regressions 11 and 
13). However, the same variables appear statistically insignificant once real exchange 
rate instability is included in regressions 10 and 12. These results lend a strong support to 
the contention that government spending fluctuations amplify real exchange rate 
instability, which in turn depresses total factor productivity and ultimately economic 
expansion.  
 
5.2.1.2 The factor accumulation channel 
 
A more systematic way to explore a potential investment channel is to look at the 
determinants of investment. We therefore regress real investment rate on all the 
explanatory variables of the core growth regression and a new control, namely, the 
lagged investment rate. Table 11 presents results that do not support any evidence of an 
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investment channel32. Public spending instability seems not to influence directly the level 
of investment33.  
 
Table 11: SYS-GMM Estimates of the Determinants of Real Investment 
 
Dependent variable is real investment rate 
Variables (14) (15) 
   
Ln(Investment Rateit-1) 0.6664*** 
(0.0448) 
0.6719** 
(0.0739) 
Ln(GDPit-1) 0.1240 
(0.0844) 
0.1384* 
(0.0752) 
Ln(ni,t+g+d) -0.0069 
(0.2541) 
0.0262 
(0.2141) 
Ln(Primary) 0.00326 
(0.0652) 
-0.0155 
(0.0571) 
Ln(Instability of REER) -0.044* 
(0.0262) 
-0.0615* 
(0.0350) 
Ln(Instability of GOVEXP Ratio) 0.0280 
(0.0220) 
 
Ln(Instability of GC Ratio)  0.0286 
(0.0381) 
   
   
Number of Observations 74 105 
Number of Countries 27 30 
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 1.00 1.00 
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation) 
0.433 0.279 
   
Variables that are instrumented All the explanatory 
variables 
All the explanatory 
variables 
   
   
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
** denotes significance of the estimates at 5 percent critical level 
* denotes significance of the estimates at 10 percent critical level 
REER stands for real exchange rate while GOVEXP and GC stand for government total expenditure and government 
consumption, respectively. 
Nakamura-Nakamura test indicates that both real exchange rate and public spending volatilities are endogenous 
Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant.  
                                                 
32
 We also got the evidence of the absence of an investment channel by comparing a growth regression that 
includes investment to a regression that does not. In both regressions, public spending instability turns not 
to be statistically significant.  
33
 Evidence of an indirect channel through real exchange rate instability is also found by putting side by 
side an investment rate regression that contains both real exchange rate and public spending instabilities 
and an investment regression that contains public spending instability only. Public spending appears 
significant only in the second regression.  
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5.2.2 The potential channels from real exchange rate instability to poor 
economic growth 
 
 5.2.2.1 The productivity channel 
 
 Results from Table 7 clearly indicate a direct negative impact of real exchange 
rate fluctuations on growth. As mentioned before, this “direct effect” indicates that real 
exchange instability has a negative impact on growth and that impact is felt through 
meagre total productivity factor growth. The finding is quite close and broadly consistent 
with what was uncovered by Aizenman and Marion (1999), Ghura and Greenes (1993), 
Guillaumont et al. (1999) and Serven (1997).  
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Table 12: SYS-GMM Estimates of the Model of Growth, with a focus on potential asymmetric 
effects 
 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of per capita GDP 
Variables (16) (17) 
   
Ln(GDPit-1) -0.0663** 
(0.0304) 
-0.1170*** 
(0.0296) 
Ln(Investment Rate) 0.1755*** 
(0.0306) 
0.1985*** 
(0.0297) 
Ln(ni,t+g+d) -0.1006 
(0.0819) 
-0.2188** 
(0.0973) 
Ln(Primary) -0.0128 
(0.0263) 
0.0026 
(0.0296) 
APPREER -0.0309*** 
(0.0059) 
-0.0375*** 
(0.0126) 
DEPRREER -0.0133 
(0.0118) 
-0.0363 
(0.0223) 
Ln(Instability of GOVEXP Ratio) -0.0172 
(0.0193) 
 
Ln(Instability of GC Ratio)  0.0047 
(0.0208) 
   
   
   
   
Number of Observations 74 105 
Number of Countries 27 30 
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 1.00 1.00 
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation)  
0.279 0.211 
   
Variables that are instrumented  All the explanatory 
variables 
All the explanatory 
variables 
   
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
** denotes significance of the estimates at 5 percent critical level 
REER stands for real exchange rate while GOVEXP and GC stand for government total expenditure and government 
consumption, respectively. 
APPREER is equal to 1 times Ln(Instability of REER) if there is an appreciation in real exchange rate and 0 otherwise. 
Similarly, DEPREER is equal to 1 times Ln(Instability of REER) if there is a depreciation in real exchange rate and 0 
otherwise.  
Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant.  
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Table 13: SYS-GMM Estimates of the Model of Growth, with a focus on potential inertia effects 
 
Dependent variable is growth rate of log of per capita GDP 
Variables (18) (19) 
   
Ln(GDPit-1) -0.0570* 
(0.0353) 
-0.0811** 
 
Ln(Investment Rate) 0.1545*** 
(0.0323) 
0.1473*** 
(0.0431) 
Ln(ni,t+g+d) -0.0996 
(0.1035) 
-0.1772* 
(0.0943) 
Ln(Primary) -0.0138 
(0.0299) 
-0.0049 
(0.0286) 
Ln(Instability of REER) -0.0297*** 
(0.0078) 
-0.0456** 
(0.0189) 
APPRt-1* DEPRt -0.0145 
(0.0310) 
-0.0991* 
(0.0514) 
Ln(Instability of GOVEXP Ratio) -0.0253 
(0.0164) 
 
Ln(Instability of GC Ratio)  -0.0027 
(0.0222) 
   
   
   
   
Number of Observations 69 98 
Number of Countries 27 30 
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 1.00 1.00 
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation)  
0.264 0.181 
   
Variables that are instrumented  All the explanatory 
variables 
All the explanatory 
variables 
   
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
** denotes significance of the estimates at 5 percent critical level 
* denotes significance of the estimates at 10 percent critical level 
REER stands for real exchange rate while GOVEXP and GC stand for government total expenditure and 
government consumption, respectively. 
APPR and DEPR are dummy variables that capture real exchange rate appreciation and real exchange 
depreciation, respectively.  
Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant.  
 
 
Having found that real exchange rate instability depresses total factor productivity 
and therefore economic growth, we then investigate potential asymmetric effects of real 
exchange rate instability and inertia effects of real exchange appreciation.  
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a. Asymmetric effects of real exchange instability 
 
Referring to real exchange instability implies accounting for both real exchange 
rate appreciation and real exchange rate depreciation. Therefore, it will be interesting to 
find out which of these two components of real exchange instability drives the result. 
This exercise amounts to exploring potential asymmetric effects. We introduce a 
multiplicative variable APPREER and DEPREER in the core regressions to account for 
these effects. APPREER is a multiplicative variable equal to 1 times real exchange rate 
instability if there is an appreciation in real exchange rate and 0 otherwise. Similarly, 
DEPREER is equal to 1 times real exchange rate instability if there is depreciation in real 
exchange rate and 0 otherwise. Table 12 summarises the results. These results indicate 
that among the newly included variables only APPREER turns to have a significant 
predictive content over per-capita growth, which suggest that the detrimental effect of 
real exchange rate instability on growth is mostly driven by real exchange rate 
appreciation.  
 
b. Inertia effects of real exchange rate appreciation  
 
In line with the theoretical argument developed in section 3.3, we explore further 
potential inertia effects of real exchange rate appreciation on total productivity factor and 
growth. We introduce a multiplicative variable APPRt-1*DEPRt  in the core regressions. 
That variable is a combination of the lagged of a dummy variable APPR, which captures 
real exchange rate appreciation, and a dummy variable DEPR, which stands for real 
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exchange depreciation. The idea being captured here is that initial real exchange rate 
appreciation has an enduring impact in subsequent period even if that subsequent period 
is characterised by real exchange depreciation. Results are reported in table 13. The 
multiplicative variable APPRt-1*DEPRt turns with the expected sign both in regressions 
18 and 19. However, the coefficient on this multiplicative variable is statistically 
significant only in regression 19. These results tend to support partially the contention 
that real exchange rate appreciation exerts an enduring impact on per capita growth.  
 
5.2.2.2 The factor accumulation channel  
 
The regressions presented in table 11 show a significant negative relationship 
between real exchange rate instability and investment, suggesting real exchange rate 
instability also affects growth in a significant and negative way through the investment 
channel. This result is in line with what was found by Guillaumont et al. (1999).  
To recap, instabilities of public spending and real exchange rate exert detrimental 
impact on growth through a variety of channels. On the one hand, the effects of real 
exchange rate instability work through both meagre total factor productivity and lower 
investment. One the other, government spending instability seems to have indirect effects 
only. It amplifies real exchange rate instability, which in turn depresses total productivity 
factor and investment.   
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VI- CONCLUSION 
 
Recent economic research on Africa has extensively explored possible reasons for 
the continent’s dismal growth performance.  This debate has been dominated by two lines 
of argument: those who attribute Africa’s poor performance to poor policies and those 
who explain it by structural and institutional impediments. That classification might be 
very simplistic because omitting the view that indicates that both factors are interrelated. 
While acknowledging the critical role played by institutional and structural factors in 
Africa’s poor performance, this chapter revisits the policy argument along the lines of the 
arguments developed by Guillaumont et al. (1999) and explores the role played by policy 
instabilities. However, the approach adopted in this chapter differs from earlier work in 
two perspectives. First, it relies entirely on the key variables underscored in the 
dependent economy model, namely the real exchange rate and the absorption. Second, 
the analysis is based on dynamic panel data instead of cross-country data. Using the 
system GMM, the most appropriate econometric technique for our model, we find only 
real exchange instability to have a direct significant effect on economic growth.  The 
combination of a statistical significance of real exchange instabilities and the non-
significance of public spending instability, when incorporated in the same regression, 
indicates that both are not two distinct factors regarding their impact on per capita 
growth. Public spending instability has a significant positive predictive content over real 
exchange rate instability, which in turn hampers growth both through investment and 
productivity channels. Also, real exchange rate instability has asymmetric effects on 
economic growth as the relationship between these two variables is driven by real 
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exchange rate appreciation. Finally, partial evidence supports the view that real exchange 
rate appreciation contributes to the decline of sectors with important positive 
externalities, thereby leading to persistent productivity losses and weak economic growth.  
Overall, we interpret the above findings as suggesting that the stability of public spending 
and real exchange rate are keys to Africa’s long-term economic growth.  
Having said that, the question arises as to how to achieve those objectives. 
Avoiding large swings in public spending requires having some control over government 
revenue sources, both internal and external. In many African countries, with a narrow 
production basis, domestic revenues are closely synchronized with developments in 
commodity markets.  The long-term solution for government revenue and expenditure 
instability is to broaden the revenue base through economic diversification. However, 
achieving a stability of government domestic revenues in the short-run may be facilitated 
by the adoption of the use of contingent financial instruments and some institutional 
arrangements, such as the establishment of a stabilisation fund. The use of contingent 
financial instruments, such as futures, swaps, and options, has the potential to transfer 
commodity price instability to international markets and guarantee more stable public 
revenue and expenditure. However, the use of such instruments critically depends on the 
existence of a sophisticated domestic financial sector, which does not exist in many 
African countries. Contrary to the contingent financial tools, stabilisation seems to be a 
feasible solution34. The stabilisation fund serves as a buffer mechanism whereby some 
part of windfall revenues are transferred from the budget to the stabilisation fund during 
                                                 
34
 Transparency and fiscal restraint are just as important in ensuring the well-functioning of a stabilisation 
fund. 
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times of increasing commodity prices and the other way round when prices are declining, 
ensuring therefore the stability of public spending. The other source of uncertainty for 
government revenue is the flows of resources coming from abroad and financing 
government deficit. Most African countries rely on aid flows in that respect, which means 
a more predictable aid, could also be beneficial. Having a more stable public spending 
could take care of an important source of real exchange rate instability. 
In a context of renewed interest on the nexus between poverty and economic 
policies, it might be interesting to use again the dependent economy framework to 
explore this issue. And, this will be the objective of Chapter II.  
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 APPENDIX I-1: VARIABLES AND SOURCES 
 
VARIABLES SOURCES 
  
Dependant 
  
    Ln(GDPit) 
 
Natural Logarithm of per capita GDP (1996 international prices) 
Source: Penn Word Table  Version 6.1  
Explanatory 
 
    Ln(GDPit-1) 
 
 
Lagged of Natural Logarithm of per capita GDP 
Source: Penn Word Table  Version 6.1 
 
    Ln(Investment Rate) 
 
 
Natural Logarithm of real investment as ratio to GDP (1996 international prices) 
Source: Penn Word Table  Version 6.1 
 
    Ln(ni,t+g+d) 
 
 
Natural Logarithm of population annual growth rate plus 0.05 
Source: World Development Indicators 2004 
 
    Ln(Primary) 
 
 
 
Natural Logarithm of primary enrolment ratio 
Source: World Development Indicators 2004 
 
 
    Ln(Secondary) 
 
 
 
Natural Logarithm of secondary enrolment ratio 
Source: World Development Indicators 2004 
 
 
    Ln(REER) 
 
 
 
 
Natural Logarithm of Real Effective Exchange Rate. The real effective exchange 
rate is the ratio of prices in the rest of the world adjusted for variations in nominal 
effective exchange rate to price in the country. The weighting scheme used in the 
calculation of prices in the rest of the world and nominal effective exchange rate is 
based on the shares of the country’s exports to the main five largest trade partners. 
An increase means a depreciation while a decrease means an appreciation. 
Source: Calculated based on data from International Financial Statistics (2004), 
World Development Indicators (2004) and COMTRADE (2004).  
 
    Ln(Instability of GC Ratio) 
 
 
 
Natural Logarithm of the instability of general government final consumption 
expenditure as ratio GDP 
Source: World Development Indicators 2004 
 
    Ln(Instabilityof GOVEXP Ratio) 
 
 
 
Natural Logarithm of the instability of government total expenditure as ratio to GDP 
Source: World Development Indicators 2004 
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APPENDIX I-2: SAMPLE 
 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Cote-d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, the 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.  
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APPENDIX I-3 STRUCTURAL, INSTITUTIONAL, AND POLICY FACTORS 
DETERMINING GROWTH 
 
Easterly and Levine (2002) provide a comprehensive and succinct account of the debate 
on policy versus structural and institutional determinants of economic growth. They highlight 
three main hypotheses, which are the geography/endowment, the institution, and the policy 
arguments.   
 
Geography/endowment 
 
The geography/endowment hypothesis asserts that environment exerts a significant 
influence on the quality and quantity of production factors such as labour and land and therefore 
contributes to determining the level of output and income. Environment also determines 
technological progress and impacts the pace of economic growth. In particular, locating in the 
tropics is seen as a handicap to higher labour productivity because of the proliferation of human 
infectious diseases in this environment (Bloom and Sachs, 1998). Other view holds that tropical 
climate dampens labour productivity as few fully involve in productive activities when hot and 
wet (Landes, 1998). Similarly, geographical location determines the quality of land. Bloom and 
Sachs (1998) and Sachs (2001) attribute the poorness of Africa’s soil to ecological factors 
inherent to the location in the tropics. Finally, environment could also drive technological 
development as well as efficiency. Diamond (1997) indicates that germs and crops influence the 
technical progress of societies in the long-term. He argues that people living in Europe developed 
some resistance to certain diseases they contracted from their farm animals. More importantly, 
the use of draft animals helps Eurasia to gain a technological lead over other continents, say 
Africa, where tsetse flies severely limit the expansion of cattle. Other particular geographical 
circumstances such as landlockness could constraint the accessibility of producers to large 
economic market, limit economies of scale gains, and therefore lead to meagre production 
efficiency (Sachs and Warner, 1998; 1997).  
 
Institutions 
 
The institution argument asserts that environment shapes institutions which, in turn, 
influence policies and therefore economic development path. Easterly and Levine (2002) identify 
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three aspects of environment, namely the location in the tropics, the proliferation of germs, and 
the type of crops grown, as some of the factors that determine the nature and the quality of 
institutions. The argument on “tropics” holds that countries that are located in the tropics are 
likely to develop poor institutions while those that are remote from the tropics tend to display 
relatively sound institutions (Hall and Jones, 1999). This argument is based on the assumption 
that Western Europeans have a historical lead over others in terms of good institutions. This 
implies that other regions where Western Europeans settle, meaning regions with similar climate, 
are likely to have relatively sound institutions.  
 European settlement and their historical advance in terms of the quality of institutions are 
also at the heart of the argument based on “germs”. Acemoglu et al. (2001) relate current 
institutions in developing countries to the past colonisation strategies of Europeans. They argue 
that Europeans were very much inclined to settle in countries where mortality among potential 
settlers is low. Europeans settlers develop institutions similar to those of their home country. 
These institutions largely promote property rights and establish checks and balances mechanisms, 
and Australia, New Zealand, Canada and the United States are some cases in point. In contrary 
when environment is hostile, with a proliferation of germs and high mortality, European did not 
settle in large numbers. They instead encouraged the emergence of “extractive institutions”, with 
little regard to property right protection and few institutional safeguards against government 
abuses.  Acemoglu et al. (2001) claimed that this description fits well the situation of African 
countries. Perhaps more important in their argument is the persistence of institutions that were 
shaped during the colonisation process. These institutions tend to endure even after independence.  
 Finally, the argument on “crops” was developed by Sokoloff and Engerman (2000). 
Although European settlement is central to this argument, the two pillars of the “crops” view are 
factor endowments and the resulting crops. The comparison of development paths in the 
Americas provides an interesting case to illustrate this argument. Latin America strong 
comparative advantage in land and its wide use of slave and indigenous people made producing 
commodities such as sugar cane, rice, silver efficient. These commodities were produced in a 
system of large-scale agriculture and mining, which was controlled by a plantation and mining 
elite, allowing therefore substantial economies of scale. The elite subsequently manage to control 
power by promoting institutions that restrict political participation and economic opportunities for 
the majority. These institutions persist even when countries stop specializing in activities that 
display large economies of scale. Similarly, Isham et al. (2006) show that countries that  rely on 
plantations crops such as sugar display worse institutions compared to countries that specialize in 
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the production of grains (rice and wheat). Turning to the success of North America countries such 
as Canada and the United States, Engerman and Sokoloff recall that “these economies35 were not 
endowed with substantial populations of natives able to provide labour, nor with climates and 
soils that gave them a comparative advantage in the production of crops characterized by major 
economies of using slave labour.” These endowments explain the widespread of small family 
farms that produced grains and the relatively equal income distribution during this period. The 
development of a middle class went hand-in-hand with the development of institutions that 
promote economic and social advancement.  
  
 Policy View 
 
The policy argument holds that environment-related hindrances are not a fatality and can 
be largely alleviated by sound microeconomic as well as macroeconomic policies. The aim of 
promoting good microeconomic policies is to remove price distortions and allow an efficient 
allocation of goods and factors and substantial productivity gains. Microeconomic policies are 
often termed as “structural policies”. They mainly include trade reforms, which consisted of 
reduction in protection, and deregulation of markets36. Good macroeconomic policies very often 
defined in terms of economic policy outcomes. They refer, among other things, to low inflation 
rates, positive real interest rates, competitive real exchange rates, low fiscal and current account 
deficits, if not surpluses of those balances (Fisher, 1993: Ghura and Hadjimichael, 1996: 
Catamitsis et al., 1999).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35
 The focus was on North East of the United States and not its southern states 
36
 These are some of policies promoted by Bretton Woods Institutions, specially the World Bank. 
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APPENDIX I-4: PANEL UNIT ROOT TESTS 
 
Suppose that the series follow an AR (1) process: 
itiititiit MXX εφα ++= −1     (1) 
Where i=1, 2, …, N represents cross-section units or series and t=1, 2, …Ti  captures the period. 
Mit is added to account for possible exogenous variables, such as individual trends or fixed 
effects.
 
There are two assumptions that can be made about the structure of the unit root. The first 
assumes that the unit root process is the same across cross-sections, meaning that iα is the same 
across individuals or countries ( αα =i ). In contrast, the second category of tests assumes 
different unit processes, implying that the unit root process varies across individuals or countries.  
Levin, Lin, and Chu (2002) test is part of the first category of tests while the Im, Pesaran and Shin 
(2003) test and the Fisher-type tests using Augmented Dicker-Fuller (ADF) (Maddala and Wu, 
1999: Choi, 2001) belong to the latter.  
  
 LEVIN, LIN, AND CHU TEST (2002) 
 
The starting point of Levin, Lin and Chu test is the following Augmented Dicker-Fuller 
(ADF) specification: itijit
p
j
jitiitit MXXX
i
εφδλ ++∆+=
−
=
−− ∑ '
1
1                 (2) 
in which the unit process is common across cross-sections ( 1−= αλ ) and the lag order of the 
difference, pi , varies among units. The null and alternative hypotheses for the test are the 
following: 
 
(3) 
(4) 
 
Under the null hypothesis, there is a unit root, while under the alternative, there is no unit root. 
The basic idea behind the Levin, Lin, and Chu Test is to obtain the estimate of λ from proxies for 
itX∆ and 1−itX that are standardised and purged of potential deterministic components and 
autocorrelations. The test involves four steps. 
0:
0:
1
0
〈
=
λ
λ
H
H
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First, itX∆ and 1−itX are regressed both on the lags terms jitX −∆  for j=1,…,pi  and the 
exogenous variables itM . The estimated parameters from these two regressions are 





 ∧∧ φδ , and ( )'' ,φδ , respectively.  
Second, the following series itX∆ and 1−itX are constructed by getting rid of the 
autocorrelations and deterministic structures. 
∧
−
=
∧
−∆−∆=∆ ∑ φδ '
1
itjit
p
j
ijitit MXXX
i
            (5) 
 
 
∧
−
=
∧
−
−
−∆−= ∑ φδ '
1
11 itjit
p
j
ijitit MXXX
i
         (6) 
 Third, itX∆ and 1−itX  are standardised by dividing them to the regression standard error, 
si . 
iitit sXX /∆=∆
≈
                                              (7) 
iitit sXX /11 −−
≈
=                                                (8) 
 
 
with si the estimated standard error derived from the each ADF from (2). 
 Fourth, λ is estimated using the previous findings, especially by running the following 
regression: 
ititit XX θλ +=∆ −
≈≈
1                                 (9) 
Levin, Lin, and Chu demonstrate that under the null, a modified t-statistic for 
∧
λ is asymptotically 
normally distributed  
 
)1,0()()(
*
**'
* N
seSNTt
t
Tm
TmN →
−
=
∧∧
σ
µλσλ
λ             (10) 
te
l-0
01
16
96
1,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 2
9 
No
v 
20
06
Chapter I: PUBLIC SPENDING AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE INSTABILITIES AND 
GROWTH IN AFRICA: EVIDENCE FROM PANEL DATA 
  
 
  
 
72 
 
λt represents the standard t-statistic for 0=
∧
λ ,  
1)/(' −−= ∑ NpTT
i
i ,  
∧
*σ is the estimated variance of the error termθ , )(
∧
λse the standard error of 
∧
λ  
NS  captures the mean of the ratios of the long-term standard deviation to the innovation standard 
deviation for each individual. This measure is obtained through kernel-based techniques. 
*
Tmµ and 
*
Tmσ are adjustment terms of the mean and standard deviation. 
 
 IM, PESERAN, AND SHIN (2003) 
 
Contrary to the Levin, Lin, and Chu test, Im, Pesaran, and Shin test start with a distinct 
ADF regression for each unit.  
  
itijit
p
j
jitiitit MXXX
i
εφδλ ++∆+=
−
=
−− ∑ '
1
1   (2) 
 
Under the null, 
0:0 =iH λ   , for all i 
 
Whereas under the alternative: 
 for i=1, 2,…, N1 
 
for i=N1+1, N1+2,…,N 
 
Once the separate ADF regressions are estimated, the average of the t-statistics for iλ from the 
individual ADF regressions, )( iiT pt I : 
Nptt
N
i
iiTNT I
/)(
1






= ∑
=
 is transformed in order to get the desired test statistics.  
If the lag order is always equal to zero (pi=0 for all i), the simulated critical values for tNT 
are deducted from Im, Pesaran, and Shin table for different numbers of cross sections N, series 
0:
0:
1
1
〈
=
i
i
H
H
λ
λ
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lengths T, and for all the equations specifications. However, if the lag order of the ADF is non-
zero for some units, Im, Pesaran, and Shin (IPS) suggest the use of an adjusted form of tNT . The 
adjusted form follows an asymptotic normal distribution and takes the following form: 
 
( )( )
∑
∑
=
=
−
−
=
−
N
i
ipiTtVar
iiT
NT
N
N
i
ptENNT
t
tN
W
1
))((1
)
1
1
((
)1,0(N→               (11) 
 
with )( )( ipiTtE and )( )( ipiTtVar representing the expected mean and variance of the ADF 
regression t-statistics. IPS suggest the values of these expressions for various values of T and p.  
 
 FISHER-ADF  
 
Another approach suggested for panel unit root tests lies on Fischer (1932) methodology. 
The idea is to build a test that combines the p-values from individual unit root tests (Maddala and 
Wu, 1999: Choi, 2001). 
Assuming that wi is the p-value of individual unit root for cross-section i , the distribution 
under the null of unit root for all N cross-sections is the following: 
− →
=
∑2 22
1
log( )wi N
i
N
χ           (12) 
Moreover, Choi shows that:  
W
N
w N
I I
n
i= →
−
=
∑
1
0 11
1
φ ( ) ( , )  
with φ −1  representing the inverse of the standard normal cumulative distribution function.  
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APPENDIX I-5: INCLUSION OF POLICY FACTORS 
 
Suppose a Cobb-Douglas function that has the following form: 
Y K K A Lp h=
− −α β α β( . )1           (1) 
where Y is the real output; K p and Kh are the physical and human capital stock, respectively; A 
captures the factor-augmenting, economy-wide levels of technical progress and efficiency; L is 
labour. 
Assuming also that the expansion of labour and labour-augmenting technology follow the 
following process: 
L L ent= 0    (2) 
A A e pt X= +0
( )φ (3) 
with n representing the exogenous rate of expansion of labour, t the time, g the exogenous rate of 
technical progress, and X a vector of economic policy variables and other factors that have the 
potential to impact the level of technology and efficiency of the economy, and φ the vector of 
coefficients associated with the economic policy variables and other growth-enhancing factors.  
If the shares of physical and human capital to income are s and h, respectively, and if both 
depreciate at the same rate d, the accumulation of physical and human capital follows the above 
rules: 
dK
dt
sY dp = −                       (4) 
dK
dt
hY dKh H= −                  (5) 
Defining y, kp and kh as the stock of physical and human capital in terms of effective labour units, 
meaning 
LAYy ./=                           (6) 
k K A Lp P= / .                      (7) 
k K A Lh H= / .                      (8) 
the production function and the accumulation functions can be expressed in terms of effective 
labour unit: 
y k kp h=
α β
                               (9) 
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dk
dt
sy n p d kp p= − + +( )    (10) 
 
dk
dt
hy n p d kh h= − + +( )     (11) 
 
The equilibrium levels of physical and human capital per effective unit at the steady state can be 
determined by assuming that the levels of these factors are constant in the steady state. This 
implies setting equations (10) and (11) to zero and solving them. This results into: 
k s h
n p dp
*
( )
=
+ +






−
− −1 1/ 1β β α β
     (12) 
 
k s h
n p dh
*
( )
=
+ +






−
− −1 1/ 1α α α β
     (13) 
Inserting (12) and (13) into (9) leads to: 
ln ln( ) ln ln*y n p d s h= − +
− −





 + + +
− −





 +
− −






α β
α β
α
α β
β
α β1 1 1     (14) 
Expressing (14) in terms of unit of labour rather than effective unit of labour results into the 
following: 
ln ln ln( ) ln lnY
L
A pt X n p d s h




 = + + −
+
− −





 + + +
− −





 +
− −





0 1 1 1
φ α β
α β
α
α β
β
α β      (15) 
 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) indicate that the transition to steady state implies the following: 
d y
dt
y yln (ln * ln )= −γ    (16) 
with γ α β= + + − −( )( )n p d 1  
From relation (14), one can deduct: 
ln ( ) ln ln*y e y e yt t= − +1 0γ γ    (17) 
where y0 represents the output per effective unit at time to 
Adding -yo to both sides lead to: 
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





+++





−−
+





−−
+++





−−
+
−−−=− θβα
β
βα
α
βα
βαγ XptAhsdpnyeyy T 000 lnln1ln1)ln(1ln)1(lnln
 (18), with T representing the period under consideration. 
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CHAPTER II: 
 
 
 
 
POVERTY AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE: EVIDENCE FROM 
PANEL DATA37 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 A condensed version of this chapter is forthcoming in the Journal of African Development, September 
2006. We would like to thank Jean-Louis Arcand and Jean-Louis Combes and two anonymous referees of 
the Journal of African Development for helpful discussions and pertinent comments on an earlier draft. We 
would also like to thank Roland Kpodar for sharing his program on Bootstraping and Tsangarides 
Charambolos for sharing his database.  
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I- INTRODUCTION 
 
Frequent exogenous shocks, including volatility of terms of trade and resource 
flows, and capricious weather conditions, have taken a heavy toll on the internal and 
external balances of many developing countries. As a result, some of these countries have 
adopted economic policies largely inspired by structural adjustment programs. The 
theoretical foundations of these policies are rooted in the dependent economy model or 
“Australian model”, in which clearing internal and external imbalances requires an 
increase of the relative price of tradable to nontradable goods, defined as the depreciation 
of real exchange rate, and a reduction in domestic absorption. Policies aimed at reducing 
fiscal deficits and privatising state owned enterprises are therefore supposed to contain 
domestic absorption while measures gearing toward promoting trade, such as slashing 
tariffs on exports, are expected to lead to the depreciation of real exchange rate. The 
analysis of the impact of these economic policies on real incomes, or poverty, has 
received a special attention in the literature38. 
This chapter investigates the influence of the intermediate indicators of economic 
policies, namely real exchange rate and absorption, on poverty. This differs from some of 
the approaches generally used in the literature. Dollar and Kraay (2002), Ghura et al. 
(2002), for instance, explore the relationship between policy outcome indicators, such as 
inflation, trade openness, and fiscal deficits, and the incomes of the poor. The idea of 
reverting to intermediate policy indicators rather than policy outcome indicators has two 
                                                 
38
 Bourguignon et al. (1991) look into the impact of adjustment policies on the distribution of income based 
on some case studies. They also bring into the analysis issues of trade-off between efficiency and equity as 
well as political feasibility of such policies.  
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advantages. First, it makes the model specification less cumbersome as the analysis relies 
on fewer factors. Second, the method helps in effectively addressing model uncertainty 
concerns and the parsimonious choice of macroeconomic policy-related variables 
because the approach is based on a theoretical model. The relationship between the 
intermediate policy variables and poverty come into play through indirect and direct 
channels. In line with the vast empirical literature on poverty reduction (Foster and 
Szekely, 2001: Dollar and Kraay, 2002: Ghura et al., 2002), economic growth is 
considered as the major indirect channel through which economic policies, real exchange 
and absorption, public spending in this chapter, influence poverty. In this chapter, direct 
channels are highlighted as well.  
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section II provides an overview of the 
nexus between economic policies and poverty in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where the challenge of alleviating poverty is of particular importance. Section III presents 
the dependent economy model. Section IV provides the conceptual background by 
reviewing the indirect and direct channels through which real exchange rate and public 
spending affect the incomes of the poor. This analysis will be complemented by a close 
look at the role of a third set of factors that determine the direct relationship between real 
exchange rate and poverty. Section V presents the theoretical framework and the 
econometric methodology. Section VI discusses the choice of variables and data and 
presents the econometric results. Section VII concludes. 
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II- OVERVIEW  
 
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund sponsored structural 
adjustments programs have often been criticised for their detrimental effects on the 
poorest segments of the society. Some, like Ali (1998), find successful macroeconomic 
reforms to be associated with increasing poverty by using IFAD data. On the other hand, 
others, like Demery and Squire (1996), reject the claim and show that improved 
macroeconomic environment is largely condusive to poverty reduction.  
These two views can be illustrated in table 1, which summarises a study carried 
out by Christiansen et al. (2002). The information combines macroeconomic policy score 
and information on poverty headcount39 and is based on poverty country case studies. It 
has the advantage of using data that are comparable over time.  
 
                                                 
39
 Poverty headcount is the share of the national population whose incomes are below the official threshold 
(or thresholds) set by the national governement.  
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Table 1: Macroeconomic policies and poverty trend 
 
  
Change in 
macroeconomic score 
Change in poverty 
headcount (%) 
Madagascar 1993-97 -0.1 12 
 1997-99 0.5 0.0 
Mauritania 1987-95 2.4 -65 
Nigeria 1985-92 1.8 13 
 1992-96 -1.0 89 
Uganda 1992-97 0.7 -40 
 1997-00 0.3 -16 
Zambia 1993-96 1.2 -27 
 1996-98 0.0 18 
Zimbabwe 1991-96 0.3 25 
Source: Christiansen et al. (2002) 
Positive value of macroeconomic means an improvement in the macroeconomic policy environment 
 
Table 1 clearly reveals three sorts of dynamics in the relation between 
macroeconomic reforms and poverty.  First, there is a situation in which a country 
experiences an escalation of poverty despite substantial improvements in macroeconomic 
policy environment. The unique case that portrays this feature is the situation in Nigeria 
between 1985 and 1992. Then, there are circumstances in which a country makes no 
progress in macroeconomic reforms and faces increasing poverty. Finally, there is a case 
where a country displays both a good track record in implementing macroeconomic 
reforms and decline in poverty headcount. The latter two cases largely reflect cases 
presented in table 1, suggesting that sound macroeconomic policies might go hand-in-
hand with poverty reduction. However, this apparent relationship may be subject to some 
criticisms. The link between the soundness of macroeconomic policies and poverty 
reduction does not automatically imply directional causality. There may be some other 
factors that account for the relationship between macro-economic stance and poverty. 
Moreover, economic reform package comes very often with aid package that helps 
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dampen the effects of negative exogenous shocks. Thus, one acceptable approach is to 
consider rigorous counterfactual scenarios rather than an ex-ante/ex-post comparison. 
General equilibrium models generally provide suitable environment for such simulations 
as shown by Bourguignon et al. (1991). Finally, the extent to which poverty headcount 
captures poverty and the way the macroeconomic score40 is built may be questionable41. 
We will present in the next section the dependent economy model, which is the 
theoretical basis for policies that have been implemented in many developing countries. 
The model will help find alternative indicators to be considered in the discussion on 
economic policies and poverty. 
 
III- SIMPLE DEPENDENT ECONOMY MODEL   
 
The failure of traditional economic models, Keynesian and Monetarian models, to 
capture the reality of the developing world gave a prominent role to the dependent 
economy model. This model has provided the theoretical background for policies 
designed to reduce internal and external imbalances in many developing countries.  
The dependent economy model was initially developed in the area of international 
trade theory (Salter, 1959: Swan, 1960) and subsequently found numerous applications in 
development economics because of its ability to capture dynamics in small open 
economies, especially developing economies. The model is built on the assumption that 
the country is price-taker, meaning that the country market power is not significant to 
                                                 
40
 The index is composed of three components: fiscal, monetary and exchange rate policy. The weights of 
each component are derived from international cross section regressions.  
41
 The weighting scheme used to compute the macroeconomic score might sound very arbitrary.  
te
l-0
01
16
96
1,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 2
9 
No
v 
20
06
Chapter II: POVERTY AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE: EVIDENCE FROM PANEL DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
84 
 
influence world prices. Another salient feature of the model is the distinction made 
between tradable and nontradable goods. In fact, the price of tradable goods is 
determined by the world market, the prevailing nominal exchange rate, and trade policy, 
especially tariffs and export subsidies, while nontradable price depends on domestic 
effective demand and domestic supply. 
The model could be summarised by the following equations: 
 
 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
 
 
Equation (1) indicates the determinants of tradable prices, PT, which are the 
nominal exchange rate , e, the international price of tradable goods, PT*, and the trade 
policy materialised in the equation by a tariff, ϖ . Equation (2) captures the general level 
of prices, which is assumed to be a linearly homogenous function of the prices of 
tradables, PT, and nontradables, PN . Equation (3) defines the real exchange rate, E, as the 
relative price of tradables to the nontradables. Equations (4) and (5) underline excess 
demand42 of nontradable and tradable goods, respectively. These equations also carry two 
                                                 
42
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public policy variables: the public spending G43 and the real exchange rate, E. Equation 
(4) suggests that any appreciation of the real exchange rate results in the decline of the 
excess demand of nontradables as they become relatively expensive. On the other hand, 
an increase in public spending leads to higher excess of the demand for nontradables. 
Equation (5) shows that an appreciation of real exchange rate, both by boosting the 
demand and restraining the supply of tradables, increases the excess demand of this 
particular good. The same equation suggests that an increase in government expenditure 
or an augmentation in absorption widens the excess demand for tradable goods. 
Equations (4) and (5) could be used to set the conditions for internal and external 
equilibriums, which require excess demands for nontradables and tradables to be equal to 
zero. In the dimension (E,G) internal equilibrium is represented by a curve with a 
negative slope, (NN). This reflects the idea that a real exchange appreciation is essential 
in restoring equilibrium in the nontradable market when public spending increases. In 
other words, an increase in absorption, which is identical to an increase in public 
spending, triggers an excess in the demand of nontradables. The relative price of 
nontradables must go up for this imbalance to be cleared, meaning that the real exchange 
rate must appreciate. The external equilibrium is captured by an increasing curve (TT), 
suggesting that, if public spending increases, so does the absorption, relative price of 
tradables must rise in order to eliminate the external imbalance. The simultaneous 
internal and external equilibriums are achieved in point A.  
 
                                                 
43
 We ignore the public spending on nontradable goods for simplicity purposes  
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Figure 1: Dynamics in a dependent economy model 
 
 
 
 
Point B represents a situation wherein there is an external imbalance, say a trade 
deficit. B can also be described as a situation where the real exchange rate is below its 
equilibrium level, or overvalued. This is reminiscent of the conditions that prevailed in 
many African countries after the second oil shock. 
One way of clearing this external disequilibrium, moving from B to A, is to 
reduce absorption and depreciate the relative price of tradables to nontradables. 
Economic policies are therefore designed to achieve these two goals and usually qualified 
as sound economic policies. These policies include prudent fiscal, monetary, and 
exchange rate policies geared towards avoiding real exchange appreciation and excessive 
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absorption. Clearly, economic policies in the dependent economy model framework tend 
to primarily impact the real exchange rate and absorption. Consequently, analysing the 
effects of sound economic policies on poverty amounts to assessing the impact of real 
exchange rate and absorption on poverty. The chapter identifies direct and indirect 
channels through which real exchange rate and absorption influence poverty. 
 
IV- REAL EXCHANGE RATE, ABSORPTION, AND POVERTY 
 
4.1 Indirect effects 
 
Economic growth remains one of the key indirect channels through which 
absorption and real exchange rate affect poverty. In fact, sound macroeconomic policies, 
reflected in the dependent economy model by appropriate real exchange rate and 
absorption, are generally considered to be conducive to strong economic growth (Fischer, 
1993), and strong economic growth , which is itself believed to yield poverty reduction 
(Foster and Szekely, 2001: Dollar and Kraay, 2002: Ghura et al., 2002). 
4.1.1 Real exchange rate, absorption, and growth 
 
Many growth studies support the contention that misalignments of real exchange 
rate adversely affect economic performance (Cottani et al., 1990: Ghura and Grennes, 
1993). There are two explanations behind this pattern. First, as a relative price of tradable 
to nontradable goods, real exchange rate determines, to a large extent, the degree of 
competitiveness of the export sector, a key growth engine in many small developing 
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countries. Second, an inappropriate real exchange rate gives rise to speculation against 
the domestic currency. This creates a destabilising effect on domestic financial markets, 
leading therefore to lower investment and growth. 
The relationship between the reduction in absorption and economic growth is 
rather ambiguous. A case in point is the experience of many developing countries that 
implemented fiscal adjustment policies. Those countries adopted stringent fiscal 
measures, including deep cuts in public investment spending and severe cuts in transfers, 
in order to achieve sustainable fiscal balances. The purpose of such policies is to send a 
signal to the private sector about governments’ commitment and ability to efficiently run 
their economies and contributes to higher private investment and economic growth. 
However, some of the measures may seriously undermine economic growth prospects. 
This is particularly true if the cuts relate to public-sector spending in infrastructural 
facilities and in the area of human capital, and law and order, which tend to strongly 
crowd in private investment and therefore highly beneficial to economic growth 
(Aschauer, 1989: Erenburg, 1993: Serven and Solimano, 1993: Oshikoya, 1994: Serven, 
1996). 
4.1.2 Growth and poverty 
 
Although there is no fully developed theoretical framework on the relationship 
between economic growth and poverty, numerous empirical studies provide conclusive 
evidence about the positive association between income growth and income measures of 
poverty. Using panel data, Dollar and Kraay (2002) found that a one percent increase of 
per capita income results in one percent rise of the average incomes of the poorest fifth of 
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society. Timer (1997), Ghura et al. (2002), Foster and Szekely (2002) applied different 
approaches to the same data, and found that the incomes of the poorest 20 per cent 
increase less than proportional with those of the non-poor. The positive impact of 
economic growth on poverty is also confirmed by various individual country studies 
(Lipton and Ravallion, 1995: Ravallion and Datt, 1996).  
 
4.2 Direct effects  
 
4.2.1 The direct impact of the reduction of absorption 
 
The reduction of the absorption is often achieved by cutting public spending, 
namely by freezing the nominal bill wage or/and downsizing the public sector or/and 
reducing substantially subsidies and other currents transfers. These measures increase 
directly poverty, particularly in a context where there are few work opportunities for the 
poor in the private sector.  
However, the relationship between absorption, especially public expenditure, and 
poverty could be also positive for three reasons. First, cuts in public spending may reduce 
the government tendency to revert to monetary financing as means of funding fiscal 
deficits, thereby contribute to lowering inflation. The poor may therefore benefit from 
low inflationary pressures as clearly demonstrated by Easterly and Fischer (2001). 
Second, a growing body of evidence shows that the structure of public expenditures in 
social sectors in many developing countries, especially in Africa, tends to favour the 
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richest at the expense of the poorest (Castro-Leal et al., 1999). For instance, the share of 
public subsidy to the poorest 20 percent of the population in the health sector varies from 
4 percent in Guinea to 17 percent in Tanzania while the share received by the richest 20 
percent ranges from 48 percent in Guinea to 17 percent in South Africa. In the education 
sector, the poorest 20 percent capture only 5 and 14 percent of public spending in 
education respectively in Guinea and Tanzania whereas the 20 percent richest receive 44 
percent and 21 percent of public spending in Guinea and Ghana. In such circumstances, 
reduction in public spending may have little impact on the poor. Third, this is all the more 
true if cuts in public expenditures are accompanied by changes affecting the intra and 
inter allocation of public spending, with more public resources channelled towards social 
sectors and/or compartments of these sectors extensively used by the poor. For instance, a 
shift in social spending toward the delivery of basic public services, including basic 
education and health care that are mostly consumed by the poor, can lead to poverty 
reduction. Clearly, the direction of the relationship between poverty and absorption is 
ambiguous.  
 
4.2.2 The direct impact of real exchange rate on poverty 
  
The Stolper-Samuelson (1941) theorem provides a strong foundation for a 
potential positive impact of real exchange rate depreciation on poverty. In fact, if one 
assumes that the tradable sector is labour-intensive, as suggested in many studies (Dorosh 
and Sahn, 2000: Agenor, 2004), and a perfect mobility of labour across sectors, 
especially between tradable and nontradable sectors, any increase of the relative price of 
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tradable goods would lead to higher returns for labour: the most abundant factor at the 
disposal of the poor.  
However, real exchange rate depreciation can potentially give rise to offsetting 
effects that could mitigate partially, or even completely, the benefits the poor get from 
stronger relative price of tradables. These effects are mainly three. First, higher tradable 
price, if achieved by nominal depreciation, raises the domestic costs of imported goods 
and therefore the cost of living of the poor.  This negative income effect might seriously 
dampen the relative price effect if imported goods represent a substantial share in the 
consumption basket of the poor.  Except for the urban poor, this impact tends to be 
marginal for rural poor, who make up the majority of the poor in most developing 
countries. Second, when production and resources switch in favour of the tradable sector 
as a result of real exchange appreciation, the demand for labour and wages in the 
nontradable sector declines, depressing therefore revenues in that sector. Since most 
urban poor tend to be nontradable good producers, the consequence will be increasing 
urban poverty. But, this effect is likely to be mitigated by the reduction in rural poverty if 
most of the poor live in rural areas. Third, the other offsetting effect comes from the 
potential contraction impact of a nominal depreciation. A real depreciation gained 
through a nominal depreciation can lead to higher cost of capital and intermediate inputs, 
such as oil, that are generally imported in developing countries (Lora and Oliveria, 1998). 
Real exchange rate depreciation generates therefore a negative supply-side shock that can 
take a toll on output and employment, both in the tradable and nontradable sectors. As a 
result poverty may rise. Again, this effect could be very limited in situations where 
production techniques are highly labour intensive and allow a high degree of substitution 
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between production factors, namely capital and labour. Such production techniques are 
likely to reflect those of commodities and some manufacturing goods44 , the mainstay of 
many developing countries’ exports.  
 
4.1.2.1 Unskilled and skilled labour 
 
The structure of the labour market could be much more complex than what was 
previously assumed, with the coexistence of skilled and unskilled labour. One can assume 
that the poor constitute the bulk of unskilled workers because they are more likely than 
other segments of the society to lack education and marketable skills. In this framework, 
the outcomes of real exchange depreciation remain again favourable to the poor provided 
that the two types of labour are mobile and the tradable sector is low-skill-intensive. 
These results fit well with the experience of some East Asian countries that experienced 
significant real exchange depreciation and poverty reduction in the 1960s and 1970s. 
Wood (1994, 1997), for instance, shows that the demand for unskilled labour and wages 
for this type of labour soared in the Republic of Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore after these 
countries liberalise their trade and increase the relative price of their tradable goods. 
Elsewhere, in Latin America particularly, empirical evidence is mixed, with real 
exchange depreciation leading to an apparent change in the structure of labour demand in 
favour of skilled workers and higher overall unemployment and poverty in most countries 
(Berry, 1998: Hanson and Harrison, 1999). The apparent combination of real exchange 
rate depreciation and rising poverty stirs controversy about the Latin America’s 
                                                 
44
 Textiles and apparels are cases in point 
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comparative advantage. Given the region’s impressive endowment in natural resources 
and its relatively higher human capital endowment compared to other developing regions, 
Spilimbergo et al. (1999) and Wood (1997) suggest that Latin America’s comparative 
advantage might not be in low-skill-intensive production.  
In any event, even by assuming that labour, especially unskilled labour, is the 
most abundant factor and a perfect mobility of this production factor among sectors, one 
can suspect the relationship between real exchange rate and the incomes of the poor to be 
influenced by a third set of factors, which include the quality of institutions and the 
distribution of productive assets. 
4.3 Third set of factors  
 
4.3.1 Inequality 
 
The debate on inequality, growth, and poverty has recently regained momentum. 
A vast literature tends to point towards a potential deleterious impact of inequality on 
growth (Persson and Tabellini, 1991: Alesina and Perotti, 1993: Alesina and Rodrik, 
1994: Keefer and Knack, 2000)45. Similar conclusions are also found on the relationship 
between inequality and poverty, with inequality leading to the appearance of poverty 
traps. The issue of access to production factors is widely referred as the key explanation 
for such relationships.  
                                                 
45
 This view contrasts with the classical approach that suggests that the marginal propensity to save of the 
rich is higher than that of the poor, meaning that high initial inequality results in higher aggregate savings, 
capital accumulation and growth (Kaldor, 1957: Bourguignon, 1981). 
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The access to productive assets is essential in determining the responses to 
incentives, particularly the increased relative price of tradables to nontradables. In fact, 
expanding activities in the tradable sector, as a result of a favourable real exchange rate, 
requires additional capital, which has to be mobilised through credit. But the access to 
credit, in a context of financial market imperfections, critically depends on collateral, 
which lenders demand in exchange of any loan they grant. For this reason, only 
borrowers with reasonable assets are able to respond to price incentives and engage in 
productive activities. Consequently, only few reap the income opportunities created by 
adequate real exchange rate when inequality runs high.  
Inequality could also determine the direction and the scope of the effects of real 
exchange rate on poverty through its impact on human capital accumulation. Inequality 
adversely affects the process of acquiring skills in two ways. First, credit market 
imperfections and the demand for collateral can constraint not only the access of the poor 
to capital but also to education, especially if the funding of education depends on loans. 
Acquisition of skills becomes therefore easy only for a very few when inequality is high.  
Second, inequality may influence the process of human capital accumulation even if there 
is no credit constraint. This is the case if the quality of the educational system is a local 
good (Durlauf, 1994: Fernandez and Rogerson, 1998). In this situation, agents are sorted 
in groups that are separated according to human capital or wealth status. The segregation 
can even be reinforced by the establishment of political measures, including zoning 
restrictions or voluntary contribution to school financing (Deininger and Olinto, 2000). 
Consequently, disparities in skills widens over time, with the poor likely to be the most 
affected. Since the level of skills may be one of the determinants as for how agents 
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effectively take advantage of opportunities, the poor are unlikely to gain the benefits 
arising from real exchange rate depreciation. 
It can therefore be assumed that a fair distribution of wealth plays a positive 
catalytic role in the relationship between real exchange rate and poverty while a more 
unequal one dampens the supposedly positive effects of real exchange depreciation on the 
incomes of the poor.  
 
4.3.2 The quality of institutions 
 
 It is broadly agreed that institutions play a critical role in the process of economic 
development. In particular, institutions that promote economic freedom, ensure a good 
provision of public goods, and enforce contracts are regarded as determinant in creating 
an enabling environment for economic activities, thus leading to economic expansion 
(Rodrik, 1999: Parente and Prescott, 1999: Acemoglu et al., 2001: Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2003). Such institutions also determine the effectiveness of the poor’s 
response to any economic incentive, especially to changes in real exchange rate.  
The impact of institutions on the relationship between real exchange rate and 
poverty will be illustrated by three pieces of evidence. First, the lack of access to capital 
is regarded as one of the constraints facing the poor in their endeavours to boost their 
incomes. It has been already mentioned in the chapter that access to credit, when capital 
markets are imperfect, depends upon collateral provided by borrowers. The ownership of 
that collateral can be severely constrained if property rights are not well defined and 
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protected. The implication is that the poor can hardly get loans in the absence of a clear 
definition and protection of property rights. As a result the poor are unlikely to expand 
their activities in the tradable sector when there is real exchange rate depreciation. 
Second, even if property rights are protected, the lack of adequate provision of 
public goods can dampen the response of the poor to any improvement of the relative 
price of tradable to nontradable goods. For instance, the quality and density of the road 
system, namely rural roads, determines to what extent the poor are connected to markets 
and therefore their ability to exploit growth-promoting opportunities. Consequently, the 
lower the provision of the public goods is, the weaker is the positive impact of a 
favourable real exchange rate on poverty.  
Third, the enforcement of contracts is also likely to influence the extent to which 
the poor react to economic incentives created by the change in real exchange rate. The 
reason for this is that enforcing contract reduces the risk of default between agents and 
creates a more auspicious environment for investment.  In this context, the poor are 
therefore more likely to gain from new opportunities created by real exchange 
depreciation. 
 
V-THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE ECONOMETRIC 
METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1 Theoretical Framework 
 
Following Dollar and Kraay (2002)’s approach, the relationship between the 
economic policies and poverty is formulated as follows:  
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tiititititititititi XEGEIEYP ,
'
,5,,4,,3,2,10, ** νηδδδδδδ +++++++=     (7) 
where the i subscripts refers to country and t  indexes years. Variable tiP , is supposed to 
capture poverty. Since there are few observations for alternative indicators of poverty, we 
revert to the logarithm of per capita income of the poor to measure poverty46. tiY , denotes 
the logarithm of per-capita income. tiI ,  represents the quality of institutions, tiE , is the 
real exchange rate, and Gi,t  corresponds to the Gini coefficient. ',tiX is a vector of control 
variables. The error component is decomposed into a time invariant element iη and a time 
variant component ti,ν . δ0  is the constant.  δ1 captures the impact of economic growth on 
poverty but also reflects the indirect effects of other right-hand-side variables on the 
incomes of the poor. δ3  measures the interactive effect of real exchange rate and the 
quality of institutions while 4δ captures the interaction between real exchange rate and 
income inequality. These interactions are key elements in determining the direction and 
the scope of the effects of economic policies on poverty. δ3 is expected to be positive, 
which implies that any combination of real exchange rate depreciation and sounder 
institutions results into the increase of the incomes of the poor. Conversely, any 
depreciation of real exchange rate that takes place in the context of weaker institutions is 
associated with disappointing outcomes for the poor. In line with the theoretical 
framework, we expect 4δ to be negative. This means that real exchange depreciation 
would be beneficial for the poor if there is a fairly equal income distribution. On the other 
hand, increasing the relative price of tradable to nontradable would not serve the cause of 
                                                 
46
 Alternative poverty indicators are presented in Appendix II.3 
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poverty alleviation if income distribution is acutely skewed. Finally, the coefficient 
vector δ5 also capture potential direct effects that other control variables may have on 
poverty. These right-hand-side variables include other policy as well as structural 
variables.  
5.2 Econometric Methodology  
 
 
tiititititititititi XEGEIEYP ,
'
,5,,4,,3,2,10, ** νηδδδδδδ +++++++=     (7’) 
The first temptation is to use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) as an estimation 
approach. This method, in the particular case of this study, has a number of shortcomings. 
First, some of the right-hand-side variables, especially per capita income, Yi,t, are likely to 
be endogenous. In fact, various studies on income distribution and growth point to a 
reverse causation from per capita income of the poorest to average income (Barro, 1999: 
Perotti, 1996). Then, one should not rule out possible omission of explanatory variables 
that are correlated with other right-hand-side variables of the equation. Moreover, not 
accounting for unobserved country-specific effects is likely to lead to biased results. 
Finally, over or under-reporting can be an important problem associated to the poverty 
measure and other control variables. It is well known that measurement error of the 
dependent variable does not generate biased coefficients47 when the error is not correlated 
with other right-hand-side variables. This seems unlikely to be the case for the poverty 
measure. For instance, in many developing countries, rural households may be difficult to 
reach by survey teams, leading to the underestimation of poverty. The same is true in 
                                                 
47
 Even though coefficients are not biased their standard errors are. 
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situation where education attainment of the population is low or in a context in which 
income inequality is high. Measurement error in poverty can clearly be influenced by the 
education attainment of the population, which constitutes some of the regressors of the 
equation to be estimated. Using OLS in a context of likely combination of omitted 
explanatory variables, measurement error, and endogeneity of some explanatory variables 
leads to inconsistent estimates.  
Following the procedure developed by Anderson and Hsiao (1982), one possible 
solution is to revert to the Method of Instrumental Variables (IV), which is a first-
differenced 48version of equation 7’: 
)()()*()*()()(
,
'
,5,,4,,3,2,1, tititititititititi XEGEIEYP νδδδδδ ∆+∆+∆+∆++∆=∆     (8) 
This procedure eliminates not only country-specific effects but also all other time-
invariant variables. It also helps control for endogeneity and even address the 
inconsistency problem associated with measurement errors (Greene, 1998) if the chosen 
instrumental variables are not correlated with measurement errors.  In line with standard 
arguments on the instrumental variables, the lagged differenced-endogenous variables (or 
lagged endogenous variables) are used as instruments. But Arellano and Bond (1991) 
argue that if such procedure is adequate therefore further lagged variables are good 
instruments as well. On that basis, they develop a Generalised Method of Moments 
Estimator (GMM), well-known by “first-differenced GMM estimator” that combines the 
suggested instruments in an efficient way. However, Blundell and Bond (1998) 
demonstrate that first-differenced GMM have poor finite sample properties, especially 
                                                 
48
 First-differencing may exacerbate measurement error 
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when lagged levels of the variables are not strongly correlated with subsequent first-
differences. Bond et al. (2001) indicate that this is likely the case when the series are 
close to a random walk or when the variance of the country-specific effects iη  rises 
relative to the variance of error term isε .  
In order to address the problem associated with persistent panel data, Blundell and 
Bond(1998) develop a system GMM estimator that is based on a simultaneous system of 
two equations, which are equations (7’) and (8). Lagged variables serve as instruments 
for the differenced equation (8) while their lagged first-differences are the instruments for 
the equation in level (7’). 
The validity of the system GMM as a consistent estimator can be ascertained by 
showing that the error term is not serially correlated and the instruments used are the 
adequate ones. The first condition is gauged by Arrelano and Bond (1991) test for 
autocorrelation, which determines whether the first-differenced error term has a second-
order. The second condition is verified by a test of over-identifying restrictions, which 
could be either the Sargan (1958) test or Hansen (1982) Test.  
 
VI- DATA ISSUES AND ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
 
6.1 Description of the variables and their sources 
 
The chapter relies to a great extent on Dollar and Kraay’s dataset, which was also 
used in other studies including Ghura et al. (2002). This dataset is complemented by 
several sources. The World Development Indicators (WDI) (2004) provides data on 
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government total expenditure, GE. Data from International Financial Statistics (IFS) 
(2004), COMTRADE (2004) and WDI (2004) are used to compute Real Effective 
Exchange Rate, REER. Polity V Database is the source for the indicators of political 
institutions. The dataset used in this chapter refers to an unbalanced panel of 86 
developed and developing countries, including 13 Sub-Saharan African countries, 
observed from 1962 to 1999. 
6.1.1 Poverty 
 
Among the several available measures of the welfare of the poor, the chapter 
sticks to the one presented in Dollar and Kraay’s database, which defines the poor as the 
poorest 20 per cent of the population. Thus, the empirical investigation uses per capita 
income of the poorest quintile as dependent variable. This decision is almost driven by 
data availability concern and criticisms that alternative measures are subject to. In fact, it 
is extremely difficult to come up with a number of observations for alternative measures 
of poverty that is equal or higher 248, which is the number of observations available in 
our dataset. More importantly, Dollar and Kraay (2002) suggest that the use of three other 
measures of poverty may be misleading. In particular, the recourse to the average 
incomes below a particular poverty line, as an indicator of poverty, is intricate to interpret 
especially when the distribution of income is very sharp in the vicinity of the poverty 
line. In this particular case, any economic growth that is not accompanied with a change 
in distribution will elevate a substantial share of the population from just below to just 
above the poverty line and consequently bring about a decline of the income of those 
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below the poverty line. This outcome completely distorts the exact picture, which is the 
improvement of the welfare of the poor. Similar apprehensions also hold when using 
other measures that give higher weight to the poorest of the population.  
 Dollar and Kraay (2002) indicate that data on the average income of the poorest 
quintile comes from two sources. The first source, household surveys, is by far the most 
important reliable one. The second is generated from data on Gini coefficient. This 
method is applied only for countries that have Gini coefficient data but lack figures on 
the poorest quintile. The technique consists in extrapolating the income of 20 per cent 
poorest of the society by assuming that the distribution of income is lognormal 
(Aitchinson and Brown, 1966: Johnson et al., 1994). 
6.1.2 Key explanatory variables of interest 
 
Per capita income: The chapter relies on the real per capita GDP at purchasing power 
parity available in Dollar and Kraay dataset as indicator for average income. This dataset 
builds on the Summers-Heston Penn World Tables Version, which is extended forward 
through 1997. 
 
Real Exchange Rate: As a relative price, the real exchange rate plays a key role in the 
analysis of dynamics that open economies go through. In the simple model described 
previously, real exchange rate moves to achieve internal and external balance, i.e., the 
equilibrium in the supply and demand of nontradable as well as tradable goods. However, 
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one major problem associated with the concept of real exchange rate is how to align 
measurement to the theoretical definition.  
In practice, there is no price index for tradable and nontradables as such. Instead, 
there are only few aggregate price indexes, which include the consumer price index 
(CPI), the wholesale price index (WPI) and the producer price index (PPI), and some 
price deflators, among other things, the personal expenditure (PCE) deflator, the Implicit 
Deflator of GDP. Most of these indicators are difficult to find in many countries or 
cannot be compared from one country to another. For these reasons, the majority of 
economists turn to the CPI, which is the most readily available indicator. In so doing, the 
real exchange rate is understood as real effective exchange rate, which is defined as the 
product of nominal exchange rate, expressed in units of the domestic currency per unit of 
the foreign currency, and the ratio of the price level abroad to domestic price. This 
measurement seems to be different to the theoretical definition of real exchange rate in 
the chapter, which refers to the relative price of tradable to nontradable goods. In reality, 
it captures in some way the ratio of tradable price to that of nontradable.  
This assertion can be best illustrated by using the following decomposition. 
Suppose that the aggregate price level, both at home and abroad, comprises tradable and 
nontradable components: 
(9) 
(10) 
where TP  denotes the log price of tradable at home, NP  denotes the log price of 
nontradable at home, and β represents the share of tradable goods in the economy. The 
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same definitions apply to (10), expect that the * denotes for the foreign country. Let’s 
define now real exchange rate with respect to overall prices, Z, 
 
                         (11) 
where e denotes the log exchange rate defined in units of home currency per unit of 
foreign. The combination of the three relations leads to the following: 
)()()( **** NTNTTT PPPPPPeZ −−−++−≡ ββ        (12) 
Equation (12) shows therefore that the common measurement of real exchange rate, Z, 
captures three elements: (i) the relative price of tradables, (ii) the relative price of 
tradables to nontradables in the home country, which by the way is the definition adopted 
in the dependent economy framework, and (iii) the relative price of tradable to 
nontradable abroad. It can be noted that, all other things equal, that a change in NT PP − , 
brings about a change in Z . So, the measurement of real effective exchange rate may 
reflect to some extent the theoretical definition of the concept.  
 
Inequality: In the absence of significant number of observations for other indicators of 
wealth/asset inequality49, the chapter chooses the data income distribution available in 
Dollar and Kraay’s dataset. This database has four distinct sources. The most important 
one is the UN-WIDER World Income Inequality Database. The three others come from 
Deininger and Squire (1996), Chen and Ravallion (2000), and Lundberg and Squire 
(2000).  
                                                 
49
 We strive to get the Gini’s land index of concentration but could not get enough observations to be used 
in a regression.  
*PePZ ++−≡
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Institutions: Recent literature suggests that the quality of institutions matters for 
economic growth (Acemoglu et al., 2001: Acemoglu and Robinson, 2003). Well 
functioning institutions refer to an environment where the rule of law is enforced, 
effective government and civil society entities exist, and policies and legal framework 
have not been controlled by vested interests. Ideally, ICRG50 index should have been the 
appropriate indicator to capture what is understood as institutions in the context of this 
chapter. Unfortunately, we could not get series for this indicator and finally have to 
content myself with indicators of political institutions, supplied by Polity V Database and 
Freedom House. These indictors include Democracy index, DEMO, Civil Liberties Index, 
ICL, and Political Rights Index, IPR. Higher values of these indexes indicate better 
institutions. There are theoretical underpinnings behind using political institutions 
indexes as indicators of good institutions. It has been widely shown in the literature that 
democratic institutions are likely to be associated with strong legal structure and security 
of property, which are some of the features emphasized in the definition of institutions 
(Clague et al., 1997: Gradstein, M. 2005).  
 
Educational attainment: Economic literature has clearly established the importance of 
human capital as a key determinant of economic growth and poverty reduction. 
Education attainment, for instance, has been proven to be effective in increasing both 
productivity and wages in agriculture and informal sector, sectors where most of the poor 
operate. This chapter uses measures of education status, namely primary and secondary 
                                                 
50
 International Country Risk Guide index is based on underlying numerical evaluations with respect to the 
expropriation risk, corruption, the rule of law and government repudiation of contracts.  
te
l-0
01
16
96
1,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 2
9 
No
v 
20
06
Chapter II: POVERTY AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE: EVIDENCE FROM PANEL DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
106 
 
attainments, as indicators of human capital development. The data are extirpated from 
Dollar and Kraay dataset.  
 
6.1.3 Other regressors 
 
Indicators for government spending: The absorption in the model is captured by public 
expenditure indicators. We revert to the government total expenditure to GDP ratio, 
which is retrieved from Word Development Indicators (2004). 
 
Openness: Measuring openness constitutes a tricky exercise as the literature has so often 
pointed out (Rodriguez and Rodrik, 1999). It is worth noting that one of the widely-used 
indicators for openness is the ratio of trade (exports, imports, or both) to GDP. However, 
such measure seems to reflect much more the outcome than the stance of the trade policy, 
prompting Sachs and Warner to develop an alternative indicator of openness. Their index 
is composed of five indicators, which capture various policy variables that influence the 
degree of openness of a country. A country is considered as open if none of the following 
conditions is met: i) an existence of a socialist economic system, ii) a state monopoly on 
major exports, iii) an average tariff rates higher or equal to 40 per cent, iv) non tariff 
barriers covering 40 per cent or more of trade; and iii) a black market premium on 
exchange rate higher than 20 per cent. Conversely, if one or more of these conditions are 
fulfilled, the economy is defined as closed. The Sachs and Warner index is therefore a 
binary variable, implying that an economy could be either open or closed with no 
possibility to be in-between. This binary representation contrasts verily with the essence 
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of openness, which itself implies gradual differences between countries an over time. The 
ideal index should have been a continuous rather than a binary variable. The Sachs and 
Warner Index is subject to other criticisms. One is the arbitrary choice of the index 
components and the thresholds associated with them. Another weakness is the nature of 
components. Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) point out that only two of the five indicators, 
namely the tariff and the coverage of quantitative import restrictions, really capture the 
orientation of trade policy. The other three measures, the classification as a socialist 
economy, the black market premium on exchange rate, and the state monopoly for major 
exports, should be considered as purely institutional indicators.  
The notion of “observed openness” and “revealed openness” developed by 
Combes et al. (1999), Guillaumont and Guillaumont (1988), and Guillaumont (1985, 
1989, 1994) constitutes an attempt to address some of the shortcomings of using trade to 
GDP ratio as the indicator for openness. Their core argument is that the magnitude of 
trade depends on structural factors, such as the size of the country, its natural 
endowments and location, as well as policies that are pursued. For that reason, actual 
trade figures, captured by the trade to GDP ratio, reflect partially the degree of openness 
to trade, therefore are qualified as an indicator of “observed openness”.  In other words; 
“observed openness” has two components: one that is driven by the structural 
determinants of trade and another explained by trade policies. The latter is called 
“revealed openness” and captures efforts made by countries to open to trade. “Revealed 
openness” is thus conceived as the difference between “observed openness” and the 
amount of trade caused by structural factors. Due to some obvious advantages of the 
“revealed openness” indicator, we revert to a very similar indicator which was built by 
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Ghura et al. (2002). This indicator was calculated by regressing trade volumes on 
geographical determinants. Then, the residuals of that regression, OPENADJAV, are 
extracted and considered as reflecting trade policy. Openness to trade indicator is 
therefore provided by Ghura et al. (2002) dataset.  
 
Agricultural productivity: The agricultural labour productivity, AGRPRODAV, is 
introduced to capture the idea that a stronger growth in agriculture relative to the rest of 
the economy is beneficial to the poor. Following Dollar and Kraay (2002), the current 
price share of agriculture in GDP divided by share of workforce in agriculture is used as 
indicator for agricultural productivity.  
6.2 Main Empirical Results 
 
6.2.1 The results of the estimation of the basic model 
 
The first step is to estimate a basic equation, in which the key variable of interest, 
the real exchange rate, is introduced in addition to per capita GDP and school enrolment 
as explanatory variables. We also consider two measures for school enrolment, namely 
primary and secondary enrolments, to make sure that the results are robust. The same 
approach will be followed in the rest of the empirical investigation.  
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Table 2: The incomes of the poor and real exchange rate 
 
Dependent variable is the Log average income of the poorest 20 per cent of the population 
 SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
 (1) (2) 
Log Per Capita Income 0.9071*** 
(0.0341) 
0.9550*** 
(0.0361) 
Log REER -0.0065 
(0.0148) 
-0.0133 
(0.0165) 
Log PRIMEDAV 0.0690*** 
(0.0172) 
 
Log SECEDAV  0.0279*** 
(0.0074) 
   
Number of Observations 203 203 
Number of Countries 57 57 
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 0.603 0.61 
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation)  
0.920 0.854 
P(H0: 10 =δ ) 0.223 0.0086 
   
Variables that are instrumented  Log Per Capita Income 
and Log PRIMEDAV 
Log Per Capita Income, 
Log SECEDAV 
   
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
REER, PRIMADAV and SECEDAV stand for Real Effective Exchange Rate, Primary Enrolment and Secondary 
Enrolment, respectively. Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant.  
 
Table 2 reports the results on the basic equation. Per capita income, growth in 
short, and education appear with the theoretically expected signs and are statistically 
significant. The magnitude of the coefficient on per capita income is 0.907 and 0.955 in 
specifications (1) and (2), respectively, which is very close to what was found by other 
studies (Dollar and Kraay, 2002;  Ghura et al., 2002). The coefficient on primary 
enrolment is 0.069 while that on secondary enrolment is 0.028, suggesting that the 
positive impact of primary education on the incomes of the poor may be stronger than 
that of secondary education. Overall, these results seem to lend a strong support to the 
contention that economic growth and human capital development are conducive to 
poverty alleviation. However, real exchange rate turns surprisingly with a negative sign, 
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albeit statistically insignificant in all the specifications. The insignificance of real 
exchange rate may be due to two reasons. First, the channels through which real 
exchange rate influences poverty might have not been properly captured. More 
specifically, as indicated in the theoretical framework, the level of inequality and the 
quality of institutions may determine the extent to which real exchange rate influences 
poverty. Second, regressions based on the basic equation might have left out other 
important variables. If those variables happen to be correlated with other right-hand-side 
variables, the estimates may turn biased. It is therefore important to expand the 
specification to account for other key factors.  
6.2.2 The results of the estimation of the core model 
 
The next move is to estimate the core specification of our model, which includes 
as main right-hand-side variables average income, a human capital indicator, real 
exchange rate and the interactions between real exchange rate and the quality of 
institutions and between real exchange rate and inequality. To check the robustness of the 
econometric results, we use three measures of political institutions: democratic 
institutions index, DEMO, civil liberties index, ICL, and political rights index, IPR, in 
columns (4), (5) and (6), respectively.  
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Table 3: The incomes of the poor, real exchange rate, institutions, and inequality 
 
Dependent variable is the Log average income of the poorest 20 per cent of the population 
 SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
 (4) (5) (6) 
Log Per Capita Income 0.9052*** 
(0.0194) 
0.9016*** 
(0.0167) 
0.9097*** 
(0.0172) 
Log REER 0.0469*** 
(0.0110) 
0.0520*** 
(0.0096) 
0.0443*** 
(0.0079) 
Log REER*DEMO -0.00004 
(0.0001) 
  
Log REER*ICL  0.0001 
(0.0004) 
 
Log REER*IPR   0.00041 
(0.0003) 
Log REER*GINI -0.1119*** 
(0.0100) 
-0.1231*** 
(0.0107) 
-0.1163*** 
(0.0082) 
Log PRIMADAV 0.0260*** 
(0.0094) 
0.0264*** 
(0.0077) 
0.0273*** 
(0.0061) 
    
    
Number of Observations 203 172 172 
Number of Countries 57 56 56 
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 0.995 0.956 0.931 
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation)  
0.751 0.315 0.345 
P(H0: 10 =δ ) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    
Variables that are instrumented Log Per Capita Income 
and Log PRIMEDAV, 
DEMO, and GINI 
Log Per Capita 
Income and Log 
PRIMEDAV,  
ICL,and GINI 
Log Per Capita 
Income and Log 
PRIMEDAV, IPR 
and GINI 
    
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis  
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
DEMO, ICL, IPR, REER and PRIMEDAV stand for Democracy, Civil Liberties , Political Rights, Real Effective 
Exchange Rate and Primary Enrolment, respectively.  
Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant.  
 
Table 3 presents the results, in which primary education is used as a proxy for 
human capital accumulation. Except the interaction between real exchange rate and 
institutions, all the other right-hand-side variables have explanatory power on the 
incomes of the poor and enter the regressions with the theoretically expected signs. 
Indeed, average income is positively and significantly correlated with the incomes of the 
poor. The coefficient on real exchange rate becomes statistically significant and displays 
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a positive sign, which indicates that real depreciation in exchange rate is potentially 
beneficial to the poor. More importantly, the interaction between real exchange rate and 
the Gini coefficient turns to be significantly negative, meaning that inequality has the 
potential to reduce the positive contribution of real exchange rate depreciation to poverty 
alleviation. However, the interaction between real exchange rate and all the indicators 
measuring institutions turns not to exert a statistically significant influence on poverty. 
This finding does not necessary imply that the quality of institutions does not matter. It 
could suggest that measures based on political institutions might not be entirely 
appropriate in gauging the quality of institutions. In line with previous findings, we find 
primary enrolment to have a positive and significant effect on the incomes of the poor.  
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Table 4: The incomes of the poor, real exchange rate, institutions, and inequality 
 
Dependent variable is the Log average income of the poorest 20 per cent of the population 
 SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
 (7) (8) (9) 
Log Per Capita Income 0.9106*** 
(0.0176) 
0.8994*** 
(0.0199) 
0.9116*** 
(0.0154) 
Log REER 0.0504*** 
(0.0097) 
0.0583*** 
(0.0098) 
0.0501*** 
(0.0079) 
Log REER*DEMO 0.00001 
(0.0001) 
  
Log REER*ICL  0.00005 
(0.0004) 
 
Log REER*IPR   0.0002 
(0.0003) 
Log REER*GINI -0.1144*** 
(0.0104) 
-0.1212*** 
(0.0097) 
-0.1165*** 
(0.0063) 
Log SECEDAV 0.0127*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0141*** 
(0.0054) 
0.0155*** 
(0.0057) 
    
    
Number of Observations 203 172 172 
Number of Countries 57 56 56 
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 0.933 0.939 0.989 
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation)  
0.655 0.401 0.551 
P(H0: 10 =δ ) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    
Variables that are instrumented Log Per Capita Income 
and Log SECEDAV, 
DEMO, and GINI 
Log Per Capita Income 
and Log SECEDAV,  
ICL,and GINI 
Log Per Capita 
Income and Log 
SECEDAV, IPR and 
GINI 
    
 
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
DEMO, ICL, IPR, REER and SECEDAV stand for Democracy, Civil Liberties , Political Rights, Real Effective 
Exchange Rate and Secondary Enrolment, respectively.  
Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant.  
 
The previous results are based on primary enrolment. One concern is whether the 
results hold up when using alternative measures of human capital. We respond to this 
question by repeating the previous exercise but using secondary rather than primary 
enrolment as the measure of human capital accumulation. Results are reported in table 4. 
Those results bear a lot of similarities with those in table 3, with the notable exception 
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that the coefficient on secondary enrolment is significantly lower than that on primary 
education. In any event, these results are preliminary because there are some structural 
and policy variables that have not yet been accounted for. 
6.2.3 Additional controls 
 
The second concern that has consistently been raised in the chapter is the issue of 
omitted variables. We therefore consider in tables 5 and 6 potential controls that might 
have been left out in our core specification. These controls include trade openness, 
agricultural productivity, public spending variables, three variables that are frequently 
used as right-side-variables in the regressions on poverty. Accounting for the labour 
productivity in agricultural sector, AGRPRODAV, is a way to capture the impact of a 
sectoral distribution of growth on poverty.  The poor are likely to live in rural areas and 
derive their livehood from the agriculture sector. As a result, they stand to benefit more 
than the rest of the population from a strong   performance of that sector. The economic 
literature is replete with examples of countries where a vibrant productivity in 
agricultural sector is associated with better outcomes for the poor (Ravallion and Datt, 
1996). The idea of considering an indicator of openness in the empirical investigation is 
justified by the desire to take into account the burning issue of trade liberalization and 
poverty. Following Ghura et al. (2002), we use as indictor of openness the residuals of 
trade volumes purged of the geographical determinants, OPENADJAV51. Both openness 
and productivity in agriculture appear not to have statistically significant effects on 
                                                 
51
 The trade openness indicator is a residual, which implies that its standard error is biased.  We use 
bootstrap method to obtain an unbaiased estimate of the standard error but the results turn to be roughly 
identical.   
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poverty. The purpose of adding an indicator for public spending is to include in the 
empirical analysis the second main policy variable of the dependent economy model: the 
absorption.  In this regard, the government expenditure to GDP ratio appears to be an 
ideal candidate. 
Results from table 5 and 6 clearly reinforce the previous findings. All additional 
controls turn to be statistically insignificant, expect in column 10 of table 5 where the 
coefficient on openness turns to be positive and significant. The lack of a statistically 
significant effect of openness, agricultural productivity and public spending on the 
incomes of the poor does not imply that these factors are irrelevant for poverty 
alleviation. It rather suggests that those factors affect the poorest 20 per cent of the 
society the same way as they impact the rest of the population. In other terms, it indicates 
that the main channel through openness, agricultural productivity, and public spending 
influence the poor is through their impact on the average income or the growth of per -
capita income 
The coefficient on average income, which is the elasticity of the income of the 
poorest 20 percent of the population with respect to average income, is statistically 
significant and appears with the expected sign. Its magnitude varies from 0.9016 to 
0.9246 and the test on growth-poverty elasticity indicates that its value is statistically 
different to 1. The positive and significant coefficient on per capita income confirms 
various studies findings (Foster and Szekely, 2001: Dollar and Kraay, 2002: Ghura et al., 
2002) that fostering economic growth is an important avenue for poverty reduction. 
Putting this finding in the African context, one could affirm that the lacklustre economic 
te
l-0
01
16
96
1,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 2
9 
No
v 
20
06
Chapter II: POVERTY AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE: EVIDENCE FROM PANEL DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
116 
 
growth in the continent has been the driving force behind the relatively poor performance 
of the region in terms of poverty reduction in recent years.   
Real exchange rate continues to display a statistically significant impact on 
poverty. The same is also true for the interaction between real exchange rate and 
inequality and the human capital development indicator. Both tables 5 and 6 show that 
the interaction between income distribution, captured through Gini coefficient, and real 
exchange rate appears with a negative coefficient, with significance obtained at the 1 
percent level. Once again, this indicates that a skewed income distribution can undermine 
the positive impact of an appropriate real exchange rate on the incomes of the poor. The 
most important change that occurs when including additional controls is that the 
coefficient on the interaction between real exchange rate and some of institution 
variables, especially civil liberties and political rights indicators, turns significant and 
appears with a positive sign. Even though entering the regression with the expected sign, 
the interaction between real exchange rate and democracy index, DEMO, remains 
statistically insignificant. Overall, the results on institution variables tend to support the 
claim that the quality of institutions amplifies the positive impact of real exchange rate 
depreciation on poverty alleviation. Turning to human capital indicators, we again find 
both secondary and primary enrolments to be positively related to the income of the 
poorest fifth of the population in all specifications.  
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Table 5: The incomes of the poor, real exchange rate, institutions, inequality, and other covariates 
 
Dependent variable is the Log average income of the poorest 20 per cent of the population 
 SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
 (10) (11) (12) 
Log Per Capita Income 0.9155*** 
(0.0308) 
0.9201*** 
(0.0214) 
0.9246*** 
(0.0234) 
Log REER 0.0478*** 
(0.0114) 
0.0440*** 
(0.0074) 
0.0457*** 
(0.0070) 
Log REER*DEMO 0.00002 
(0.0001) 
  
Log REER*ICL  0.00086*** 
(0.0003) 
 
Log REER*IPR   0.0056*** 
(0.0002) 
Log REER*GINI -0.1141*** 
(0.0092) 
-0.1148*** 
(0.0079) 
-0.1121*** 
(0.0091) 
Log PRIMADAV 0.0158** 
(0.0062) 
0.01164 
(0.0074) 
0.0151*** 
(0.0056) 
OPENADJAV 0.0371** 
(0.0168) 
0.0209 
(0.0214) 
0.0200 
(0.0170) 
AGRPRODAV -0.0250 
(0.0128) 
-0.0189 
(0.0126) 
-0.0305 
(0.0120) 
Log GE 0.0008 
(0.0075) 
-0.0013 
(0.0091) 
-0.0054 
(0.0079) 
    
    
Number of Observations 157 148 148 
Number of Countries 53 53 53 
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation)  
0.395 0.339 0.711 
P(H0: 10 =δ ) 0.008 0.0005 0.002 
    
Variables that are instrumented Log Per Capita Income 
and Log PRIMEDAV, 
DEMO, GINI and GE 
Log Per Capita 
Income and Log 
PRIMEDAV,  ICL, 
GINI and GE 
Log Per Capita 
Income and Log 
PRIMEDAV, IPR, 
GINI and GE 
    
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
** denotes significance of the estimates at 5 percent critical level 
DEMO, ICL, IPR, REER and PRIMEDAV, OPENADJAV, AGRPRODAV, GE stand for Democracy, Civil liberties , 
Political Rights, Real Effective Exchange Rate and Primary Enrolment, the measure of Openness,  the Agricultural 
Relative Productivity and the ratio Government Expenditures to GDP  respectively.  
Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant.  
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Table 6: The incomes of the poor, real exchange rate, institutions, inequality, and other covariates 
 
Dependent variable is the Log average income of the poorest 20 per cent of the population 
 SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
 (13) (14) (15) 
Log Per Capita Income 0.9246*** 
(0.0215) 
0.9240*** 
(0.0211) 
0.9380*** 
(0.0293) 
Log REER 0.0446*** 
(0.0095) 
0.0432*** 
(0.0078) 
0.0407*** 
(0.0060) 
Log REER*DEMO 0.00004 
(0.0001) 
  
Log REER*ICL  0.0006** 
(0.0003) 
 
Log REER*IPR   0.0004*** 
(0.001) 
Log REER*GINI -0.1141*** 
(0.0156) 
-0.1124*** 
(0.0098) 
-0.1106*** 
(0.0072) 
Log SECEDAV 0.0099* 
(0.0056) 
0.0118** 
(0.0048) 
0.0144*** 
(0.0039) 
OPENADJAV 0.0348 
(0.0309) 
0.0188 
(0.0241) 
-0.0056 
(0.0200) 
AGRPRODAV -0.0178 
(0.0122) 
-0.0086 
(0.0127) 
-0.0222 
(0.0142) 
Log GE 0.0030 
(0.0057) 
-0.0013 
(0.0073) 
-0.0039 
(0.0148) 
    
    
Number of Observations 157 148 148 
Number of Countries 53 53 53 
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 1.00 1.00 1.00 
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation)  
0.342 0.703 0.792 
P(H0: 10 =δ ) 0.001 0.001 0.039 
    
Variables that are instrumented Log Per Capita Income 
and Log SECEDAV, 
DEMO, GINI and GE 
Log Per Capita Income 
and Log SECEDAV,  
ICL, GINI and GE 
Log Per Capita 
Income and Log 
SECEDAV, IPR, 
GINI and GE 
    
    
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
** denotes significance of the estimates at 5 percent critical level 
* denotes significance of the estimates at 10 percent critical level 
DEMO, ICL, IPR, REER and SECEDAV, OPENADJAV, AGRPRODAV, GE stand for Democracy, Civil liberties , 
Political Rights, Real Effective Exchange Rate and Secondary Enrolment, the measure of Openness,  the Agricultural 
Relative Productivity and the ratio Government Expenditures to GDP  respectively.  
Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant.  
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6.2.4 Asymmetric effects 
 
One of the concerns about the results in tables 5 and 6 is whether the real 
exchange-poverty correlation is either driven by episodes of real exchange rate 
depreciation and decline in poverty or episodes of real exchange appreciation and 
increasing poverty. We address this concern by extending the analysis so as to account 
for potential asymmetric effects of real exchange rate on poverty. Following Agénor 
(2002), we introduce two dummy variables. The first is labelled PASY and is equal to 1 
times REER when there is depreciation in real exchange rate and 0 otherwise. The second 
is called NASY, which gets the value 1 times REER when there is real appreciation in 
exchange rate and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 7: The incomes of the poor and real exchange rate asymmetric effects 
 
 
Dependent variable is the Log average income of the poorest 20 per cent of the population 
 SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
 (16) (17) (18) 
Log Per Capita Income 1.0092*** 
(0.0216) 
1.0062*** 
(0.0203) 
1.0014*** 
(0.0288) 
Log REER*DEMO -0.00003 
(0.0001) 
  
Log REER*ICL  0.00065** 
(0.003) 
 
Log REER*IPR   0.00047 
(0.0003) 
Log REER*GINI -0.1085*** 
(0.0095) 
-0.1100*** 
(0.0101) 
-0.1050*** 
(0.0144) 
Log PRIMEDAV 0.0046 
(0.0073) 
0.0067 
(0.0108) 
0.0062 
(0.0140) 
OPENADJAV 0.0270 
(0.0257) 
0.0044 
(0.0186) 
0.0123 
(0.0144) 
AGRPRODAV -0.0097 
(0.0191) 
-0.0044 
(0.0186) 
-0.0216 
(0.0186) 
Log GE -0.0054 
(0.0108) 
-0.0071 
(0.0174) 
-0.0046 
(0.0117) 
NASY 0.00038*** 
(0.00008) 
0.00035*** 
(0.00009) 
0.00036*** 
(0.00006) 
PASY 0.00036*** 
(0.00009) 
0.00035*** 
(0.0001) 
0.00038*** 
(0.00006) 
    
    
Number of Observations 122 116 116 
Number of Countries 44 44 44 
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 1.00 0.99 1.00 
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation)  
0.537 0.281 0.281 
P(H0: 10 =δ ) 0.672 0.761 0.960 
P[H0: Coef(NASY)=Coef(PASY)] 0.777 0.941 0.340 
    
Variables that are instrumented Log Per Capita Income 
and Log PRIMEDAV, 
DEMO, GINI and GE  
Log Per Capita Income 
and Log PRIMEDAV,  
ICL, GINI and GE 
Log Per Capita 
Income and Log 
PRIMEDAV, IPR, 
GINI and GE 
    
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
DEMO, ICL, IPR, REER and PRIMEDAV, OPENADJAV, AGRPRODAV, GE stand for Democracy, Civil liberties , 
Political Rights, Real Effective Exchange Rate and Primary Enrolment, the measure of Openness,  the Agricultural 
Relative Productivity and the ratio Government Expenditures to GDP  respectively.  NASY is equal to 1 times REER 
when there is an appreciation in REER, 0 otherwise. PASY is equal to 1 times REER when there is depreciation in 
REER, 0 otherwise.  
Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant.  
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Table 8: The incomes of the poor and real exchange rate asymmetric effects 
 
 
Dependent variable is the Log average income of the poorest 20 per cent of the population 
 SYS-GMM SYS-GMM SYS-GMM 
 (19) (20) (21) 
Log Per Capita Income 1.0121*** 
(0.0118) 
1.0038*** 
(0.0147) 
1.0085*** 
(0.0247) 
Log REER*DEMO -0.00004 
(0.00013) 
  
Log REER*ICL  0.0004 
(0.0003) 
 
Log REER*IPR   0.0005 
(0.0002) 
Log REER*GINI -0.1057*** 
(0.0125) 
-0.1088*** 
(0.0085) 
-0.1059*** 
(0.0111) 
Log SECEDAV 0.0045 
(0.0117) 
0.0081* 
(0.0041) 
0.0081 
(0.0075) 
OPENADJAV 0.0165 
(0.0394) 
0.0025 
(0.0215) 
-0.0063 
(0.0196) 
AGRPRODAV -0.0136 
(0.0585) 
-0.0035 
(0.0210) 
-0.0137 
(0.0158) 
Log GE -0.0061 
(0.0167) 
-0.0042 
(0.0088) 
-0.0084 
(0.1273) 
NASY 0.00036*** 
(0.0001) 
0.00035*** 
(0.00008) 
0.00036*** 
(0.00007) 
PASY 0.00035*** 
(0.0001) 
0.00035*** 
(0.0001) 
0.00036*** 
(0.00007) 
    
    
Number of Observations 122 116 116 
Number of Countries 44 44 44 
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 0.99 0.99 1.00 
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation)  
0.55 0.40 0.88 
P(H0: 10 =δ ) 0.31 0.79 0.73 
P[H0: Coef(NASY)=Coef(PASY)] 0.828 0.975 0.814 
    
Variables that are instrumented Log Per Capita 
Income and Log 
SECEDAV, DEMO, 
GINI and GE 
Log Per Capita Income 
and Log SECEDAV,  
ICL, GINI and GE 
Log Per Capita Income 
and Log SECEDAV, 
IPR, GINI and GE 
    
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
DEMO, ICL, IPR, REER and SECEDAV, OPENADJAV, AGRPRODAV, GE stand for Democracy, Civil liberties , 
Political Rights, Real Effective Exchange Rate and Secondary Enrolment, the measure of Openness,  the Agricultural 
Relative Productivity and the ratio Government Expenditures to GDP  respectively. NASY is equal to 1 times REER 
when there is an appreciation in REER, 0 otherwise. PASY is equal to 1 times REER when there is depreciation in 
REER, 0 otherwise.  
Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant.  
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Table 7 reports the results wherein primary enrolment is used as the measure of 
human capital development whereas Table 8 contains the results of estimates that revert 
to secondary enrolment as the measure of education. The results in both tables tilt 
towards the same conclusions.  The more important one is that the coefficients on PASY 
and NASY are significant and statistically indistinguishable, which implies that there is no 
asymmetric effect of real exchange rate on the incomes of the poor. As far as the other 
explanatory variables are concerned, results largely confirm previous findings. 
Especially, per capita income, or economic growth, continues to be strongly correlated 
with poverty as suggested by significant higher poverty-growth elasticity, which in both 
tables is not statistically different to 1. The coefficient on the interaction between 
inequality and real exchange rate also remains statistically significant while those on 
openness, agricultural productivity and government expenditure are insignificant at 
conventional significance levels.  
 
VII- CONCLUSION 
 
Facing both external and internal imbalances, several developing countries have 
implemented some economic reforms over the past two decades. The dependent economy 
model shows that these policies have two pillars: the reduction of absorption, obtained to 
a large degree through fiscal adjustment, and the depreciation of real exchange rate. The 
approach used in this chapter consists in assessing the impact of economic policies on 
poverty through these two instruments, with more emphasis on real exchange rate. 
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The main point in the theoretical framework is that the depreciation of real 
exchange rate is conducive to poverty reduction provided that there are good institutions 
and a fairly equal distribution of income. The empirical investigation strongly supports 
the view that high inequality, proxied by income distribution, impedes the potential 
positive effect of real exchange rate depreciation on poverty. It also largely backs the 
contention that the potential positive impact of real exchange rate depreciation on the 
poor is much stronger when institutions are sound. 
Some additional controls are added in the analysis to account for other factors that 
might have been missed in the analysis. Education appears to be critical for poverty 
reduction. On the other hand, trade openness, agricultural productivity and public 
spending are found not to be statistically associated with the incomes of the poor. The 
lack of significant coefficients associated with these variables does not mean a complete 
absence of relationships between these indicators and poverty but rather indicates that 
trade openness, agricultural productivity and public spending come into play indirectly 
because of their potential impact on economic growth.  
Overall, the main policy implication of our findings is that real exchange 
depreciation could be a powerful tool for poverty reduction if complemented by other 
policies. Those policies include facilitating the access of the poor to production factors 
and improving the quality of institutions.  
The improvement of institutions, especially political, may have an important 
bearing on the design of economic policies. In view of the major political reforms that 
took place in many African countries, it will be worth exploring the implications of such 
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changes on economic policy stances in the continent. This is, in part, what Chapter III is 
going to pursue.  
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APPENDIX II-1: SOURCES AND COMMENTS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables Sources Comments (if any) 
Average Incomes in lowest quintile Dollar & Kraay (2002)  
Per Capita Income Dollar & Kraay (2002)  
REER 
International Financial Statistics 
(2004), World Development Indicators 
(2004) and COMTRADE (2004) 
Natural Logarithm of Real Effective 
Exchange Rate. The real effective exchange 
rate is the ratio of prices in the rest of the 
world adjusted for variations in nominal 
effective exchange rate to price in the 
country. The weighting scheme used in the 
calculation of prices in the rest of the world 
and nominal effective exchange rate is 
based on the shares of the country’s exports 
to the main five largest trade partners. An 
increase means depreciation while a 
decrease means an appreciation. 
Source: Calculated based on data from 
International Financial Statistics (2004), 
World Development Indicators (2004) and 
COMTRADE (2004).  
 
PRIMAV Dollar & Kraay (2002)  
SECEDAV Dollar & Kraay (2002)  
DEMO Polity V Database  
Polity2 was transformed into DEMO by 
adding 10. DEMO becomes strictly positive. 
ICL Freedom House (2005) 
Civil Liberties Index (CL) was transformed 
into an increasing function (ICL) by adding 
7 to the product of -1 times CL 
IPR Freedom House(2005) 
Political Rights Index (PR) was transformed 
into an increasing function (IPR) by  adding 
7 to the product of -1 times PR 
OPENDJAV 
Ghura, Leite, and Tsangarides’s 
Database (2002)  
AGRODAV Dollar & Kraay (2002) 
 
 
Labour productivity in agricultural sector 
relative to economy wide labour 
productivity  
GE 
 
World Development Indicators 2004 
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APPENDIX II-2: SAMPLES 
 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lesotho, Mali, Mauritania, Madagascar, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, 
Seychelles, and Zambia.  
 
OTHER REGIONS 
Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, Bahamas, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chilli, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Germany, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Spain, Estonia, Finland, Fiji, 
France, Great Britain, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Hong Kong, Honduras, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, 
Japan, Korea, Sri Lanka, Luxembourg, Morocco, Moldova, Mexico, Mauritius, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, 
Nepal, New Zealand, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Portugal, Romania, Russia, 
Singapore, Slovakia, Sweden, Thailand, Tonga, Tunisia, Turkey, Taiwan, Tanzania, United States, Venezuela, and 
Yemen.  
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APPENDIX II-3 : DEFINITION ET INDICATEURS DE PAUVRETE 
 
 
La pauvreté est l’état dans lequel le bien-être d’une personne ou d’un groupe de 
personnes est en deçà du niveau perçu comme étant le minimum raisonnable selon les critères 
d’une société donnée (Ravallion, 1995). Cette définition soulève trois questions. La première 
porte sur la façon dont on évalue le « bien-être » ou précisément les concepts ou les approches qui 
permettent de saisir le « bien-être ». La seconde a trait à l’identification du seuil à partir duquel 
une personne est considérée comme étant pauvre. La troisième concerne la façon dont il faut 
synthétiser les informations en un indicateur agrégé de pauvreté. La première question soulevée 
relève de l’identification des approches permettant de capter le bien-être, et sera traitée dans la 
première section de cette annexe. Les deux dernières questions touchent à l’élaboration des 
indicateurs de pauvreté et seront analysées dans la deuxième section.  
 
I. APPROCHES 
 
  De nombreuses méthodes conceptuelles existent pour mesurer le bien-être d’un individu. 
Ces méthodes diffèrent non seulement selon le nombre de facteurs retenus pour évaluer le bien-
être mais aussi selon l’importance qu’attache l’analyste à la manière dont l’individu juge lui-
même son bien-être. 
 
  1.1 Approche matérielle et non-matérielle 
 
Certaines méthodes ne captent que le côté matériel autrement dit « le bien-être 
économique », et ainsi définissent la pauvreté comme étant la rareté de ressources et de biens 
(Bey, 1999), entravant la satisfaction de besoins essentiels comme la nutrition, l’habillement, et le 
logement. Cette définition met en lumière deux aspects importants de la pauvreté « matérielle »,  
à savoir le faible revenu et la non-satisfaction des nécessités de base. La prise en compte de la 
deuxième dimension, c’est-à-dire les besoins fondamentaux, répond aux interrogations soulevées 
sur la pertinence de l’approche en termes de revenu dans l’évaluation de la pauvreté. Au nombre 
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des limites d’une telle approche figurent la difficulté à évaluer les revenus non-monétaires 
(autoconsommation en particulier) dans les pays pauvres,  la difficulté à mesurer les flux 
d’entraide, et la non-prise en compte des externalités générées par l’Etat, à travers la fourniture de 
biens publics,  et les industries, par le truchement de leurs effets sur l’environnement. Bref, les 
approches fondées exclusivement sur le revenu n’accordent pas d’importance aux biens qui ne 
passent pas par le marché et qui ont un impact sur le niveau de vie des individus, et contribuent 
ainsi à biaiser vers le haut ou le bas le niveau de pauvreté. Pour cette raison, elles sont complétées 
par d’autres concepts qui mettent en exergue la satisfaction de nécessités de base.  
Les besoins fondamentaux recouvrent non seulement ce qui est requis à un ménage au 
titre de sa consommation individuelle (alimentation, logement, habillement) mais également ce 
dont la collectivité ne peut se passer (approvisionnement en eau potable, services d’éducation, de 
santé et d’hygiène) (Destremau et Salama, 2002). Ces besoins fondamentaux ont la particularité 
d’être considérés comme universels et identiques, c’est-à-dire indépendants des cultures et 
civilisations, du temps et de l’espace. Cependant, ils constituent des besoins physiques et 
psychiques qui peuvent être satisfaits selon des modalités économiques extrêmement variées. Une 
autre particularité des besoins fondamentaux est qu’elle possède deux attributs. Le premier est 
qu’ils peuvent être quantifiables ou mesurables. Le second attribut est que leur satisfaction est 
productive en ce qu’elle rehausse le niveau de productivité des hommes.  
L’approche des besoins fondamentaux tire ses fondements d’une vision humaniste qui va 
au-delà de l’économie et qui met l’accent sur la morale et le développement de l’Homme sur tous 
les angles. Elle a connu un grand écho à partir des années 1950. Pour des fins descriptives et 
normatives, l’approche se ramena à celle de minimum vital. Certains comme François Perroux 
(1952) parlait de « coûts de l’homme » qui englobent la nourriture, la santé, et l’éducation. 
L’approche des besoins fondamentaux attira davantage l’attention de la communauté 
internationale à partir de la moitié des années 1970 avec la Conférence mondiale tripartite sur 
l’emploi, la répartition du revenu, le progrès social, et la division internationale du travail. Suite à 
cette conférence,  elle devient l’épine dorsale d’un nouveau type de stratégies pour la promotion 
du développement dans le Tiers Monde. 
La rareté de ressources et d’actifs compromet la possibilité de se couvrir contre le risque, 
donc le concept de pauvreté recouvre également la notion de vulnérabilité face aux chocs. La 
notion de vulnérabilité a la même signification que celle exposée par Guillaumont et Combes 
(2000), à savoir le risque pour les pauvres d’être défavorablement touchés par des chocs exogènes 
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sur lesquels ils n’ont pas un contrôle direct. Il est possible de distinguer trois éléments de la 
vulnérabilité : l’importance du choc, le degré d’exposition aux chocs, et la résilience ou capacité à 
réagir aux chocs (Combes et Guillaumont, 2002 ; Guillaumont, 1999).  
Dercon (2001) analyse la relation entre pauvreté et vulnérabilité, et propose un schéma 
conceptuel distinguant trois niveaux de risques. Le premier niveau de risques survient lorsque les 
ménages dotés d’actifs comme le travail, le capital physique, le capital humain, et le capital social 
s’engagent dans des activités génératrices de revenus. Ce type de risques peut être lié aux 
contraintes d’information, et de fonctionnement des marchés et des autres institutions. Le 
deuxième groupe de risques peut porter directement sur les actifs, entre autres les risques de 
destruction imputables à l’environnement et aux conflits armés, et à l’érosion du capital humain. 
Les risques liés aux actifs peuvent, également, découler du non-respect des droits de propriété. Le 
troisième groupe de risques survient au cours du processus de passage des revenus vers 
l’accroissement des capacités, et comporte des risques pouvant être liés aux politiques publiques 
adoptées et à l’accès aux biens publics. En somme, cette typologie de risques montre que la 
vulnérabilité est une dimension importante dans la dynamique de production et de création de 
revenus et ainsi de la pauvreté matérielle, mais souligne également qu’elle peut en être la cause. 
L’adoption de comportements réducteurs de risque peut être la source de moindres revenus et 
donc limite les possibilités de réduction de la pauvreté.  
D’autres, par contre, intègrent dans la définition de la pauvreté d’autres aspects plus 
abstraits du bien-être, à savoir l’absence ou le manque de potentialités ou de capacités 
(capabilities). Le manque ou l’absence de ces éléments entravent l’acquisition d’un capital 
physique minimale requis pour s’épanouir dans une société donnée. 
Le concept de capacités a été développé par Sen (1985a), qui se démarque des approches 
axées sur les besoins fondamentaux et opte pour une démarche mettant l’accent sur la justice 
sociale, l’équité, et les inégalités. Aussi, définit-il la pauvreté dans un cadre qui prend en compte 
non seulement les facteurs économiques mais également les dimensions légales, politiques, et 
sociales. La base de son analyse sur les capacités part d’une réflexion sur les famines. Celle-ci 
l’amène à deux conclusions majeures. Premièrement, il rejette la possession de biens matériels, y 
compris ceux jugés essentiels, comme élément permettant d’apprécier le bien-être des personnes. 
Deuxièmement, il met en cause les approches agrégées pour cerner la problématique des famines, 
des inégalités et de la pauvreté. 
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En effet, Sen démontre que la disponibilité d’un bien à un endroit donné n’est que 
faiblement corrélée (par l’autoproduction, la création d’emplois, le système des prix et la 
constitution de réserves publiques) à l’aptitude qu’ont certains groupes d’y avoir accès. 
Autrement dit, c’est l’incapacité à se procurer les biens et non la pénurie, qui explique les 
famines. Cette incapacité découle de facteurs légaux, ou semi-légaux, et économiques. 
Partant de ce constat, la pauvreté se définirait non pas comme un manque vis-à-vis des 
besoins fondamentaux en divers biens, mais en termes de défaut de réalisation de certains 
fonctionnements de base et de l’acquisition des capacités correspondantes. L’approche des 
capacités est ainsi une approche qualitative qui embrasse à la fois l’avoir matériel mais porte 
également une grande attention aux valeurs de réalisation et de liberté, les fonctionnements 
représentant une façon de mener son existence, et les capacités incarnant les diverses opportunités 
qui se présentent à une personne et parmi lesquelles elle opère un choix. Il découle que ni le 
revenu, ni l’utilité ne peut capter le bien-être dans l’approche en termes de capacités. La pauvreté 
ne peut pas être définie  par rapport à la faiblesse du revenu et de l’utilité mais plutôt par rapport à 
l'inadaptation des moyens économiques au regard de l’aptitude des individus à les transformer en 
capacités de fonctionner, et ceci dans un contexte social, économique et culturel spécifique.      
La combinaison de la rareté de ressources et d’opportunités limite le choix des pauvres et 
leur capacité à être entendu et à contrôler les situations dont dépendent leur sort (powerless and 
voiceless) (Narayan et al., 2000). Donc la pauvreté peut-être synonyme d’exclusion sociale, de 
détresse psychologique, et de manque de choix et d’action. 
 
1.2. Les approches « utilitariste » et « non utilitariste » 
 
      1.2.1 Exposé 
 
L’approche utilitariste fonde les comparaisons du bien-être exclusivement sur les 
préférences des individus et tire une grande partie de ses fondements théoriques de la théorie 
microéconomique moderne. Au cœur de l’approche se trouve la notion de classement des 
préférences pour les biens, qui peut être captée par une « fonction d’utilité ». La valeur de cette 
dernière est supposée résumer le bien-être d’un individu. Les utilités constituent alors la base des 
préférences sociales, y compris des comparaisons de la pauvreté. Des doutes sont émis quant à la 
pertinence des jugements personnels de bien-être, et deux raisons sont couramment évoquées. La 
première est que les individus peuvent être mal informés. La seconde repose sur le phénomène de 
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« dissonance cognitive » (Akerlof, 1982) dans lequel les choix effectués par l’individu peuvent 
s’avérer économiquement irrationnels même en présence d’information parfaite. 
En supposant qu’il soit possible de comparer les utilités de différents individus (utilités 
cardinales), des fonctions de bien-être social, qui ne sont que l’agrégation d’utilités individuelles, 
peuvent être construites. Cependant, le concept de fonction de bien-être social est incompatible 
avec la théorie purement ordinaliste des préférences en raison entre autres de la non-transitivité 
des choix sociaux, et ne permet pas ainsi d’établir des comparaisons logiques de pauvreté ou  de 
former tout autre jugement pertinent sur le bien-être social. 
En effet, en définissant les préférences sociales à partir des préférences individuelles et en 
choisissant la règle de la majorité comme étant la base de définition d’une fonction de bien-être 
social, le Paradoxe de Condorcet nous apprend que le concept de bien-être social ne révèle pas, de 
façon cohérente, ce qui est préféré socialement.  En effet, il est possible qu’une alternative A soit 
préférée à une alternative B, que B soit préférée à C, mais par contre que C soit préférée à A, 
violant ainsi le principe de transitivité des choix.  
Le Théorème d’Impossibilité d’Arrow, qui est une version générale du paradoxe de 
Condorcet, élimine la possibilité d’existence d’une fonction de bien-être social. Arrow établit un 
certain nombre d’hypothèses sur ce que doit être une fonction de bien-être, et démontre qu’il 
n’existe aucun mécanisme, permettant le passage des préférences individuelles aux préférences 
sociales et qui ne violerait pas les hypothèses de départ. Une des hypothèses est l’absence de 
dictature, qui suppose qu’une fonction de bien-être social  ne se résume pas à la fonction d’utilité 
d’une personne. Une autre hypothèse est l’indépendance des choix « independence of irrelevant 
alternatives » qui postule que si une fonction de bien-être social amène à conclure qu’une 
alternative A est préférée à une alternative B, tout changement de préférences qui n’affecte pas 
l’ordre de préférence entre A et B établit par les individus ne modifie nullement les préférences 
sociales pour A et B. Une autre hypothèse établit le principe de transitivité de la fonction de bien-
être social, à savoir que si A est préféré à B, et B préféré à C, alors A est préféré à C.  
 
L’approche non utilitariste se distingue par la référence faite à certaines aptitudes 
élémentaires à satisfaire ses besoins fondamentaux, comme la possibilité de se nourrir et de se 
vêtir de manière adéquate. Sen (1980, 1985b, 1987) marque sa préférence pour l’approche non-
utilitaire en s’appuyant sur une argumentation différente, abandonnant à la fois l’utilité comme 
étalon de mesure du bien-être et les formules non utilitaires axées sur les besoins. Sen (1987) 
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rappelle que « la valeur du niveau de vie a tout à voir avec la vie, non pas avec la possession de 
biens ». La pauvreté est ainsi perçue comme une privation de la faculté qu’ont les individus à 
fonctionner. L’analyse de la pauvreté revient pour Sen à cerner ce que sont ces facultés dans des 
sociétés spécifiques et à identifier les personnes qui ne peuvent pas les acquérir.  
 Par ailleurs, Sen, tout en admettant la pertinence d’une considération de l’efficacité, 
propre aux utilitaristes, remet en cause les arguments en faveur d’un maintien des inégalités, et 
conteste l’idée selon laquelle toute réduction des inégalités est antithétique à l’amélioration de 
l’efficience d’une économie et au principe de maximisation des utilités. 
La critique des modèles non utilitaires tient au fait que l’identification des formes 
spécifiques de privation de biens ainsi que l’importance qui leur sont accordées relèvent du 
champ de l’analyste, soulevant ainsi des critiques relatives au caractère arbitraire de l’approche. 
 
     1.2.2 Points communs et divergences  
 
La théorie donne rarement des recommandations pratiques quant à la façon de mesurer 
les niveaux de vie. Aussi, constate-t-on l’usage de nombreuses procédures d’estimation du bien-
être par chaque approche.  Néanmoins, ce qui semble ressortir des deux approches est le choix 
porté sur la consommation de biens et services comme facteur déterminant du bien-être. 
L’approche utilitaire génère des indicateurs reposant sur les biens et services consommés 
par un ménage et sur les caractéristiques dudit ménage ; ce qui restreint la notion « d’utilité » au 
seul « bien-être économique » et amène à ignorer les autres aspects de l’utilité qui ne sont pas 
quantifiables comme les biens non marchands et les éléments non matériels de la condition 
humaine comme la liberté. L’indicateur qui découle de l’approche utilitariste est le total des 
dépenses de consommation en biens et services, normalisé de sorte à prendre en compte les 
différences de prix et les caractéristiques des ménages. Les approches non utilitaires et celles 
fondées sur les facultés mettent en avant l’aptitude à se procurer des biens comme élément 
explicatif du bien-être et retiennent aussi la consommation comme indicateur. 
Quoiqu’ayant systématiquement recours aux données sur la consommation, l’usage qui 
en est faite diffère d’une approche à une autre. Primo, les utilitaristes fondent leur analyse du 
bien-être sur les dépenses totales tandis que les non-utilitaristes ne s’intéressent qu’à certains 
types de privation de biens à l’instar du logement, de la nutrition ou de l’habillement. Secundo, 
dans l’approche utilitaire les méthodes d’agrégation des biens et services consommés sont 
clairement explicitées. Les prix du marché servent à évaluer les préférences. Par contre les 
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approches non utilitaires ne donnent aucune indication sur la façon dont il faudrait agréger les 
principaux déterminants du bien-être. Tierco, des divergences subsistent quant à l’estimation de la 
valeur des services publics consommés et sur l’importance accordée aux caractéristiques de 
l’individu qui, rappelons le, peuvent influencer les aptitudes des individus sans pour autant agir 
sur les préférences. 
 
II-INDICATEURS DE PAUVRETE 
 
Deux catégories d’indicateurs seront présentées, celles reposant sur des mesures 
monétaires et celles intégrant d’autres dimensions de la pauvreté autres que le revenu.   
 
2.1 Les indicateurs de pauvreté monétaire  
 
Le processus de construction d’indicateurs de pauvreté monétaire exige qu’on réponde à 
trois questions : la première a trait au choix du type de données, la seconde porte sur le choix de 
l’unité de référence et de la façon dont on tient compte de son hétérogénéité, et la troisième est 
relative au seuil qui permet de définir qui est pauvre et qui ne l’est pas. 
 
2.1.1 L’unité d’observation et l’ajustement pour les économies d’échelle  
 
Les enquêtes budget-consommation prennent généralement le ménage comme unité de 
référence et d’analyse. Ce dernier n’ayant pas toujours la même composition, il y a lieu de 
prendre en compte la dimension taille du ménage dans la mesure du bien-être matériel. En effet, 
une personne qui vit dans un ménage de cinq personnes ayant une consommation totale de 10 000 
CFA par mois est manifestement moins nantie qu’une personne issue d’un ménage d’un individu  
enregistrant une consommation totale de 10 000 CFA. Une façon d’intégrer la dimension taille 
dans l’analyse peut consister à raisonner en termes de consommation par tête, ce qui peut paraître 
simpliste pour deux raisons. Premièrement, certains types de biens peuvent être consommés par 
tout le ménage d’où l’existence d’économies d’échelle. Deuxièmement, l’âge influe sur le niveau 
de la consommation. On peut s’attendre à ce que la consommation d’un adolescent soit moins 
importante que celle d’un adulte en activité. La notion d’échelle équivalente est généralement 
utilisée et permet de capter tant la structure d’âge que la taille du ménage. La notion d’échelle 
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équivalente se mesure à travers deux méthodes : une dite de deux paramètres et l’autre dit d’un 
seul paramètre. Elles se formulent de la façon suivante :    
Echelle équivalente = (adultes + α*enfants)θ  
Echelle équivalente = (Taille du ménage)θ  
Par enfants, on entend le nombre de personnes âgées de moins de 15 ans ; α et θ sont des 
paramètres tels que : 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 et 0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 ;  θ capte les économies d’échelle , plus il est élevé 
plus les économies d’échelle sont importantes ; α saisit le poids de la consommation des enfants. 
Cependant, il n’existe aucune technique d’estimation consensuelle de θ : l’ampleur des 
économies d’échelle (Deaton, Paxon 1996, Deaton 1997). De nombreuses méthodes sont 
utilisées, chacune ayant des limites. Les méthodes utilisées diffèrent selon les pays, posant du 
coup un problème de comparabilité.  
 
2.1.2 Choix du type de données 
 
La mesure monétaire de la pauvreté requiert des données sur le revenu ou sur les 
dépenses. La seconde alternative est préférée à la première pour trois raisons: i) pour des raisons 
liées aux chocs intermittents, les revenus des ménages, dans bon nombre de pays en 
développement, subissent une évolution erratique qui peut ne pas refléter rigoureusement celle de 
la richesse des ménages; par contre la consommation fluctue moins en raison du fait qu’elle est 
lissée dans le temps; ii) l’épargne est perçue comme une consommation différée et par conséquent 
affecte les niveaux de bien-être ; iii) les données sur la consommation sont plus fiables que celles 
sur le revenu parce que les ménages les divulguent plus facilement. En effet, les ménages ont 
tendance à sous-estimer le niveau de leurs revenus par volonté d’échapper à la fiscalité ou pour 
des raisons culturelles. 
 
2.1.3 Seuils de pauvreté 
 
Définir une personne comme étant pauvre suppose l’existence d’un repère, qui peut être 
un seuil ou un indice, sur lequel repose le classement. Les seuils sont formulés le plus souvent 
dans l’espace de la consommation, et deux concepts reviennent souvent : la notion de « pauvreté 
relative » et celle de « pauvreté absolue ». Ravallion (1995) définit le seuil de pauvreté absolue 
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comme étant «  le seuil constant en termes de niveaux de vie,   et unique sur l’ensemble du 
domaine dans lequel les comparaisons de la pauvreté sont effectuées ». Un seuil de pauvreté 
relative, par contre, consiste à choisir une fraction donnée des dépenses moyennes par habitant ou 
par ménage comme repère.  
La détermination   du seuil de pauvreté absolue commence par la détermination du panier 
de  biens permettant d’obtenir  l’énergie nutritive requise pour survivre. Cependant, force est de 
reconnaître qu’il existe plusieurs paniers d’aliments pouvant assurer l’énergie nutritive 
recherchée. L’efficience voudrait qu’on choisisse la combinaison d’aliments qui minimise le coût 
du nombre de calories nécessaires à la survie, à des prix donnés, et qui répond aux habitudes 
alimentaires d’une population donnée.  Dès que ces biens sont identifiés, on leur trouve une 
équivalence monétaire en utilisant un système de prix qui reflète la structure du panier de 
consommation. Le montant ainsi trouvé est appelé la ligne d’indigence qu’on peut élargir au 
ménage en appliquant des coefficients de réduction pour les membres de la famille au-delà ou en 
deçà  d’un certain âge. On parlera de pauvreté extrême pour qualifier les personnes (ou les 
ménages) ayant des  revenus en dessous de la ligne d’indigence.  
Cependant, la relation entre la consommation d’énergie nutritive et des dépenses de 
consommation diffère d’un secteur à un autre, d’une période à une autre, et d’une région à une 
autre. Cette relation peut être tributaire des goûts, des prix relatifs, de l’existence de biens publics, 
et de la richesse. Par exemple, les ménages les plus nantis auront tendance à acheter des calories 
plus onéreuses. Pour toutes ces raisons, la méthode décrite ci-dessus dite de l’énergie nutritive 
génère des seuils de pauvreté différents selon les sous-groupes, et ne permet pas ainsi d’établir un 
profil de pauvreté cohérent.  
Le passage de la ligne d’indigence à la ligne de pauvreté nécessite la prise en compte des 
dépenses de logement, d’habillement et de transport qui se fait en appliquant à la ligne 
d’indigence un multiplicateur dit d’Engel. Afin de faciliter des comparaisons internationales, la 
ligne de pauvreté est convertie en utilisant des taux de change en termes de parité de pouvoir 
d’achat (PPA). Ceux-ci sont préférés aux taux de change du marché parce que prenant en compte 
les différences de prix relatifs entre pays. Le seuil couramment retenu comme seuil de pauvreté 
absolue est celle de la Banque Mondiale qui se base sur le critère 1$ ou 2$ (PPA) par jour et par 
personne. Il est très souvent utilisé à des fins de comparaisons internationales de pauvreté.  
Indépendamment de leurs besoins absolus, les ménages peuvent se sentir pauvres lorsque 
leur niveau de vie est en dessous de celui des autres membres de la société. La notion de pauvreté 
relative capte, dès lors, cette situation. La ligne de pauvreté relative définit la pauvreté par rapport 
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au niveau national. Ravallion (1995) la définit comme «  une proportion donnée de la moyenne 
arithmétique ou de la médiane de la distribution de la consommation ou du revenu ».     
 
2.2 Exemples d’indicateurs de pauvreté monétaire 
   
Il convient de rappeler que l’analyse de la pauvreté dans une société donnée s’opère à 
deux niveaux ; au niveau individuel où l’on s’attèle à déterminer le degré de pauvreté d’un 
individu ou d’un ménage, et au niveau agrégé où il s’agit de capter l’étendue de la pauvreté et le 
profil de la pauvreté. 
Soit    ),( iyzy  une mesure du degré de pauvreté d’un individu ou d’un ménage dans 
lequel z et iy  représentent respectivement le seuil de pauvreté et le revenu d’un individu ou d’un 
ménage. On suppose, également, que la fonction ),( iyzy  est croissante en iy et décroissante en 
z .  
L’additivité est une propriété nécessaire pour passer de l’indice individuel à l’indice 
agrégé. En termes d’analyse, cette propriété permet de conclure que la pauvreté globale 
s’accentue quand la pauvreté augmente au sein d’une couche de la population, toutes choses étant 
égales par ailleurs. La classe d’indices additifs au niveau global se présente comme suit : 
),(1)(
1
∑
=
=
q
i
iyz
n
zP ξ  
En choisissant  )0()1(),( ≥−= αξ α
z
y
yz ii  
 
On obtient la classe des indices de Foster, Greer et Thornbecke (FGT) qui se définit comme suit :  
α
α )1(
1
1
∑
=
−=
q
n
i
z
y
n
P  
où le paramètre α  mesure l’aversion pour l’inégalité entre les pauvres. Plus la valeurα  est 
élevée, plus l’indice global accorde de poids au sort des plus pauvres. Il convient d’ajouter que 
),( iyzξ  est égal à zéro pour les non-pauvres et à 1 pour les démunis ( )( zy i > . Autrement dit 
lorsque iy varie de 0 à z , l’indice de pauvreté varie de 1 à 0. Par conséquent, la classe FGT 
d’indices de pauvreté s’interprète comme la moyenne de ),( iyzξ sur l’ensemble de la 
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population. Par ailleurs, ),( iyzξ  et )(zP sont tous deux homogènes de degré 0 par rapport à 
iy et z .  
 
Indice numérique de pauvreté (H) 
 
Lorsque α =0, on obtient l’indice suivant : 
HzF
n
qP === )(0  
0P  est la proportion des pauvres dans la population ; autrement dit le rapport du nombre de 
pauvres (ou de ménages pauvres), q,  sur le nombre d’habitants (ou de foyers) n ; q est l’effectif 
de la population dont la consommation (ou toute autre mesure appropriée du niveau de vie) est 
inférieure à z, le seuil de pauvreté. 
L’indice essuie, cependant, deux critiques majeures. Premièrement, l’indicateur ne donne 
qu’une mesure indirecte de la pauvreté puisque les nécessités de base peuvent être satisfaites 
partiellement par l’état dans des situations où le revenu monétaire des couches les plus démunies 
baisse. Deuxièmement, l’indice ne tient nullement compte de la portée ou de l’étendue de la 
pauvreté. En effet, la baisse du niveau  de vie d’un pauvre n’engendre pas la hausse de H, et le 
transfert de revenu d’un pauvre vers une personne plus nantie  ne se traduit pas nécessairement 
par une augmentation de H. Pour corriger ces deux dernières limites, recours est fait à l’écart de 
pauvreté qui prend en compte des différences d’intensité de la pauvreté.  
 
 L’écart de pauvreté 
 
Lorsque le paramètre α  prend la valeur 1, on a : 
∑∑
==
−=−=
q
i
i
q
i
i y
nzn
q
z
y
n
P
11
1
1)1(1  
)1(1
z
H
nz
q
n
qP ss
γγ
−=−=  où sγ est le revenu moyen des pauvres. 
L’indice 1P  mesure l’écart de pauvreté. Il tient compte non seulement du nombre de 
pauvres, mais aussi de l’étendue de la pauvreté. A partir de la seconde transformation,  l’on peut 
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noter que 1P  serait nul si H=0 (en l’absence de pauvres) ou si sγ =z. Dans le deuxième scénario, 
le revenu total des pauvres est équivalent à qz, puisque, par définition, le revenu total des pauvres 
est égal à sqγ . Or, on remarque qu’en multipliant l’indice 1P  par nz, on obtient : 
[ ]szqnzP µ−=1   
Cette expression révèle que pour éliminer la pauvreté, il faudrait que chaque individu ou 
ménage ait un revenu au moins égal à z. Le revenu total pour l’ensemble de la société serait alors 
au moins égal à nz. En supposant qu’il n’y ait pas de ressources externes disponibles, le résultat 
peut être obtenu en transférant 1nzP des non-pauvres aux pauvres. Ceci suppose également que le 
processus peut être parfaitement ciblé et qu’il n’y pas d’effets d’incitations négatives associées 
aux transferts. Dans ces conditions, 1nzP représente un plancher des engagements financiers 
nécessaires pour éliminer la pauvreté.  
Cependant, l’inconvénient de l’écart de pauvreté tient au fait qu’il n’est pas sensible aux 
différences d’intensité de la pauvreté entre les pauvres. L’indicateur d’intensité de Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke et celui de Sen permettent de remédier à cet inconvénient. 
   
 L’indicateur d’intensité de Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT)  
En supposant 2=α  on obtient nzyP i
q
i
/)/1( 2
1
2 ∑
=
−=  
A la suite de Ravallion (1992), 2P  peut être écrit de la façon suivante :  
( ) 22
0
10
0
2
1
2 PCVP
PP
P
P
P
−
+=  avec PCV  représentant le coefficient de variation des revenus des 
pauvres. 
Cet indicateur encore noté 2H  mesure l’intensité de pauvreté. Il comporte deux 
éléments, le premier capte la contribution de l’écart de pauvreté et le second tient compte  de 
l’inégalité parmi les pauvres.  
L’inconvénient de l’indicateur d’intensité de Foster-Greer-Thorbecke réside dans le fait 
qu’il est difficile à interpréter. En effet, une valeur de 2P , pris comme tel, donne peu d’indication 
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sur le niveau d’intensité de pauvreté ; elle n’a de valeur que lorsqu’elle est comparée dans le 
temps et dans l’espace. 
 
L’Indicateur d’intensité de Sen (Ps) 
 
En supposant que z représente le seuil de pauvreté, pµ le niveau de vie moyen des 
pauvres,  PG  l’indice de Gini des pauvres, q  le nombre de pauvres, et 0P  l’indice numérique de 
pauvreté, Sen formule son indicateur de la façon suivante :  
 
[ ]PS GIkIPP )1(0 −−=       avec 1+= q
qk  et 
z
I P
µ
−=1   
Lorsque q est très grand, l’expression 
1+q
q
 converge vers 1. Dans ce cas de figure, Sen 
(1997) montre que son indicateur prend la forme suivante : 
[ ] [ ]




 −
−=−−=
z
G
PGIIPP ppPS
1
1)1( 00
µ
 
Cette reformulation se rapproche de celle de l’écart de pauvreté, 1P . La seule différence entre les 
deux est que l’indicateur de Sen prend en compte la distribution du revenu parmi les pauvres, à 
travers l’expression PG−1 . Dans des situations où il n’y a pas d’inégalité entre les pauvres, 
l’indicateur d’intensité de Sen est équivalent à l’écart de pauvreté. 
 
2.3 Les indicateurs d’inégalité 
 
Les indicateurs présentés jusque là donnent des indications sur le niveau et l’intensité de 
la pauvreté sans pour autant éclairer sur la distribution de revenus. Cette dernière est utile en ce 
qu’elle permet d’apprécier la marge de manœuvre dont dispose les décideurs publics au cas où ils 
opteraient pour une politique rédistributive comme moyen de lutte contre la pauvreté.   Quatre 
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indicateurs sont couramment utilisés : l’indicateur d’inégalité d’Atkinson, le ratio des percentiles, 
le coefficient de Gini et des indices de Theil. 
 
 Indicateur d’inégalité d’Atkinson 
 
Le débat entre inégalité, efficience, et équité est au cœur de la construction de l’indicateur  
d’inégalité d’Atkinson. L’indicateur d’inégalité d’Atkinson permet d’estimer le pourcentage 
du revenu total (ou par tête) qu’on pourrait économiser tout en gardant intact le niveau de 
bien-être social.  
L’indicateur d’inégalité d’Atkinson tire son fondement de concept de l’équivalent d’un 
revenu également réparti. Atkinson (1970) part d’une fonction d’utilité croissante et concave 
ayant pour formule : 
α
α
−
=
−
1
)(
1yyU  avec y représentant le revenu, 0≥α , 1≠α  ; 
αy
yU 1)(' =  ; 
α
α
+
−
= 1
'' )(
y
yU  
Il trouve que l’indicateur du degré d’aversion pour l’inégalité est équivalent à l’élasticité 
de l’utilité marginale du revenu par rapport au revenu, et s’écrit comme suit :  
αφ =−= )(
)()(
'
''
yU
yxUyu   
 
Le choix de la forme de la fonction d’utilité garantit que l’indicateur d’aversion pour l’inégalité 
ne dépend pas du revenu.  
 L’équivalent d’un revenu également réparti, ey  , s’obtient en posant 
dyyfydyyfyUyyU z zee )(1)()(1)( 0 0
11
∫ ∫
−
==
−
=
−
−
αα
αα
 ; 1≠α  
 
d’où l’on déduit αα −− 



= ∫
1
1
0
1 )( dyyfyy ze  ; 1≠α  
te
l-0
01
16
96
1,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 2
9 
No
v 
20
06
Chapter II: POVERTY AND REAL EXCHANGE RATE: EVIDENCE FROM PANEL DATA 
 
 
 
 
 
142 
 
En optant pour une forme discrète 
α
α
−
−
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
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11
i
ie y
n
y  ; 1≠α  
Le coût social moyen de l’inégalité se présente comme suit : ee yc −= θ  avec θ  
 représentant le revenu moyen. L’indicateur d’inégalité d’Atkinson est construit à partir du coût 
social moyen de l’inégalité, soit  
 ( ) ααθθθα
−

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1
1
0
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Dans le cas d’une variable discrète, l’indicateur prend la forme suivante : 
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Il s’interprète comme le pourcentage du revenu total (ou par tête) que l’on pourrait mettre de côté 
en donnant ey à chacun sans toutefois modifier le bien-être social. A titre d’exemple, une valeur 
de l’indicateur d’inégalité d’Atkinson égal à 32 pour cent signifie que l’on pourrait distribuer 68 
pour cent du revenu et atteindre le même niveau de bien-être social que celui généré par la 
répartition initiale. Par ailleurs, il est également possible de décomposer additivement l’indicateur 
d’inégalité d’Atkinson, suivant un profil de la population concernée, en inégalité entre groupes et 
en inégalité au sein de chaque groupe. 
 
Ratio des percentiles 
 
Le ratio des percentiles est parmi les indicateurs d’inégalité les plus faciles à interpréter. 
Le plus usité est le ratio 90/10, qui est le rapport de la consommation du 90ème percentile sur celle 
du 10ème percentile. Un ratio de 3 voudrait dire que le plus pauvre parmi les 10 pour cent les plus 
riches de la population consomme 3 fois plus que le plus riche parmi les 10 pour cent les plus 
pauvres de la société. Il est même possible d’opérer une décomposition à des fins d’analyse plus 
poussées ; le ratio 90/10 peut être décomposé en ratio de 90/50 et en ratio de 50/10, et permet 
ainsi de savoir si l’inégalité provient de la partie inférieure ou supérieure de la distribution. 
Cependant, ce ratio ne donne aucune indication sur l’ampleur de l’inégalité entre le 11ème et le 
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89ème percentile. Une façon de pallier ce problème consiste à utiliser les coefficients de Gini et les 
indices de Theil.  
 
 Coefficient de Gini 
 
Il s’obtient en faisant le rapport entre l’aire de concentration des revenus (comprise entre 
la diagonale du carré et la courbe de distribution des revenus) et la moitié de la surface de ce carré 
(défini d’un côté par le pourcentage cumulé du revenu et de l’autre par le pourcentage cumulé de 
la population). Le coefficient de Gini s’interprète de la façon suivante : plus la valeur du 
coefficient se rapproche de 1, plus les inégalités de revenus sont importantes ; et plus elle tend 
vers 0, plus la répartition des revenus devient égalitaire. Sa formule se présente comme suit : 
 
i
n
i
i y
n
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
 +
−=
1
2 2
12
µ
 
 
i étant l’individu ou le ménage, yi son revenu, n est le nombre total d’individus ou de 
ménages, ri  désigne le rang du ménage ou de l’individu en termes de revenu, le rang de celui 
ayant le plus faible revenu est 1 tandis que celui qui dispose du revenu le plus élevé  aura un rang 
 
 
égal à n. µ  représente le revenu moyen.  
L’inconvénient du coefficient de Gini réside dans le fait que deux courbes de répartition 
de revenus différents peuvent générer un coefficient de Gini identique, rendant du coup difficile 
l’interprétation. De plus, le coefficient de Gini s’avère être plus sensible aux inégalités qui 
tiennent leur origine de la partie moyenne de la distribution. Recours est donc fait aux indices de 
Theil afin de contourner cette dernière limite.  
 
Les indices de Theil  
 
Les deux indices de Theil appartiennent à la classe des Entropies Généralisées 
(Generalised Entropy), dont les indicateurs ont les propriétés requises pour toute comparaison 
cohérente de distributions. La première propriété est le principe de transfert de Pigou-Dalton, qui 
garantit que tout transfert de revenu d’une personne pauvre vers une personne plus nantie 
s’accompagne d’un accroissement ou du maintien du niveau d’inégalité, la réciproque étant 
également vraie. La seconde propriété ou indépendance du revenu d’échelle implique que tout 
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changement proportionnel de tous les revenus laisse les indicateurs d’inégalité inchangés. La 
troisième propriété ou principe de population voudrait que la fusion de deux populations de 
distribution identiques donne une population ayant la même distribution. La quatrième propriété 
se réfère à la symétrie et garantit l’indépendance d’une distribution (inégalité) vis-à-vis des 
caractéristiques des individus autres que leur revenu. Enfin, la cinquième propriété, à savoir la 
décomposabilité, permet de décomposer l’inégalité et d’estimer, par exemple, les contributions 
des différents sous-groupes.  
Les deux indices de Theil les plus utilisés se formulent de la façon suivante : 
 
)ln(11lnln1)0(
111
∑∑∑
===
−





=





=
n
i
i
n
i
i
n
i i
y
n
y
nyn
E µ  
 






= ∑
=
µµ
i
n
i
i yy
n
E ln1)1(
1
 
 
Le premier est Theil mean log deviation index et le second est appelé Theil entropy index. 
Les deux indices mesurent l’égalité parfaite lorsqu’elles prennent la valeur 0. Par contre, en 
situation d’inégalité parfaite, le premier tend vers l’infini tandis que le second prend la valeur 
nln(n). En termes de sensibilité, le premier capte mieux une inégalité provenant de la queue 
inférieure de la distribution tandis que le second est plus pertinent lorsque l’origine de l’inégalité 
se situe au niveau de la queue supérieure de la distribution. 
L’indice de Theil permet d’analyser l’évolution des inégalités entre deux déciles 
caractérisés par leur revenu moyen. Il a surtout l’avantage d’être décomposable et permet 
d’identifier les facteurs qui expliquent la pauvreté ; qu’il s’agisse de l’éducation, de l’âge, de la 
catégorie  socioprofessionnelle. Partant de là, l’approche duale consisterait à estimer la 
probabilité d’être pauvre au  regard de certaines caractéristiques des ménages ou des personnes. 
Un exemple serait de déterminer la probabilité d’être pauvre sachant que le ménage a complété 
les études primaires.  
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2.4 Les indicateurs captant les conditions de vie 
 
Pour pallier les insuffisances des indicateurs décrites ci-dessous, le PNUD a construit un 
certain nombre d’indicateurs qui reposent sur le critère de revenu. Ces indicateurs intègrent 
diverses dimensions de la pauvreté et partent d’une théorisation de la production/reproduction de 
la pauvreté qui prennent en compte tous les contours de la vie économique, sociale et politique 
des pauvres, ainsi que les questions identitaires, de statut et de représentations. Cependant,  
l'élaboration des indicateurs de développement humain pose de nombreux problèmes 
méthodologiques. Ces problèmes tiennent tant  à la multiplicité des dimensions qu’à la difficulté 
de les quantifier52.  
Construit à partir de 1990, l’indice du développement humain (IDH) mesure les progrès 
accomplis en matière d’accès aux besoins de base. A partir de  1995 ont été ajouté à la liste deux 
indicateurs, à savoir l’indicateur sexospécifique du développement humain (ISDH) et l’indicateur 
de participation féminine (IPF), qui prennent en compte la dimension genre dans la mesure du 
développement humain.   Enfin, l’indicateur de pauvreté humaine (IPH) remplace, depuis 1997,  
l’indice de pénurie des capacités (ICP), créé un an plutôt.  Contrairement à l’indice de 
développement, axé uniquement sur les besoins de base,  l’IPH essaie de capter les autres formes 
de privation, entre autres l’accès problématique aux ressources publiques et privées. Tous ces 
indicateurs se basent sur le principe du développement humain.  
 
 Le concept du développement humain 
 
Le concept de développement humain fut son apparition à l’occasion de la publication du 
premier rapport sur le développement humain en 1990. Cet évènement intervenait dans un 
contexte où les programmes d’ajustement structurels et de stabilisation macroéconomique mises 
en place dans bon nombre de pays n’avaient pas abouti au résultat escompté, à savoir le retour de 
la croissance économique. Pis, les réformes portant sur le secteur public,  le taux de change, le 
commerce, et la politique de prix des produits agricoles ont largement occulté la dimension 
humaine du développent. Partant de ce constat, les rapports sur le développement humain se 
proposent d’aider à recentrer le concept de développement autour de l’homme ; autrement dit que 
le développement soit conçu comme « étant celui de l’homme » (PNUD,1991). 
                                                 
52
 La plupart des dimensions sont, par nature, qualitatives.  
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 Le développement humain, tel que définit par le PNUD, est le processus qui consiste à 
élargir les choix des individus et le niveau de leur bien-être, et ce en augmentant leurs capabilités 
(capabilities). Trois capabilités sont considérées comme fondamentales au développement 
humain : celle garantissant une vie longue et saine, celle permettant d’accéder au stock de savoir 
accumulé, et celle facilitant l’accès suffisant aux ressources indispensables à une vie descente. 
L’élargissement de ces facultés doit être équitable, productive, soutenable et doit s’effectuer dans 
des conditions garantissant la participation de tous les acteurs. Le développement humain 
consisterait ainsi à accroître les capabilités des personnes à mener une vie descente à travers 
l’accroissement des revenus et l’amélioration des autres composantes du niveau de vie entre 
autres l’espérance de vie, la santé, l’éducation, le savoir et le contrôle de son propre destin 
(Anand et Sen, 1994 ; Griffin et Knight, 1989). 
 Le concept de développement humain englobe tant les aspects matériels que non-
matériels. Ces derniers incluent la liberté dans le choix du travail et du mode de vie, l’accès à un 
environnement physique harmonieux, la liberté de mouvement et d’expression, l’absence de 
persécution et d’arrestation arbitraire, la libération de l’oppression, de la violence et de 
d’exploitation, la liberté de cultes, et la participation aux activités de société civile (Steeten, 
1999).  
 Il existe quatre composantes principales du paradigme du développement humain : la 
productivité, l’équité, la soutenabilité et la responsabilisation (empowerment). Accroître les 
capabilités implique rehausser la productivité des agents économiques de sorte à les rendre agents 
actifs de la croissance. Ceci passe par leur participation au processus de création de richesse et 
d’emplois. En ce qui concerne l’équité, les agents économiques doivent avoir les mêmes 
chances ; pour ce faire toutes les entraves d’ordre économique, politique et social doivent être 
levées de sorte à permettre à tous les agents économiques de bénéficier des mêmes opportunités. 
La soutenabilité sous-tend  que les considérations liées à l’équité ne doivent pas seulement se 
limiter aux générations présentes mais aussi aux générations futures ; ce qui implique que toutes 
les formes de capital (physique, environnemental et humain) doivent être régénérées. La 
responsabilisation suppose que les hommes et femmes participent activement à la conception et 
l’exécution des décisions touchant à leurs destinées. 
 Le concept de développement humain diffère sous plusieurs angles des approches 
conventionnelles basées sur la croissance économique, le développement du capital humain, et la 
satisfaction des besoins primaires. En effet, en partant de l’hypothèse que la croissance bénéficie 
à toute la société, les approches orientées sur la croissance économique  font de la maximisation 
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de la croissance économique le seul objectif. En revanche, les approches du développement 
humain, axées sur une perspective beaucoup plus large, posent la croissance économique comme 
condition nécessaire mais pas suffisante de l’amélioration du bien-être. La croissance devient, dès 
lors, un moyen d’accélérer le développement humain et non une fin en soi. Le développement 
humain met concomitamment ensemble production, distribution, et expansion des capabilités tout 
en ayant un regard sur les choix que les personnes peuvent faire dans le but d’améliorer leurs 
niveaux de vie. 
 Une dernière caractéristique du concept de développement humain est l’importance 
de  la complémentarité entre les dépenses touchant aux capacités humaines. Une illustration est 
donnée par Griffin et McKinley (1992) qui montrent que les dépenses de santé primaire ont une 
répercussion directe sur l’état de santé des pauvres. Cette amélioration de la santé accroît, par 
ricochet, l’efficience du processus de transformation des aliments en calories, et donc renforce les 
gains des programmes de nutrition infantile et maternelle. Des progrès en matière de nutrition 
rehaussent la capacité d’apprentissage des enfants et ainsi améliorent les rendements scolaires. 
 
 L’indicateur de développement humain (IDH) 
 
L’indicateur de développement humain est un indice composite qui a été construit pour 
refléter les aspects fondamentaux du développement humain. Il capte les éléments fondamentaux 
que les personnes doivent disposer pour s’intégrer à la société et y apporter leur contribution. 
Aussi, permet-il de mesurer les résultats atteints en matière de satisfaction des besoins primaires, 
entre autres la connaissance, la longévité, et l’accès à une vie décente. L’indicateur du 
développement humain est la moyenne arithmétique de trois éléments : la santé/longévité, captée 
par l’espérance de vie à la naissance ; le niveau d’éducation mesuré  par une combinaison du taux 
scolarisation aux trois niveaux et du taux d’alphabétisation, et le niveau de vie capté par le PIB en 
termes réels, exprimé en dollars pondérés des parités de pouvoir d’achat (PNUD, 1995 et 1999).  
La technique de construction de l’IDH a évolué dans le temps, prenant en compte les 
nombreuses critiques formulées à son encontre. Les modifications intervenues permettent de 
mesurer les progrès réalisés et non plus les probabilités de souffrir de dénuement. Elles sont aussi 
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de nature à corriger les biais53, engendrés par les méthodes permettant de passer des indicateurs 
de pauvreté aux indices.  
La version originelle de l’IDH partait des indicateurs partiels de manque. L’espérance de 
vie à la naissance  traduit le manque par rapport à un maximum établi par la moyenne des 
longévités les plus élevés. En 1994-1995, les extrema ont été établis de manière normative 
(minimum à 25 ans et maximum à 85 ans) de sorte à éviter que les pays développés ne constituent 
un horizon mobile pour les pays pauvres. 
L’indicateur, saisissant le manque de savoir, était au départ le taux d’alphabétisation, 
avec un maximum à 100 %. Cet indicateur cède le pas, à partir de 1991, à une combinaison de la 
moyenne de durée de la scolarité et du taux d’alphabétisation. La pondération assignée au premier 
est un tiers tandis que le second occupe les deux tiers restants. En 1995, l’indicateur mesurant le 
manque en termes de savoir fut modifié, et la moyenne de la durée de la scolarisation substituée 
par  le taux de scolarisation aux trois niveaux. 
La variable choisie, pour capter le niveau de vie dans la version de 1990, était le 
logarithme du PIB par habitant en termes réels, affecté d’une pondération nulle au-dessus d’une 
valeur correspondant au seuil de pauvreté des neuf pays les plus riches. Pour tenir compte de 
l’utilité marginale décroissante des niveaux élevés de revenus, et du principe selon lequel un 
niveau respectable n’exige pas de  revenus illimités, le PNUD eut recours à la formule d’Atkinson 
pour corriger les niveaux de revenus.  Cette technique permet de comprimer les plus hauts 
revenus dans le calcul de l’IDH. Elle consiste notamment à faire augmenter progressivement la 
valeur de l’élasticité de l’utilité marginale du revenu par rapport au développement humain à 
mesure que le revenu augmente54. La formule d’Atkinson se présente comme suit : 
ε
ε
−
−
=
1
1
1)( yyZ  avec 10 ≤≤ ε  
)(yZ  est l’utilité dérivée du revenu, y le revenu, et ε  l’élasticité de l’utilité marginale du revenu 
par rapport au développement humain.  
Soit *y  le seuil de pauvreté moyen de 17 pays industrialisés. Si  ε =1, le revenu n’a 
aucune contribution au développement humain. Si ε =0, W(y)=y et il en ressort qu’il n’y a pas de 
                                                 
53
 Le biais est en faveur des pays à revenu élevé.  
54
 Chaque tranche est exprimée en multiple du seuil de pauvreté moyen de 17 pays industrialisés 
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décroissance du revenu ; ce cas représente celui des pays dont le revenu se situe entre 0 et *y . 
Dans ce cas de figure, toute augmentation du niveau de revenu se transforme intégralement en 
une amélioration du niveau de développement humain. ε =1/2 pour tous les pays dont le revenu 
est compris entre *y et *2y , et la formule d’Atkinson s’écrit alors : 2/1** )(2)( yyyyW −+= . 
ε =2/3 pour tous les pays ayant un revenu compris entre *2y et *3y , et la formule qui en découle 
se présente comme suit : 3/1*2/1* )2(3)(2)( yyyyyW −++= . Des changements affectant la 
façon d’estimer le seuil interviennent en 1994. En effet, pour éviter que les pays développés ne 
demeurent la norme à atteindre, la valeur du seuil fut fixée à la moyenne mondiale du PIB par 
habitant, exprimé en parité de pouvoir d’achat. Une fois le revenu ajusté obtenu, l’indicateur est 
transformé en indice en utilisant la formule suivante : 
 
 Indice = (valeur réelle 
 
–valeur minimale)/ (valeur maximale 
 
–valeur minimale). 
A rappeler que cette formule est valable et s’applique aux deux autres indicateurs constitutifs de 
l’IDH. Constatant que cette formule comprime sensiblement les revenus situés au-dessus du seuil, 
et handicape les pays à revenus élevés, le PNUD, dès 1999, modifie la méthode permettant 
d’obtenir l’indice captant le niveau de vie. Sur la base des travaux de Sen, la formule change de 
façon à pallier cet inconvénient. La formule proposée par Sen est la suivante :  
minmax
min
loglog
loglog)(
yy
yy
yW
−
−
=  
Cette formule affecte l’ensemble des revenus, y compris ceux situés au-dessus d’un seuil retenu, 
et pénalise moins les pays à revenu moyen et élevé.  
Une fois le niveau de l’IDH déterminé, les pays sont classés sur une échelle comprise 
entre 0 et 1, et regroupés selon la valeur de leur IDH. Trois catégories sont constituées : les pays à 
faible niveau de développement humain, comprenant les pays dont l’IDH est inférieur à 0.5 ; le 
pays à niveau moyen, pour lesquels l’IDH est compris entre 0.5 et 0.8 ; et les pays à niveau élevé, 
englobant tous les pays dont l’IDH est supérieur à 0.8.   
En 1995, l’indicateur sexospécifique du développement humain (ISDH) et l’indicateur de 
participation féminine (IPF) ont été créés pour saisir les inégalités sociologiques entre sexes. 
L’ISDH mesure les résultats enregistrés en matière de développement humain  corrigé des 
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inégalités reposant sur le genre. En effet, il se distingue de l’IDH par le fait qu’il intègre les 
disparités sociologiques entre hommes et  femmes en termes d’espérance de vie, de niveau 
d’éducation et de revenu. L’indicateur de participation féminine (IPF) a été construit afin de 
cerner à quel point les femmes ont un contrôle sur leur destinée ; ce qui suppose la place qu’elles 
occupent dans la sphère politique et  économique. 
 
 L’indicateur de pénurie de capacités (IPC) 
 
Contrairement à l’IDH qui donne une idée sur le niveau des progrès atteints par toute une 
société en matière de développement humain, l’indicateur de pénurie de capacités (IPC) permet 
d’analyser la pauvreté à travers une approche par les manques, en insistant sur la condition des 
pauvres et des déshérités (PNUD, 1996, 1997). L’IPC cherche à estimer le pourcentage de 
personnes n’ayant pas accès au minimum des potentialités humaines élémentaires. Celles-ci sont 
au nombre de trois : « Tout d’abord, pouvoir s’alimenter correctement et être en bonne santé 
(potentialité mesurée par la proportion d’enfants de moins de cinq ans souffrant d’une 
insuffisance pondérale) ; ensuite, pouvoir enfanter dans des conditions salubres (potentialité 
représentée par la proportion d’accouchements intervenant sans l’aide d’une personne de santé 
compétente) ; enfin, pouvoir s’instruire et s’informer (potentialité mesurée par le taux 
d’analphabétisme chez les femmes). »  (PNUD, 1996). Le revenu n’est pas pris en compte dans 
l’estimation de l’IPH parce qu’il est considéré comme étant  une manifestation de la misère, et 
donc ne concerne que les moyens plutôt que les fins. Une fois que les valeurs des trois 
composantes de l’IPH sont trouvées, elles sont agrégées en affectant une pondération identique à 
chaque élément constitutif de l’IPH. 
 
 L’indicateur de pauvreté humaine (IPH) 
 
Le PNUD introduit, en 1997, l’indicateur de pauvreté humaine en remplacement de 
l’indice de pénurie de capacités (IPC). Les principes directeurs qui ont guidé la construction de 
cet indicateur sont les mêmes que celles de l’IPC. Toutefois, des modifications ont été introduites 
dans le choix des variables, et ce pour tenir compte de la profondeur et de la spécificité de la 
pauvreté dans les pays en développement comparativement aux pays développés. L’IPH se fonde 
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sur des aspects les plus élémentaires des manques et déficits affectant la vie humaine : faible 
longévité, indicateur de survie, manifestant la vulnérabilité à la mort à un âge relativement 
précoce ; manque d’instruction de base, indicateur de savoir, signe d’exclusion du monde de 
l’écriture et de la communication ; et absence d’accès aux ressources privées et publiques, 
indicateur de la capacité à jouir d’un niveau de vie décent en termes de biens économiques 
(PNUD, 1998). En bref,  l’indicateur de pauvreté humaine (IPH)  est élaboré à partir de trois 
éléments de base que sont la longévité, l’instruction et l’accès aux ressources publiques et 
privées. Sa particularité tient au fait qu’il cherche à mesurer les risques. Ainsi, la faible longévité 
est appréhendée par le pourcentage des personnes courant le risque de décéder avant l’âge de 
quarante ans (P1), le manque d’éducation par le pourcentage d’adultes analphabètes (P2), et le 
manque de conditions de vie décentes par la   moyenne pondérée de trois indicateurs (P3) ( le 
pourcentage de personnes ayant accès à l’eau potable, le pourcentage d’individus ayant accès aux 
services de santé, et le pourcentage d’enfants de moins de 5 ans souffrant de malnutrition) ). La 
formule de calcul est la suivante : 
  
[ ] 3/1333231 )3/)( PPPIPH ++=    
 
Au vu du choix des variables, l’IPH ne semble capter que la réalité des pays en développement, et 
tend à supposer que la pauvreté n’est que l’apanage des pays du Sud. Or, il se trouve que le 
phénomène de pauvreté est également au centre des préoccupations des pays industrialisés. Pour 
combler ce déficit, un nouvel indicateur, plus encré sur la réalité des pays développés, Indice de 
Pauvreté Humaine-2, IPH-2, est élaboré par le PNUD à partir de 1998. 
L’IPH-2 saisit non seulement les trois aspects de l’existence humaine présents dans l’IDH 
mais également la dimension exclusion, qui renvoie à la non participation des personnes aux 
systèmes démocratiques et juridiques, au marché du travail, au système assuranciel et de 
protection sociale, à la famille et la communauté. Au regard du grand rôle exercé par le marché 
du travail dans la définition du statut et du bien-être social de l’individu dans les sociétés 
industrialisées, les problèmes rencontrés sur le marché du travail sont placés au centre des 
analyses sur l’exclusion. 
Les  quatre variables retenues dans la mesure de l’IPH-2 sont les suivantes : le 
pourcentage de la population risquant de décéder avant 60 ans, qui saisit le déficit en termes de 
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survie ; le pourcentage de la population souffrant d’illetrisme, qui traduit le déficit dans le 
domaine de l’instruction ; la proportion de personnes dont le revenu disponible est inférieur à la 
demi-médiane nationale, qui mesure la pauvreté économique ; et le pourcentage de chômeurs de 
longue durée dans la population active, qui capte l’exclusion ou la non participation. 
 
 Faiblesses et forces  du concept du développement humain 
 
L’approche du développement humain a été critiquée pour plusieurs raisons. 
Premièrement, le développement humain a été décrit comme étant antithétique à la croissance 
économique parce qu’il est supposé privilégier la répartition des ressources au détriment de la 
création de richesse (PNUD, 1992). Deuxièmement, l’approche a été qualifiée de sectoriel en ce 
qu’elle recommande des interventions ciblées dans les secteurs de l’éducation, la santé, et les 
services sociaux. Enfin, la stratégie de développement humain a été longtemps considérée comme 
répondant exclusivement aux attentes des pays en développement ou pauvres. Nonobstant ces 
critiques, le concept de développement humain a cinq avantages majeurs. Premièrement, il 
s’intéresse directement au bien-être des populations. Deuxièmement, il est basé sur l’égalité de 
chances. Troisièmement, il permet de s’assurer que les bénéfices du développement sont repartis 
équitablement. Quatrièmement, il garantit l’interdépendance et la synergie entre les 
investissements dans différents secteurs clés du développement humain sont exploités. Enfin, le 
concept de développement humain permet de bénéficier de la complémentarité entre capacités 
humaines et capital physique. te
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IS FISCAL POLICY BECOMING COUNTERCYCLICAL IN 
AFRICA55? 
 
 
 
                                                 
55
 We would like to thank Jean-Louis Arcand and Jean-Louis Combes for helpful discussions and pertinent 
comments on an earlier draft.  We would also like to thank Roland Kpodar for sharing his program on 
Bootstraping. 
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I-INTRODUCTION 
 
The adoption of multipartism and the systematic use of elections as means of 
selecting rulers were the key political developments in virtually all Sub-Saharan African 
countries during the 1990s. While some analysts viewed this development as opening a 
new area for improved economic performance, others were more pessimistic, fearing that 
democratic reforms would result in political instability and poor economic outcomes. The 
issue of the impact of democratisation is still a matter of debate, with each camp 
supporting its claim with some anecdotal examples. Even though the discussion on 
democracy among economists primarily focuses on potential correlation between 
democratic reforms and economic outcome such as growth, a growing number of papers 
explore economic policy changes that may be associated with democratic institutions. 
One area that is frequently explored is the effect of political regimes on government 
spending or social spending policies. Person and Tabellini (2004) analyse the impact of 
electoral rules and political regimes on the size of government spending in a large 
number of democracies. Stasavage (2003) investigates whether the move to a more 
democratic system has been associated with larger spending in primary education in 
African countries. Similar discussion also takes place in the context of other developing 
regions. Brown and Hunter (1999) and Kaufman and Segura-Ubiergo (2001) examine the 
impact of democratic reforms on public spending in Latin America.  
This chapter follows the aforementioned central thesis, which is the effect of 
political reforms on public policies. However, the thrust of the chapter departs slightly 
from the mentioned studies and focuses on the impact of democratic reforms on the 
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cyclical properties of fiscal policy. More specifically, we ask whether the increase in 
political pluralism in many African countries in recent years has resulted in the adoption 
of more countercyclical fiscal policies. This question is of particular importance for at 
least one reason. The post-independence experience was characterised by the 
predominance of authoritarian regimes, riddled with patronage and interest groups whose 
continued loyalty was preserved by implicit and explicit government transfers. Such 
environment was, in part, condusive to stop-go policies, resulting in boom-bust cycles. 
On the one hand, positive shocks, such as an improvement in terms of trade, increased the 
pressure, especially from entrenched constituencies, for higher spending. Public spending 
therefore spiralled out of control during good times. On the other hand, negative shocks 
forced, though not instantly, countries to embrace fiscal consolidation. Against this 
background, the move towards political pluralism is expected to unleash more political 
competition. The likelihood of retaining office becomes closely related to the ability of 
rulers to pursue policies that increase the well-being of the median voter. If one assumes 
that countercyclical fiscal policies are welfare-enhancing, it is likely that governments 
favour such fiscal polices, which smooth out fluctuations in output and boost, or at least 
preserve, the well being of the majority.  
The circumstances described above are those that prevail in a properly working 
democracy system. But it is not often the case in the majority of newly democratised 
African nations. One condition underlying the functioning of a well established 
democracy is the existence of objective information to the typical voter. This condition is 
unmet when voter loyalty to ethnic communities is strong. In such case, political 
competition does not always produce rulers that are keen of delivering national public 
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goods. Beyond the mechanisms guiding the selection of rulers, another important feature 
of a properly working democracy is the mechanisms that limit how power is used, which 
are often called “checks and balances”. This dimension of democracy is the most difficult 
element to build as it takes time to introduce effective restraints on power. The foregoing 
arguments suggest caution in hastily drawing optimistic views about the impact of 
democracy on the cyclicality of fiscal policy. However, this does not imply that 
democracy is largely ineffective in Africa because political pluralism and freedom are 
essential values in their own rights. Moreover, even a scant improvement in civil liberties 
and political rights represents an institutional change, and it is worth exploring the 
implications of such change in the conduct of economic policies in general or more 
particularly on fiscal policy. 
 The chapter is divided into six sections. Section II reviews some of the theoretical 
support for the positive relationship between countercyclical fiscal policies and growth.  
Section III presents a brief literature review of the determinants of procyclical fiscal 
policy. Section IV highlights the ambiguous relationship between democratic institutions 
and countercyclical fiscal policies, thus providing the theoretical foundation for our 
analysis.  Section V presents two country cases to illustrate our theoretical construct. 
Section V discusses data issues and the empirical strategy. Section VII confronts the 
implications of the theoretical framework with the data and comments the results. Finally, 
section VIII concludes. 
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II- COUNTERCYCLICAL FISCAL POLICIES AND LONG TERM GROWTH  
 
Apart from being volatile, public spending tends to be procyclical in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. It increases during booms and experiences severe cuts in bad times. This 
procyclical nature of government spending is costly as it dampens economic growth and 
increases poverty. Why do procyclical fiscal policies hamper long term growth?  
Endogenous growth models, especially those suggested by Aghion (1992) and 
Aghion et al. (2006), provide an interesting and compelling explanation of how 
countercyclical fiscal policy could positively affect long-term growth56. Aghion et al. 
(2006) argue that a recession is considered, in the Schumpeterian tradition, as a cleansing 
mechanism, whereby inefficient firms are eliminated and surviving firms experience deep 
restructuring. Such restructuring involves reallocating resources, innovating, and 
branching out to new markets. This process requires new investments, say, in the form of 
investment in R&D. If firms have full access to credit, the restructuring process goes 
smoothly, with firms investing in R&D and innovating. Ultimately, productivity growth 
is increased and long-term growth fostered. However, if firms evolve in an environment 
where credit is rationed, the restructuring process is impaired and protracted recession 
follows. For instance, if firms can only borrow an amount proportional to their current 
earnings, their borrowing capacity shrinks significantly with recession. Firms cut back on 
R&D expenditures and other necessary investments and may not be able to initiate the 
necessary restructuring activities. The degree of innovation slows down, and productivity 
                                                 
56
 Similarly, in the pure Keynesian tradition, increasing public spending during recession helps to stabilize 
the cycle and ensure a full employment. Tax smoothing (Barro, 1979: Lucas and Stockey, 1983) and public 
spending smoothing motives (permanent income theory) explain the conduct of counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy, with countries running deficits during recessions and surpluses during good times.  
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growth and long-term growth are reduced. The policy implication is that countercyclical 
fiscal policy can help achieve a seamless adjustment process and secures long-term 
growth in a financially constrained economy.  In other words, government can increase 
public spending or reduce tax in order to boost the demand for firms’ products and 
improve their growth prospects. These measures can also consist of providing direct 
incentives to firms through subsidies and other transfers to firms.  
The R&D expenditure dynamics within firms is one of the main arguments put 
forward to justify a potential positive impact of countercyclical fiscal policy on long-term 
growth. The argument fits very well situations that prevail in developed countries and 
some of the more advanced developing countries, where R&D expenditure represents an 
important source of innovation. But such an explanation might not fully capture the 
specificities of other developing countries, especially Sub-Saharan African countries. In 
these countries, R&D expenditure tend be marginal, and innovation is very often brought 
about through imported capital goods, which require skilled labour in order to be used 
effectively and efficiently. This means that countercyclical fiscal policy may affect long-
term growth in the poorest countries if for instance it can impact the human capital and 
the ability to import in these countries. It follows that human capital and real exchange 
channels are plausible chains of causation from countercyclical fiscal policy to stronger 
long-term growth.  
A great deal of evidence suggests that crises can have long-lasting effects on 
human capital accumulation and economic growth (Lustig, 1998; Ocampo, 2002). This is 
primarily the outcomes of both household and government reactions in times of crises. 
During economic downturns, some households are forced to pull their children out of 
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schools. Long-term human capital is then eroded, and the long-run overall performance 
of the economy weakened. Similarly, governments facing mounting fiscal deficits during 
bust times cut in social spending, notably in education expenditure. These policies lead to 
setbacks in education enrolments and contribute to lowering long-term human capital and 
potential growth. The situation of African countries in the 1980s illustrates very well this 
point. One way of avoiding such an adverse development is to pursue a countercyclical 
fiscal policy. This implies increasing public spending, especially in social sectors, during 
bad times so as to avoid irreversible losses in human capital and sustain long-term 
growth. The argument is very much similar to the economic rationale for publicly funded 
safety nets.  
The second mediating channel from countercyclical fiscal policy to higher output 
operates through real exchange rate. The reason is that developments in real exchange 
rate can determine export competitiveness, export earnings, and therefore the capacity to 
import, especially of countries that have limited access to international capital markets. 
More specifically, real exchange rate appreciates as a result of the accommodative fiscal 
policies that are adopted during boom times. This phenomenon is commonly dubbed as 
“Dutch Disease”. The real appreciation of exchange rate exerts a negative impact on 
export receipts and undermines countries’ ability to import goods, especially capital 
goods that represent an important source of innovation and productivity improvement.  
Apart from the import channel, real exchange rate appreciation is accompanied by 
a structural transformation that can have an enduring impact on growth. The real 
appreciation of exchange rate caused by rising export prices has two opposite effects on 
the tradable sector. First, tradable industries that benefit from high prices, such as 
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commodity producers, expand significantly. Second, other tradable industries, including 
the manufacturing, that produce goods for which prices decline or experience modest 
gains, contract. The contraction may be so severe as to cripple these industries and 
making the situation irreversible even when booms end and real exchange rate 
depreciates. Since the manufacturing industry generates positive externalities or 
productivity advantages57, over other sectors, such as those that produce commodities, a 
persistent decline of this industry impairs long-term growth. Again, fiscal policy can help 
prevent these negative outcomes by addressing the primary cause of real exchange rate 
appreciation. Implementing countercyclical fiscal policy during booms times, meaning 
pursing tight fiscal stance limits the overvaluation of real exchange rate and contributes 
to long-term productivity improvement and growth. If countercyclical policy is growth-
enhancing, why have many developing countries persistently pursued procyclical fiscal 
policies? 
 
III-DETERMINANTS OF PROCYCLICAL FISCAL POLICY 
 
Understanding the factors underlying fiscal procyclicality has been a subject 
largely explored in the literature. However, this intense research generally tends to 
concentrate on developed or emerging countries and gives little space to Sub-Saharan 
African countries.  
Many factors have been put forward to explain fiscal procyclicality in developing 
countries. Tornell and Lane (1999) link fiscal procyclicality to distributional conflicts 
                                                 
57
 These positive externalities and productivity advantages are diffused through learning by doing  
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over government resources. They argue that struggle among government entities 
(ministries, provinces) for public resources gives rise to a “voracity effect”, whereby 
expenditures outpace windfalls. Likewise, Talvi and Végh (2000) argue that it is optimal 
for policymakers to run negligible primary surpluses during booms by boosting 
government spending and cutting tax rates. In contrast, Gavin and Perotti (1997) attribute 
the procyclicality of government spending in developing countries to the credit 
constraints these countries face. These constraints reduce their ability to borrow during 
recessions or busts thereby  forcing them to adjust through cuts in public spending and/or 
increase in taxes.  
Both factors, i.e. distributional conflict and credit constraints, come into play in 
determining the fiscal policy stance in many African countries. Because of the 
narrowness of their export structures as well as their domestic economic activities, those 
countries are likely to suffer much more from exogenous shocks than other developing 
countries. In other words, African countries are more prone to distributional conflicts 
than other developing countries. In addition to their vulnerability to exogenous shocks, 
most of the countries in the region have a limited or no access to international capital 
markets. However, these two constraints do not necessary imply that fiscal policy in the 
region is doomed to experience procyclicality. Democratic institutions can be conducive 
to both procyclical and countercyclical fiscal policies.   
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IV-DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND CYCLICAL PROPERTIES OF 
FISCAL POLICY  
 
4.1 Democratic institutions conducive to procyclical fiscal policies 
 
There are some reasons to believe that the advent of democracy might exacerbate 
the procyclicality of fiscal stance.  That view is supported by the political business 
cycle58 argument, especially the opportunistic version of that argument, and the argument 
based on corruption. Opportunistic political business cycle theory posits that incumbents 
facing competitive elections engage in economic policy manipulation to induce economic 
expansions prior to elections, therefore increasing their chances to get re-elected 
(Nordhaus, 1975: Lindbeck, 1976: Tufte, 1978). The manipulation of economic policy 
tools consists in pursing expansionary monetary and fiscal policies before elections and 
adopting contractionary polices after elections. This situation is said to be particularly 
acute in new democracies as, for example, the newly democratised African states.  At 
least two main factors explain the widespread of politically motivated policies in newly 
democratised countries (Block et al., 2003: Brender and Drazen, 2004). First, during 
transitions from dictatorships to democracies, authoritarian leaders tend to have enough 
leeway to distort economic policies in their favour. Initial competitive elections provide 
them with the opportunity to discourage entry by future challengers. Showering 
constituents with public spending increases around election time, for instance, boosts the 
                                                 
58
 The political business cycle theory has two versions. The first is termed “rational partisan cycle” and 
emphasizes the importance of ideology as the driving force behind the cycle generated before election. The 
second is dubbed as “opportunistic business cycle” and highlights the opportunistic behaviour of all 
incumbents independently of ideology or partisanship (Hibbs, 1977: Alesina et al., 1997). Evidence 
suggests that opportunistic business cycle is more common in Africa (Ka and van de Walle, 1994). 
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incumbents’ credentials and public support before the opposition has any say on the 
design and conduct of economic policies. Such behaviours are made easier by the lack of 
significant institutional constraints, such as a free press or independent legislatures, 
which reduce the degree of discretion for incumbents to manipulate macroeconomic 
policies. Second, some deficiencies are inherent to transitions from dictatorships to 
democracies. Constituents generally lack information about candidates and are not very 
much knowledgeable about the functioning of a democracy, thus providing incumbents 
with further incentives to engage in politically motivated policy interventions. However, 
it is worth noting that falling into political budget cycles is not purely identical to 
conducting procyclical policies. For instance, conducting expansionary fiscal or monetary 
policies prior to elections does not always mean that governments impart a procyclical 
bias to policies.  It is only true when the economy is booming before the elections. 
Similarly, pursuing contractionary fiscal or monetary policies after elections amounts to 
conducting procyclical policies only if economies experience recessions after elections.  
The second argument that is put forward in explaining procyclical policies, and in 
particular procyclical fiscal policy, in nascent democracy lies on corruption (Alesina and 
Tabelleni, 2005). Numerous accounts point to widespread corruption in some of the 
African countries characterised by authoritarian regimes (Ake, 1990). That feature 
persists during the transitions from authoritarian rule to democracies.   
The “corruption” argument rests on the premise that constituents do not trust 
corrupt governments when it comes to managing additional resources. The public tends 
to believe that any additional government revenue will be siphoned off through 
distributing favours to special groups close to the government or the increase of the 
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consumption of government officials. Thus, in line of the “starve the Leviathan” 
argument the constituents demand increases in public spending, transfers or public 
investment, whenever the economy experiences a positive shock. This is one way for 
constituencies to hold governments accountable. Such demand forces governments to 
pursue a procyclical fiscal stance during good times. Alesina and Tabelleni (2005) 
illustrate this using a principal-agent framework wherein constituents represent the 
principal and the government the agent.  
 
4.2 Democratic institutions conducive to countercyclical fiscal policies 
 
Democratic institutions can mitigate credit constraints and the “voracity effect”, 
the two main causes of procyclical fiscal policy. Democratic systems per se can not 
address credit constraints but they have the potential to cure the leading factor of 
procyclical fiscal stance: rising government spending during expansions. Access to 
international capital markets is closely linked to the business cycle, with capital flows 
pouring during good times and drying up during recessions. This means that the issue of 
access to international capital markets often cited in the literature is of relevance only 
when crisis erupts. In different circumstances, i.e. during booms, countries enjoy large 
capital inflows, and the challenge during those times is to follow prudent fiscal polices, 
such as putting aside windfalls. These policies would ultimately gives more room of 
maneuver for expansionary fiscal stance during recessions.  However, the political 
acceptance of cautious fiscal policies during expansions may be hard to sell, notably in 
African countries. Poor infrastructure, widespread poverty, low levels of human 
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development, and the pressing need to address these problems places pressure on 
government expenditure.  Public pressure for more public spending during good times 
could be lessen if governments are enough persuasive and “trusted”. These two qualities 
may critically depend on their legitimacy and to the extent to which they are accountable 
to the people: the electorate. Legitimacy may be gained through political competition, 
notably free and fair elections, while accountability may be guaranteed by what we 
previously call “checks and balances” institutions, which are restraints on the executive 
branch. Interestingly, political competition and checks and balances are two important 
aspects of a properly working democracy. Consequently, one may expect democracy to 
facilitate governments’ plan to follow responsible fiscal policy during good times and set 
a stage for an expansionary fiscal stance during recessions.  
Distributional conflicts can also be mitigated by what Rodrik (1999) refers to as 
“institutions of conflict management”, and these institutions include “democratic 
institutions, an independent and effective judiciary, an honest and non-corrupt 
bureaucracy, and institutionalized modes of social insurance”. In sum, if democratic 
institutions carry transparency and accountability values, they are likely to put a restraint 
on a fierce competition for public resources during good times and open avenue for a 
more relaxed fiscal policy during bad times.  
The argument advanced in this chapter is therefore that the democratic nature of 
political institutions matters for the cyclical stance of fiscal policy. Countries with 
sufficient checks and balances on the executive power are in a better position to conduct 
countercyclical fiscal policy than countries with weak institutions.  
 
te
l-0
01
16
96
1,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 2
9 
No
v 
20
06
Chapter III: IS FISCAL POLICY BECOMING COUNTERCYCLICAL IN AFRICA? 
 
 
 
 
 
167 
 
4.3 Theoretical Model 
 
Even though the chapter entirely concentrates on fiscal policy, the empirical 
model is a slight modified version of the standard Taylor rule’s monetary model, without 
inflation deviation term.  Following Calderòn et al. (2004), our baseline model 
specification is as follows:  
 tiitititititititititi unIyyyygggg ,,
*
,,4
*
,,3
*
1,1,21
*
,,
)()()()( ++−+−+−+=−
−−
λλλλ     (1) 
where i and t represent the country and the period, respectively; )( *
,, titi gg − is the 
difference between actual government spending and its long-run value; 
)( * 1,1, −− − titi gg denotes the deviation of lagged government spending from its long-term 
trend; )( *
,, titi yy − represents the output-gap, meaning the deviation of real GDP from its 
long-term trend; Ii,t captures the quality of political institutions; ni denotes the unobserved 
country-specific effects and ui,t  is the error term. The additional point that is being 
brought in the discussion is that the quality of political institutions might help attenuate 
the potential detrimental effect of shocks on the soundness of policies. 
 Since the deviation of real GDP from its long-term trend is assumed to be 
capturing exogenous shocks African countries are confronted with, we replace the 
expression )( *
,, titi yy − by the term Si,t, with Si,t representing the exogenous shocks. This 
formulation builds on the argument that shocks, such as terms of trade volatility, impact 
negatively the design and implementation of sound economic policy (Guillaumont et al., 
2003). Substituting )( *
,, titi yy − by Si,t  leads to the following structural equation: 
 tiitititititititi unISSgggg ,,,4,3
*
1,1,21
*
,,
*)()( ++++−+=−
−−
λλλλ
    (2) 
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λ2 captures inertia effect and is expected to display a positive sign but smaller than 1. The 
coefficient on shocks, λ3, is also expected to carry a positive sign while that on the 
interaction term, λ4, is supposed to be negative. The joint statistical significance of λ3 and 
λ4 may indicate the existence of a trade-off mechanism, with two opposite forces in 
action. First, the occurrence of a positive (negative) shock induces governments to favour 
an expansionary (contractionary) fiscal policy stance. Second, the same positive 
(negative) shock, in the presence of sound political institutions, induces a countercyclical 
fiscal response: a relaxed (tight) fiscal stance in the presence of negative (positive) shock. 
The theoretical framework developed below entirely concentrates on the concept 
of democracy, therefore ignoring the two attributes of democracy we refer to in the 
discussion: electoral competition and checks and balances. These two formal dimensions 
of democracy can be integrated in the analysis and replace the democratic institution 
variable, and the model specification becomes: 
tiitititititititititi unRBSCESSgggg ,,,5,,4,3
*
1,1,21
*
,,
**)()( +++++−+=−
−−
λλλλλ
 (3) 
where  CEi,t and RBi,t  are the measures of competitive elections and the restraints on the 
executive branch, respectively. If electoral competition is the key channel through which 
democratic institutions exert their influence on fiscal policy stance, λ4 will appear with a 
statistically significant negative sign while λ5 will be statistically insignificant. On the 
contrary, if the main mediating channel is through checks and balances, the interaction 
between exogenous shock and restraints on the executive branch, Si,t*RBi,t, will enter the 
regression negative and significant while the coefficient on the interaction between 
exogenous shock and political competition, Si,t*CEi,t, will be insignificant.  
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V- COUNTRY EXPERIENCES 
 
A brief country-specific analysis is conducted to show how democratic 
institutions can potentially affect fiscal policy stance. The analysis will also reveal the 
transmission channels supporting the relationship between fiscal policy stance and 
democracy. The exercise will be a selective analysis of only two African countries: 
Botswana and Nigeria. Botswana is considered as the brightest spot in the continent in 
terms of avoiding procyclical fiscal policies while Nigeria constitutes in many views the 
typical example of how poor institutions can give rise to procyclical fiscal policies.  
5.1 Botswana 
 
Apart from being the most well-known economic success story in Africa, 
Botswana is perhaps, with Mauritius, one of the most politically stable and democratic 
nations in the continent. Since gaining independence in 1966, Botswana has organised 
multipartite elections every five years, which all have been won by the ruling Botswana 
Democratic Party (Tsie, 1996). Even though views differ on whether Botswana is a 
genuine democracy, with competitive elections, a vast majority of analysts agree that the 
country has an independent judiciary system and a relatively free press and has actively 
pursued a broad based participation approach in designing public policies.  
The Botswanan legal system functions effectively. The constitution of the country 
provides for an independence of the judiciary system from the executive and the 
legislative branches, and this provision is largely abode by. Also, standards of conduct in 
civil, commercial, and political life are high. Corruption or misuses of position cases, 
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though rare, are prosecuted by the independent Directorate for Corruption and Economic 
Crime. As a result, Botswana compares favourably to other developing countries in terms 
of the quality of the judiciary system. The country ranked 11th worldwide according to 
the World Economic Forum, Global Technology Report 2003-2004.  
The press is relatively free. Even though that there is only one daily newspaper, 
which is state-owned, there are many weekly newspapers that are free to take a critical 
stance about the government and inquire about allegations of public mismanagement.  
The third important feature of Botswanan institutions is the degree of 
participation of a broad-section of the society in the formulation of policies. Such 
participation limits the degree of discretion of the elites to manipulate policies in their 
favour.  
The aforementioned features contribute to constraining the power of the executive 
branch, thus limiting rent seeking behaviours and corruption. The foundations of some of 
these elements of constraints on the executive are grounded in the Botswana’s pre-
colonial institutions, which were not altered by the British colonisation (Acemoglu et al., 
2003). The institution that is often cited as having contributed to fostering the culture of 
openness to criticism is the Kgotla. Acemoglu et al. (2003) argue that “the Kgotla was an 
assembly of adult males in which issues of public interest were discussed. Both wards 
and the whole society itself had kgotlas. Even though they were supposed to be advisory 
they seem to have been and effective way for commoners to criticize the King. They also 
were the venue where the king heard court cases and law was dispensed”.  
The effective constraints on the executive ensure transparency and accountability 
in managing mineral booms. The country resisted to spending effects of the diamond 
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booms. Instead, any excess revenue from the mining sector was set aside, in the form of 
foreign exchange reserves, and drew in years when revenues were low, like in the earlier 
1980s and 1990s. Thus, Botswana was able to smooth public spending relative to public 
revenue.  
5.2 Nigeria 
 
In contrast to Botswana, Nigeria’s economic performance has been startlingly 
poor. The country has grown poorer since mid 1970s, leaving its per capita GDP in 2005 
among the 20 lowest in the world. The country experienced high political instability, with 
a succession of many civilian and military regimes. Eifert et al. (2003) classify Nigerian 
military regimes as predatory autocracies and suggest that power in such systems “is not 
based on broad public support or economic performance; rather, military power and the 
support of a narrow elite are the basis for authority… state power faces few constraints.”  
The lack of legitimacy and constraints on the executive creates a lot of pressure on public 
spending during oil booms. Significant shares of oil windfalls were squandered through 
inefficient public investment (Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 2003) or implicit transfers 
to specific groups. One of these implicit transfers consists in selling to specific agents 
foreign exchange at an official rate that is below the market price (Azam, 1999). This 
amounts to allocating implicit subsidies to these agents.  Since the increases in 
government expenditure were not sustainable, the country was forced to undertake fiscal 
adjustment during bad times. Fiscal policy tends therefore to be highly procyclical.  
One interesting aspect of Nigeria case is that civilian rule has dominated the 
country from 1960 to 1966, from 1979 to 1983, from 1998-2003 and since 2003. These 
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periods were all marked by intense political pluralism and multipartite elections, but the 
only period where some effective restraints were introduced is the period after 2003, 
which corresponds to the second term of President Obasanjo. Institutions have been 
established during this period to improve the standards of conduct in political and 
economic life, thus restraining government officials from plundering oil windfalls. Two 
independent commissions are at the forefront of Nigeria’s fight against corruption. First 
is the Economic and Financial Crimes commission. Its main role is to investigate 
allegations of economic and financial crimes and bring charges against people involved 
in these crimes. The second, which complements the first, is the Independent Corrupt 
Practices Commission. It main duty is to receive complaints and prosecute alleged 
financial and economic criminals. Other tasks assigned to the commission include 
education and enlightenment of the public about bribery, corruption, and other related 
offences. The commission is also in charge of assessing and suggesting an overhaul of 
the activities of public bodies that may encourage corruption. 
This period is perhaps the first successful attempt to conduct prudent fiscal 
management and accumulating savings during boom times. The country has been able to 
build-up impressive foreign reserves and even to repay ahead of schedule its foreign debt. 
One this account, one can conjecture that the attribute of democracy that matters the most 
for the ability of a country to conduct countercyclical or neutral fiscal policy is the 
existence of checks and balances institutions rather than electoral competition. 
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VI -DATA ISSUES AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
  
 6.1 Data 
 
The dataset used for the empirical investigation consists of annual observations 
(1989-2002) for 47 African countries. This gives a panel dataset, which allows us to 
exploit both time-series for each country and cross-country differences. The panel is not 
balanced because of some missing observations. The reason that we decide to start from 
1989 is qualified by the fact that this year roughly corresponds to the beginning of 
democratic reforms on the continent. Prior to 1989, virtually all countries were ruled by 
one-party regimes. 
6.1.1 Dependent variable 
 
The dependent variable of the model is the cyclical behaviour of fiscal policy. 
What remains unclear is the indicator that should be used to estimate the cyclicality of 
fiscal policy. 
 
Which indicators to use for fiscal policy? 
 
The analysis of the cyclical properties of fiscal policy requires a clear 
understanding of the concept of “policy cyclicality”. The most widely prevailing view in 
the literature is that policy cyclicality is seen through outcomes, such as fiscal balance, 
tax revenues, rather than through policy instruments, such as government spending and 
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tax rates. However, there are compelling arguments in favour of the policy instrument 
approach, and table 1, which is excerpted from Kaminsky et al. (2004), clearly backs this 
view.  
 
Table 1: Fiscal Indicators: Theoretical Correlations with the Business Cycle 
 
 GS Tax 
Rates 
TR PB GS/GDP TR/GDP PB/GDP 
Countercyclical - + + + - +/0/- +/0/- 
Procyclical + - +/0/- +/0/- +/0/- +/0/- +/0/- 
Acyclical 0 0 + + - +/0/- +/0/- 
Source: Excerpt from Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh (2004) 
GS, TR, PB and GDP mean Government Spending, Tax Revenues, Primary Balance and Gross Domestic Product, 
respectively 
 
 
By assuming that government spending is exogenous and tax revenues are equal 
to tax base multiplies by tax rates, Kaminsky et al. (2004) show that only government 
spending and tax rates display unambiguous signs for different policy stances. A positive 
association between government spending and business cycles, or shocks, will suggest a 
procyclical fiscal policy; a negative correlation between these two variables will indicate 
a countercyclical stance while the absence of correlation will point to a neutral-fiscal 
stance. Moving to tax rates, which is defined as tax revenues divided by the tax base, a 
fiscal policy is said to be procyclical when the correlation between tax rates and business 
cycles, or shocks, is negative, meaning tax rates decrease in boom periods and increase in 
bust periods. Conversely, a fiscal policy is qualified as countercyclical if tax rates rise in 
good times and decline in bad times. Finally, fiscal policy is seen as acyclical when there 
is no correlation between tax rates and business cycles, or shocks. This clear-cut 
definition of fiscal policy stance based on government spending and tax rate variables 
stands in contrast to what comes from other fiscal indicators, such as tax revenues.  
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We will illustrate this by focusing on one fiscal indicator reported in table 1, 
namely tax revenues. A countercyclical fiscal policy in terms of tax revenues means that 
these revenues rise in good times and drop in bad periods, suggesting therefore a positive 
correlation between business cycle, or shocks, and tax revenues. What is confusing is that 
the very same patterns might indicate the pursuit of a neutral fiscal stance. Indeed, a 
positive (negative) shock could give rise to increased (decreased) tax revenues, via the 
widening (shrinking) of the tax base, even if tax rates are kept constant59. Moreover, the 
positive association between tax revenues and business cycles can be an indication of a 
procyclical fiscal policy as well. Higher tax revenues in good times can go hand-in-hand 
with lower tax rates, provided that tax base increases substantially. Conversely, lower tax 
revenues in bad times can be accompanied with rising tax rates, which aim at offsetting 
the shrinkage in tax base.  
Because of the ambiguous cyclical behaviour of primary balance, government 
revenues, and other variables presented in table 1, we will base our analysis on 
government spending60 indicators, which provide a clear-cut measure of fiscal stance. 
Government spending will be captured through the government total expenditure and the 
government current expenditure. These two variables will be denominated in constant 
terms.  
Once we decide to define the cyclicality of fiscal policy in terms of public 
spending, a question arises as how to measure cyclicality. We favour the approach that 
                                                 
59
 This is very much similar to the automatic fiscal stability argument. 
60
 Even though tax rates fits into the group of indicators that give an unambiguous measure of fiscal stance, 
it is dropped because of data availability concern.  
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consists in using the deviation of fiscal spending from its corresponding country 
average61.  
 
6.1.2 Explanatory variables  
 
Turning to one of the key explanatory variables, the exogenous shock, Si,t , we 
focus on terms of trade  shock, which we believe is one of the most important shocks in 
the context of African countries.62 Gauging the shock requires splitting terms of trade into 
a trend component and a volatility component and then uses the volatility component as 
the measurement of cyclicality. Two approaches are used. Firstly, we resort to the 
Hodrick-Prescott (H-P) filter, which generates a smooth trend and stationary deviations63. 
The deviation of terms of trade from its H-P- filtered trend will then capture the shock64. 
Secondly, we turn to the approach suggested by Combes et al. (1999) for robustness 
check. That approach assumes a broad specification, with series having the following 
structure: 
titiiiiti XctbaX ,1,, ε+++= −  
                                                 
61
 It has been shown in Chap I that public spending series are stationary around a drift.  
62
 Ideally we should have added a variable that capture climate hazard. Agricultural sector output seems to 
be the ideal candidate but turns empirically not to be significant.  
63
 Following the frequency rule of power of Rvan and Uhlig (2002), we put the value of the smoothness 
parameter at 100.  
64
 The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter tool has been criticized on many grounds. Some of criticisms point to 
the arbitrary choice of the smoothness parameter. Additionally, it is shown the HP filter does not handle 
effectively structural breaks.  Another weakness highlighted in the literature is the instability of the HP 
filter in the beginning and end of the sample because of its symmetric two-sided structure.  Though the HP 
filter meets numerous criticisms, it is still commonly used because alternative tools are far from being 
perfect too. For instance, the Band-Pass (BP) filter designed by Baxter and King (1995) defines a cycle 
period between 6 and 32 quarters, which could be considered as arbitrary. Moreover, the BP filter has end-
point instability problem too.  
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where Xi,t is the variable of interest in country i  and in period t . This equation suggests 
that variables can potentially have two components: stationary (ai) and non-stationary (bit 
+ ciXi,t-1 ). The non-stationary component could display a deterministic or/and a stochastic 
trends. The shock could then be captured by the error term (εi,t) .  
As far as the democratic institutions are concerned, we identify two indicators 
from Freedom House Database. Those are Political Rights Index and Civil Liberty Index 
and range from 1 to 7, with 7 representing the most drastic privation of political freedom 
(civil liberties  Index) and 1 representing the largest political freedom (civil liberties ) 
instances. For convenient reasons, we favour transforming Political Rights Index and 
Civil Liberty Index from a decreasing to an increasing function. We add 7 to the product 
of -1 times the scores of these variables.  
 
Table 2: Correlation Matrix between Civil Liberties   and Political Rights  
 
 Civil Liberties   
Index 
Political  Rights Index 
Civil Liberties   Index 1 0.856 
Political  Rights Index 0.856 1 
   
 
We introduce in the empirical investigation other measures of democracy to keep 
in with the growing consensus that there are some dimensions of democracy that are 
relevant for economic performance than others (Keefer, 2004; Collier and Hoeffler, 
2005). Measures of “checks and balances” as well as indicators of political competition 
are introduced in the analysis to gauge the relative importance of these factors in 
determining fiscal policy stance. We revert to one indicator, POLCOMP, from POLITY 4 
Database, and another from the Database of Political Institutions: CHEC. On the one 
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hand, POLCOMP measures the competitiveness of executive recruitment and is meant to 
capture the degree of electoral competition. Its value ranges from 1 to 7, with higher 
numbers indicating stronger competition.  On the other hand, CHEC measures how many 
political actors can blockpropose the legislation, therefore capturing the intensity of the 
constraints that the executive faces. This variable is expected to measure “checks and 
balances”. The highest value of this variable is also 7 while the lowest is 1. Higher score 
corresponds to more constraints on the executive and consequently lower independence 
of the executive. 
 
6.1.3 Control variables 
 
We add a small set of variables to control for the impact of political business 
cycle, demographic factors, and openness, on fiscal stance. As argued before, politically 
motivated fiscal policy can be pursued before elections, contributing to expansionary 
stance during these times. We introduce presidential electoral dummy65 to capture this 
dynamic. The demographic argument posits that a high dependency ratio demands 
governments to commit more public resources to satisfy the growing needs of the 
population. The demographic view is captured through the dependency ratio, which is the 
ratio of people younger than 15 and older than 64 to those age between 15 and 64 years. 
Finally, the rationale behind including trade shares as a control is to gauge the openness 
                                                 
65
 The data on elections is compiled from CIA-World Factbook and Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.  
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of countries66. This might determine the extent to which countries have access to 
international capital markets, thus their ability to borrow in order to smooth public 
spending over time.  
6.2 Empirical Strategy 
 
The model that we estimate is the following: 
tiitititititititi unISSgggg ,,,4,3
*
1,1,21
*
,,
)()( ++++−+=−
−−
λλλλ
 (5) 
Our empirical analysis will be based on Equation (5). The use of OLS is likely to 
generate biased and inconsistent estimates at least for two reasons. First, the lagged 
dependent variable is expected to be correlated with the error term, violating therefore the 
assumption of the exogeneity of right-hand-side variables. Second, failure to account for 
unobserved country-specific affects, ni , also violates the exogeneity assumption. An 
appealing approach to deal with unobserved heterogeneity is to first-difference (5), which 
allows to get rid of the individual effects. Then, the endogeneity problem is addressed by 
instrumenting the variable(s) that are suspected to be correlated with the error term. 
Following the standard arguments on the use of instrumental variables, * 2,2, −− − titi gg , is 
considered as a suitable instrument. Such an approach is termed in the literature as the 
“Anderson and Hsiao (1982) approach”.  
The instrumental variable estimator of Anderson and Hsiao is consistent as the 
sample size widens. However, it is asymptotically inefficient when the time dimension is 
bigger than 3, meaning that all the available instruments (or orthogonality restrictions) 
                                                 
66
 Ideally, financial variables would have the first choice but we could not get enough reliable data for the 
period considered.  
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are not used. Arrelano and Bond (1991) propose a remedy for that problem by developing 
a Generalised Method-of-Moments Estimator (GMM) that uses all the orthogonality 
restrictions. All possible lags of the dependent variable from at least two periods earlier 
and eventually lags of other right-hand side variables are used as instruments. However, 
Blundell and Bond (1998) demonstrate that first-differenced GMM have poor finite 
sample properties. Bond et al. (2001) indicate that this is the case when the series are 
close to a random walk or when variance of the country-specific effects ni rises relative to 
the variance of error term.  
In order to address the problem associated with persistent panel data, Blundell and 
Bond(1998) develop a system GMM estimator that is based on a simultaneous system of 
two equations, which are the equation in level and that in difference. Lagged variables 
serve as instruments for the differenced equation while their lagged first-differences are 
the instruments for the equation in level. 
The validity of the instruments is established by using an over-identification test. 
This could be either the Sargan (1958) test of overidentifying restrictions or the Hansen 
(1982) J-test, both testing whether the instruments are orthogonal to the error terms. This 
should be complemented by a test on the no residual serial autocorrelation.  
 
VII-RESULTS 
 
The results of the implementation of our empirical construct are presented in this 
section. We consider terms of trade volatility as the measurement of exogenous shock 
because of the prominence of this factor in the debate on export performance, GDP 
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growth, and fiscal policy in the context of African countries (Deaton, 1999). The 
rationale is that the export basis of many African countries tends to be concentrated in a 
few major primary commodities, making exports, government revenues, and expenditures 
in these countries highly dependent to developments in commodity markets. We then 
check the robustness of our results to alternative indicators or measurement of democratic 
institutions and fiscal stance. Finally, we identify the critical aspect(s) of democracy that 
are of relevance for conducting countercyclical fiscal policies. 
 
7.1 Terms-of-trade shock, democratic institutions, and fiscal policy stance  
 
7.1.1 Fiscal policy stance captured through government expenditure 
 
Column 1 in Table 3 reports the relation between the cyclicality of government 
expenditure, terms-of-trade shock, and democratic institutions. Democratic institutions 
are measured by the Civil Liberties   Index, ICL, which is derived from Freedom House 
(2005). Fiscal stance is captured by the deviation of government expenditure from 
country average normalised to country average. Terms-of-trade shock is derived from the 
H-P cyclical component of terms of trade normalised to the filtered-trend, and weighted 
by trade shares67 (Guillaumont et al., 1999, Combes and Saadi-Sedik, 2006). In line with 
the model developed below, we introduce lagged fiscal stance to account for possible 
persistent effects of previous fiscal policies. All the coefficients in this regression turn to 
                                                 
67
 The idea is to capture the degree of exposure of countries to terms-of-trade shocks. The more open the 
countries are the more they are exposed to terms-of-trade shocks.  
te
l-0
01
16
96
1,
 v
er
sio
n 
1 
- 2
9 
No
v 
20
06
Chapter III: IS FISCAL POLICY BECOMING COUNTERCYCLICAL IN AFRICA? 
 
 
 
 
 
182 
 
have the theoretically expected signs and are statistically significant at conventional 
levels.  The coefficient on lagged fiscal policy cyclicality is positive, indicating the 
existence of some degree of persistence in fiscal policy stance. The jointly positive 
coefficient on terms-of-trade shock and negative coefficient on the interaction between 
terms-of-trade shock and democracy is consistent with the trade-off concept developed in 
the theoretical model. An exogenous shock is conducive to the adoption of procyclical 
fiscal policy, but this outcome can potentially be alleviated and even reversed in the 
presence of sound democratic institutions. Since some of the variables may be very 
volatile, a question then arises as what is the relative magnitude of the effects of the 
significant explanatory variables. We respond to this question by reverting to the concept 
of “standardised beta coefficients” outlined by Isham et al. (2006). These coefficients are 
the product of the coefficient on the variable of interest and the standard deviation of that 
variable, divided by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. Results on these 
coefficients are reported in column (1’). Interestingly, they suggest higher persistency of 
fiscal policy, but more importantly they indicate the effect of the interaction of terms-of-
trade shock and democratic institutions may be as strong as the impact of the terms of 
trade alone, meaning that democratic institutions could completely offset the negative 
effect of terms-of-trade on the ability of government to pursue countercyclical fiscal 
policies.  
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Table 3: Determinants of the cyclicality of Government Expenditure 
 
Dependent variable is the deviation of Government Expenditure from the period averagea  
 SYS-GMM  SYS-GMM  
 (1) (1’) (2) (2’) 
     
(Lagged GE-Mean GE) 0.7821*** 
(0.1440) 
0.7621 0.9591*** 
(0.0906) 
0.9591 
TOT Shockb 0.7013* 
(0.3605) 
0.3521 0.8051* 
(0.4547) 
0.4042 
TOT Shock*ICL -0.2678** 
(0.1262) 
-0.3621   
TOT Shock*IPR   -0.2320** 
(0.1133) 
-0.3111 
     
     
Number of Observations 160  160  
Number of Countries 25  25  
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 1.00  1.00  
AR(2) (Test for Serial Autocorrelation)  0.238  0.145  
     
Variables that are instrumented GE and ICL  GE and IPR  
     
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
GE, TOT, ICL and IPR stand for Government Expenditure, Terms of Trade, Civil Liberties  Index and Political Rights 
Index, respectively. Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant 
a. The deviation of government expenditure from the period average is normalised to the country average   
b. The deviation of terms trade from its H-P-filtered trend is normalised to the same H-P-filtered trend and weighted by 
the trade shares 
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
** denotes significance of the estimates at 5 percent critical level 
* denotes significance of the estimates at 10 percent critical level 
 
 
 
We repeat the same exercise but instead consider an alternative measure of 
democratic institutions. We therefore use political liberties index as a check. This choice 
is supported by table 2, which clearly shows that the two measures are highly correlated. 
The results displayed in column 2 and (2’) are roughly similar to those found in column 1 
and (1’). Persistent effects of precedent fiscal policy stance tend to be statistically 
significant, albeit their strength appears to be much stronger. The coefficients on terms-
of-trade shock and the interaction between terms-of-trade shock and political rights index 
are jointly significant, with the theoretical signs predicted by our model. As far the 
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relative magnitude of the effects of the right-hand-side variables is concerned, we find the 
interaction between terms-of-trade shock and political rights index to be more modest and 
to offset only partially the procyclical bias of terms-of-trade shock.  
  
7.1.2 Fiscal policy stance captured through government current expenditure 
 
  One concern with our results in table 3 is that they may depend on the choice of 
the measure for the dependent variable. To shed some light on this issue, we estimate the 
same model as in table 3, but with other measures of public spending: current 
expenditure68. Results are then summarised in table 4. They lend strong support to the 
argument that democratic institutions are conducive to the adoption of countercyclical 
fiscal policies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
68
 In addition to current expenditure, we try with current expenditure minus interest payments but the 
results turn to be roughly identical.  
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Table 4: Determinants of the cyclicality of Government Current Expenditure 
 
 
Dependent variable is the Deviation of Government Current Expenditure from the period averagea  
 SYS-GMM  SYS-GMM  
 (3) (3’) (4) (4’) 
(Lagged GCE-Mean GCE) 0.8331*** 
(0.585) 
0.8024 0.8831*** 
(0.0921) 
0.8506 
TOT Shock 0.8976* 
(0.4566) 
0.4651 0.8332** 
(0.3895) 
0.4317 
TOT Shock*ICL -0.2380* 
(0.1217) 
-0.3335   
TOT Shock*IPR   -0.2043* 
(0.0843) 
-0.2841 
     
     
Number of Observations 155  155  
Number of Countries 25  25  
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 1.00  1.00  
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation)  
0.386  0.315  
     
Variables that are instrumented GCE and ICL  GCE and IPR  
     
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
GCE, TOT, ICL and IPR stand for Government Current Expenditure, Terms of Trade, Civil Liberties  Index and 
Political Rights Index, respectively. Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant. 
a. The deviation of government current expenditure from the country average is normalised to the period average  
b. The deviation of terms trade from its H-P-filtered trend is normalised to the same H-P-filtered trend and weighted by 
the trade shares 
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
** denotes significance of the estimates at 5 percent critical level 
* denotes significance of the estimates at 10 percent critical level 
 
 
All the results that have so far been reported are based on a specific measure of 
terms-of-trade shock. This measure lies on a H-P filter. We now seek to establish the 
robustness of our results by replacing H-P-based measure by the measure recommended 
by the residual approach. 
7.2 The residual approach  
 
Table 5 presents two regressions, in which terms-of-trade shock is captured 
through the deviation of actual terms of trade index from its fitted value, and the 
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dependent variable in these regressions is the deviation of government total expenditure 
from country average. The indicator of terms-of-trade shock is an estimated variable. 
Therefore, its standard error is likely to be biased. We correct this bias by using the 
method of bootstrapping, which is a commonly used method of resampling (Wooldridge, 
2002). The general idea is to consider the observed sample as the population and, at each 
iteration, draw from this sample a sub-sample that is used to estimate coefficients on 
terms-of-trade shock and on the interaction between terms-of-trade shock and political 
institution variables. Several iterations69 are run and the estimated coefficients are used to 
compute the real values of the standard errors.  
The results reported in column 5 are satisfactory as all the coefficients on 
explanatory variables appear with the theoretically expected signs.  Lagged fiscal stance 
has significant and high explanatory power on current fiscal policy, suggesting persistent 
effects. Column 5 also indicates that terms-of-trade shock potentially introduces a 
procyclical bias to fiscal policy, as shown by the positive coefficient on terms-of-trade 
volatility. Finally, the interaction between terms-of-trade shock and institutions, 
measured by civil liberties index, ICL, appears with a significant negative coefficient, 
confirming the offsetting impact of democratic institutions. It is worth noting that both 
the absolute and relative magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction between terms-
of-trade shock and institutions is lower than what was previously found. Overall, these 
results are in line with those found earlier. The next move is to see if the results hold up 
when using an alternative measure for institutions. Column 6 reports the results based on 
the use of political rights index, IPR, as the measure of the quality of political institutions. 
                                                 
69
 We run 1 000 iterations in this exercise. 
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Again, except the terms-of-trade shock, all the other explanatory variables turn to exert 
statistically significant effects on fiscal stance. Especially, we find the coefficient on the 
interaction between terms-of-trade shock and political rights index to be statistically 
significant, backing the argument that political institutions can offset the tendency of 
government to impart a procyclical bias to fiscal stance as a result of terms-of-trade 
shocks.  
 
Table 5: Determinants of the cyclicality of Government Expenditure 
 
 
Dependent variable is the Deviation of Government Expenditure from the period averagea  
 SYS-GMM  SYS-GMM  
 (5) (5’) (6) (6’) 
(Lagged GE-Mean GE) 0.7993*** 
(0.1328) 
0.8241 0.8351*** 
(0.1216) 
0.8610 
TOT Shockb 0.3024*** 
(0.1016) 
0.1407 0.2430 
(0.2264) 
 
TOT Shock*ICL -0.1770* 
(0.0513) 
-0.2180   
TOT Shock*IPR   -0.1221* 
(0.0629) 
-0.1587 
     
     
Number of Observations 160  160  
Number of Countries 25  25  
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 1.00  1.00  
AR(2) (Test for Serial Autocorrelation)  0.211  0.174  
     
Variables that are instrumented GE and ICL  GE and IPR  
     
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
GE, TOT, ICL and IPR stand for Government Expenditure, Terms of Trade, Civil Liberties Index and Political Rights 
Index, respectively. Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant 
a. The deviation of government expenditure from the country average is normalised to the period average   
b. The deviation of terms trade from its fitted values is normalised to the same fitted values and weighted by the trade 
shares. The standard errors of the terms-of-trade shock and the interaction between terms-of-trade shock and political 
institution variables are corrected using a method of bootstrapping.  
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
* denotes significance of the estimates at 10 percent critical level 
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We again conduct robustness check by using an alternative measure of fiscal 
stance, which is based on government current expenditure rather than government total 
expenditure70. Results are reported in table 6. They are very much similar to those found 
earlier. Except the terms-of-trade shock, all the key variables of interest appear with the 
theoretically expected signs and are statistically significant at conventional levels. We 
find, for instance, the coefficient on lagged discretionary fiscal policy measure to be 
positive and slightly bigger than what was uncovered in previous findings, confirming the 
presence of a persistence effect of previous discretionary fiscal policy. The coefficients 
on terms-of-trade shock and on the interaction between terms-of-trade shock and political 
institutions are robust and exhibit the right signs, implying again that economies that 
exhibit sound political institutions are prone to conduct countercyclical fiscal policies 
when facing terms-of-trade shocks.  
                                                 
70
 In addition to current expenditure, we try with current expenditure minus interest payments but the 
results turn to be roughly identical.  
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Table 6: Determinants of the cyclicality of Government Current Expenditure 
 
 
Dependent variable is the Deviation of Government Current Expenditure from the period averagea  
 SYS-GMM  SYS-GMM  
 (7) (7’) (8) (8’) 
(Lagged GCE-Mean GCE) 0.8723*** 
(0.0718) 
0.9011 0.8313*** 
(0.0570) 
0.8587 
TOT Shock 0.2198 
(0.2212) 
 0.3484* 
(0.1812) 
0.1674 
TOT Shock*ICL -0.1240* 
(0.0606) 
-0.1578   
TOT Shock*IPR   -0.1257*** 
(0.0322) 
-0.1688 
     
     
Number of Observations 155  155  
Number of Countries 25  25  
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 1.00  1.00  
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation)  
0.954  0.333  
     
Variables that are instrumented GCE and ICL  GCE and IPR  
 
    
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
GCE, TOT, ICL and IPR stand for Government Current Expenditure, Terms of Trade, Civil Liberties Index and 
Political Rights Index, respectively. Time dummies are included and they turn not to be significant. 
a. The deviation of government current expenditure from the country average is normalized to the period average.   
b. The deviation of terms trade from its fitted values is normalised to the same fitted values and weighted by the trade 
shares. The standard errors of the terms-of-trade shock and the interaction between terms-of-trade shock and political 
institution variables are corrected using a method of bootstrapping.  
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
* denotes significance of the estimates at 10 percent critical level 
 
 
7.3 Transmission channels and other covariates  
 
Having found that democratic institutions are conducive to countercyclical fiscal 
policies, we now examine the channels through which this correlation operates. 
Following the proliferate literature on democracy (Keefer, 2004), we identify two sorts of 
mechanisms at work in any democratic system: the way power is gained and the 
mechanism that constraints the way power is exerced. The first refers to what is called 
“the political competition” while the second is known as “checks and balances”.  
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To gauge the relative importance of these two dimensions in the measurement of 
the quality of democratic institutions, we regress civil liberties  index, ICL, and political 
rights index, IPR, on political competition, POLCOMP, and checks and balances, CHEC, 
and the results are recorded in columns 9 and 10, respectively. All the coefficients in 
those regressions are found to be robustly significant. In particular, coefficients on 
POLCOMP and CHEC display positive signs and are statistically significant at one 
percent, supporting the argument that political competition and checks and balances 
constitute some important aspects of democratic regimes. We also find the coefficients on 
political competition to be much higher than those on checks and balances, suggesting 
that a higher consideration is given to political competition in designing the indicators of 
democratic institutions. In sum, we find the competitiveness of elections and restraints on 
the executive branch to be two important dimensions of democratic regimes.  
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Table 7: Democratic Institution indexes and two key characteristics of democratic systems 
 
Dependent variable is the Civil Liberties Index in (9) and Political Rights Index in (10) 
 TSEGLS TSEGLS 
 (9) (10) 
   
Constant 0.8650*** 
(0.0892) 
-0.4367*** 
(0.0383) 
CHEC 0.0680** 
(0.0295) 
0.1068*** 
(0.0374) 
POLCOMP 0.2923*** 
(0.0138) 
0.5034*** 
(0.0130) 
   
   
R-Squared 0.83 0.89 
Number of Countries 41 41 
Number of Observations 276 276 
Note: White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses 
POLCOMP stands for Political Competition while CHEC stands for Checks and Balances 
TSEGLS stands for Two-Stage Estimated Generalised Least Squares estimator  
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
**denotes significance of the estimates at 5 percent critical level 
 
The next step is to examine how these dimensions relate to the ability of African 
countries to avoid procyclical fiscal policies. We address this concern by replacing 
democratic institutions indicators with political competition and checks and balances 
indicators. In addition to exploring the mediating channels through which democratic 
systems are conducive to countercyclical fiscal policies, we account for additional 
controls that are widely used in the literature. These controls include political business 
cycles, trade shares, and the demographic structure of the population. We introduce an 
electoral dummy to account for the potential effects of political business cycles on the 
cyclicality of fiscal policy. The rationale behind adding trade shares is to capture the 
openness of the economy. The assumption is that the more a country is open the less the 
country is credit constrained. Finally, we include the dependency ratio to capture the 
impact of demographic structure of the population on fiscal stance.  
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Table 8: Determinants of the cyclicality of Public Spending, additional covariates considered 
 
 
Dependent variable is the Deviation of Government total expenditure and Governement Current 
Expenditure from the period averagea  
 SYS-GMM  SYS-GMM  
 (11) (11’) (12) (12’) 
(Lagged GE-Mean GE) 0.6587*** 
(0.1633) 
0.5893   
(Lagged GCE-Mean GCE)   0.7980*** 
(0.2235) 
0.5587 
TOT Shockb 0.40070* 
(0.2156) 
0.3576 0.5676* 
(0.2709) 
0.3974 
TOT Shock*CHEC -0.2038** 
(0.0857) 
-0.4082 -0.2341** 
(0.1042) 
-0.3955 
TOT Shock*POLCOMP 0.0015 
(0.0040) 
 0.0038 
(0.0034) 
 
PRES 0.0206 
(0.0332) 
 0.0133 
(0.0613) 
 
XM 0.0010 
(0.0006) 
 -0.0002 
(0.0013) 
 
DRATIO -0.0549 
(0.0525) 
 -0.0095 
(0.1138) 
 
     
     
Number of Observations 117  116  
Number of Countries 19  19  
Chi-Square( Hansen over-id test) 1.00  1.00  
AR(2) (Test for Serial 
Autocorrelation)  
0.425  0.548  
     
Variables that are instrumented GE, CHEC and 
POLCOMP  
 GCE, CHEC 
and POLCOMP 
 
     
Note: Robust standard errors are in parenthesis 
GE, GCE, TOT, CHEC, POLCOMP, PRES, XM, and DRATIOstand for Government Expenditure, Government 
Current Expenditure, Terms of Trade, Checks and Balances, Political Competition, Presidential Elections Dummy, 
Imports+Exports to GDP ratio, and the dependency ratio,  respectively. Time dummies are included and they turn not 
to be significant. 
a. The deviation of government expenditure from the country average is normalised to the period average.  
b. The deviation of terms trade from its H-P-filtered trend is normalised to the same H-P-filtered trend and weighted by 
the trade shares. 
*** denotes significance of the estimates at 1 percent critical level 
** denotes significance of the estimates at 5 percent critical level 
* denotes significance of the estimates at 10 percent critical level 
 
 
 
Results are reported in table 8 in columns (11) and (12). They are largely in line 
with earlier results. The lagged cyclicality of government total expenditure does enter the 
two regressions significantly, confirming the earlier finding of the persistency in 
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cyclicality. Other interesting finding is that the coefficient on terms-of-trade shock is 
statistically significant at conventional levels and turns with the right sign (positive sign). 
As mentioned before this result suggests that a positive (negative) exogenous shock, 
irrespective of the quality of political institutions, gives rise to expansionary 
(contractionary) fiscal stance.  
Moving to the two features of democratic systems, we find the interaction 
between terms-of-trade shock and checks and balances indicator, TOT Shock*CHEC, to 
have a statistically significant negative impact on the cyclicality of public spending, 
suggesting that constraints on the executive branch have the potential to make fiscal 
policy countercyclical in the presence of exogenous shocks.  On the other hand, the 
coefficient on the interaction between terms-of-trade shock and political competition 
indicator, TOT Shock*POLCOMP, is not statistically significant. This result might 
indicate that political competition alone does not set conditions for fiscal policies to be 
countercyclical. These results therefore lend strong support to the argument that 
democratic institutions are prone to conduct countercyclical not because of the electoral 
competition they brought about but because of the effective restraints they put on rulers.   
Turning to other controls, we find all to be statistically insignificant. Political 
business cycle, the degree of openness, and the demographic structure of the population 
do not impact directly the cyclicality of fiscal policy. The non-significance of the 
coefficient on the electoral dummy may indicate that political business cycles may be 
neutralised in the presence of effective constraints of the executive. Assuming that the 
trade shares capture the degree of openness, the lack of significance of the coefficient on 
trade shares may illustrate the imperfection of the international capital markets 
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(Kaminsky et al., 2004). In other terms, even open economies can not borrow during bad 
times to smooth public spending.  
Overall, the main argument holds up even when one includes additional controls. 
Democratic institutions facilitate the adoption of countercyclical fiscal policies mainly 
because of the effective constraints these institutions place on the executive.  
 
VIII-CONCLUSION 
 
The vast majority of African countries went through bold political transformations 
in the earlier 1990s, especially moving from one-party rule to increased political 
pluralism. The period that predates the democratisation era was characterised by a broad 
wave of authoritarian rule, procyclical economic policies, including fiscal and monetary, 
and poor economic growth. These three events have been proven to be closely related. 
For that reason, a move towards greater democracy in many African countries 
legitimately raises hopes among many analysts for an improved economic management 
and stronger and sustained economic growth. The goal of this chapter was therefore to 
test whether democratic reforms in the context of African countries have the potential to 
make fiscal policy more countercyclical. If this is the case, what are the channels through 
which this correlation operates? 
The empirical analysis is based on panel data of 47 African countries over the 
1989-2002 period, and the estimation technique used is the system Generalised Method-
of-Moments Estimator System (SYS-GMM). We found measures of government 
spending cyclicality to be negatively and strongly correlated with the interaction between 
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democratic institution indicators (political rights index and civil liberties  index) and 
terms-of-trade shock. This result is consistent with the prediction of our model, which is 
that sound democratic institutions are conducive to countercyclical policies.  Moving to 
the channels through which fiscal policy matters for fiscal policy, we focused on two 
critical aspects of democratic institutions, which are electoral competition and checks and 
balances. These two dimensions of democratic systems are found to be strongly related to 
the two measures of democratic institutions (political rights index and civil liberties  
index). Among the two dimensions of a democratic system, electoral competition, 
however, seems to have the highest weight in the construction of indicators of democratic 
institutions.  
Even though more weight is given to political competition in the compilation of 
democratic institutions indexes, we found this dimension of democracy to be uncorrelated 
to fiscal policy stance. On the contrary, we found formal institutions that impose 
restraints on the executive branch to be the key factor that explain why democracies can 
smooth business cycles better than autocracies. 
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APPENDIX III-1: DEFINITION OF VARIABLES AND SOURCES 
 
 
VARIABLES SOURCES 
  
Dependant 
  
    GE 
 
 
 
 
    GCE 
 
 
Total Government Expenditure (in constant prices, deflated by the Implicit Deflator of GDP) 
Source: World Development Indicators 2004 
 
 
 
 
Government Current Expenditure (in constant prices, deflated by the Implicit Deflator of GDP) 
Source: World Development Indicators 2004 
 
Explanatory  
    TOT 
 
 
Net barter terms of trade, which is the ratio of the export price index to the corresponding 
import price index  
Source:  World Development Indicators 2004 
 
    ICL 
 
 
Civil Liberties Index (CL) was transformed into an increasing function (ICL) by adding 7 to 
the product of -1 times CL  
Source: Freedom House, 2005 
 
    IPR 
 
 
Political Rights Index (PR) was transformed into an increasing function (IPR) by  by adding 7 
to the product of -1 times PR  
Source: Freedom House, 2005 
 
    CHEC 
 
 
 
Checks and balances capture the number of veto players present in a political system.  
Source:  Database of Political Institutions 
 
 
    POLCOMP 
 
 
 
The competitiveness of executive recruitment. 
Source: Polity 5 
 
 
    DRATIO 
 
 
 
Age dependency ratio is the ratio of dependents, people younger than 15 and older than 64, to 
the working, age population, those ages 15-64  
Source: World Development Indicators 2004 
 
 
     XM 
 
 
 
 
Exports of goods and services plus imports of goods and services 
Source: World Development Indicators 2004 
 
 
 
    PRES 
 
 
 
 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the is a presidential election and 0 otherwise 
Source: CIA-World Factbook and Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia 
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APPENDIX III-2: SAMPLES 
 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 
Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Cote-d’Ivoire, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, 
Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, 
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe.  
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
Despite the recent growth resumption in Sub-Saharan Africa, the region continues 
to harbour the majority of the world’s poorest nations. Per-capita income is still below 
the level achieved before the 1973 oil shock. The distribution of incomes and assets is 
largely skewed, and Africa is considered the second highest unequal region in the world 
(United Nations, 2006). The poor growth record and high inequality conspire to increase 
poverty. Africa is home to a growing share of the world’s absolute poor.  
 
However, there are some positive developments. There is an increasing number of 
countries that have made headway in pursuing economic and political reforms, which 
both are believed to be conducive to strong economic growth.  Most of the economic 
reforms that have been implemented are rooted in the dependent economy model. Real 
exchange rate and absorption, captured by public spending, are therefore the two 
variables targeted by policy-makers. Chapter I revisits the policy argument along the 
lines of the arguments developed by Guillaumont et al. (1999) and looks into the role 
played by policy instabilities in the poor growth performance of African countries. 
However, the approach adopted in Chapter I differs from earlier work in two 
perspectives. First, it relies entirely on the key variables underscored in the dependent 
economy model, namely the real exchange rate and public spending. Second, the analysis 
is based on dynamic panel data instead of the commonly use of cross-country data. The 
empirical investigation shows that only real exchange instability has a direct significant 
influence on economic growth.  The combination of a statistical significance of real 
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exchange instability and the non-significance of public spending instability, when 
incorporated in the same regression, indicates that both are not two distinct factors 
regarding their impact on per capita growth. Public spending instability has a significant 
positive predictive power over real exchange rate instability, which in turn hampers 
growth both through investment and productivity channels. Also, real exchange rate 
instability has asymmetric effects on economic growth as the relationship between these 
two variables is driven by real exchange rate appreciation. Finally, partial evidence 
supports the view that real exchange rate appreciation contributes to the decline of sectors 
with important positive externalities, thereby leading to persistent productivity losses and 
weak economic growth.  Overall, we interpret these findings as suggesting that the 
stability of public spending and real exchange rate are keys to Africa’s long-term 
economic growth. Reducing large fluctuations in public spending requires gaining some 
control over both internal and external sources of government revenues. In many African 
countries, with a narrow production basis, domestic revenues are closely linked to 
developments in commodity markets.  The long-term solution for government revenue 
and expenditure instability is to broaden the revenue base through economic 
diversification. However, achieving stability of government domestic revenues in the 
short-run may be facilitated by the adoption of contingent financial instruments and some 
institutional arrangements, such as the establishment of a stabilisation fund. The use of 
contingent financial instruments, such as futures, swaps, and options, has the potential to 
transfer commodity price instability to international markets and guarantee more stable 
public revenue and expenditure. However, the shortcoming of this scheme is that it 
requires a sophisticated domestic financial sector, or at least capacity in trading 
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commodity-backed financial instruments. Such institutional structures do not yet exist in 
many African countries. Contrary to the contingent financial tools, stabilisation seems to 
be a feasible solution. The stabilisation fund serves as a buffer mechanism whereby part 
of windfall revenues are transferred from the budget to the stabilisation fund during times 
of increasing commodity prices and the other way around when prices are declining, 
ensuring therefore a stability of public spending. The other source of uncertainty for 
government revenue is the flow of resources from abroad that finance government deficit. 
Most African countries rely on aid flows in that respect, which means a more predictable 
aid could also be beneficial. Having more stable public spending could take care of an 
important source of real exchange rate instability. 
 
The dependent economy model also serves as the main theoretical framework to 
investigate the controversial nexus between economic policies and poverty in chapter II. 
The approach used in that chapter consists in assessing the impact of economic policies 
on poverty through real exchange rate and public spending, with more emphasis on real 
exchange rate. The main argument put forward in the theoretical framework is that the 
depreciation of real exchange rate is conducive to poverty reduction provided that there 
are good institutions and a fairly equal income distribution.  
 
The empirical investigation strongly supports the view that high inequality, 
proxied by income Gini coefficient, impedes the potential positive effect of real exchange 
rate depreciation on the poor incomes. It also largely backs the contention that the 
potential positive impact of real exchange rate depreciation on the poor is much stronger 
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when institutions are sound. In addition, it appears that there is no asymmetric effect of 
real exchange rate on the incomes of the poor. These findings hold when adding 
additional covariates. Additional controls are added to the analysis to account for other 
factors that might have been missed. Among these variables, education appears to be 
critical for poverty reduction. On the other hand, trade openness, agricultural 
productivity, and public spending are found not to be statistically associated with the 
incomes of the poor. The lack of significant coefficients associated with these variables 
does not mean a complete absence of relationships between these indicators and poverty 
but rather indicates that trade openness, agricultural productivity, and public spending 
come into play indirectly because of their potential impact on economic growth. The 
main lesson that can be drawn from these findings is that policies favouring the 
depreciation of real exchange rate could be a powerful tool for poverty reduction, 
provided they are complemented by reforms that facilitate the access of the poor to 
production factors and improve the quality of institutions. 
 
The quality of institutions, notably political institutions, is at the core of the issues 
raised in Chapter III. The vast majority of African countries went through bold political 
transformations in the early 1990s, especially moving from one-party rule to increased 
political pluralism. This development raised hopes because the period that predates this 
wave of democratisation was characterised by authoritarian rule, procyclical economic 
policies, including fiscal and monetary, and poor economic growth, which all three have 
been proven to be closely related. Chapter III attempts to test whether democratic 
reforms, in the context of African countries, have the potential to make fiscal policy more 
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countercyclical. In addition, it tries to uncover the channels, through which this 
correlation operates, if there is any association between democratic changes and 
countercyclical policy. 
 
Assuming that terms-of-trade shock captures the deviation of output from its 
long-term level, the empirical analysis suggests that the cyclicality of government 
spending is negatively and strongly associated with the interaction between democratic 
institution indicators (political rights index and civil liberties  index) and terms-of-trade 
shock. This result is consistent with the main argument developed in the chapter, namely 
that sound democratic institutions are conducive to countercyclical policies. As far as the 
transmission channels are concerned, we focused on two critical dimensions of 
democratic institutions, which include electoral competition and the checks and balances. 
These two dimensions of democratic systems are found to be strongly related to the two 
measures of democratic institutions (political rights index and civil liberties  index). 
Among the two dimensions of a democratic system, electoral competition, however, has 
implicitly the highest weight in the construction of indicators of democratic institutions. 
Even though more weight is given to political competition in the compilation of 
democratic institutions indexes, we find this dimension of democracy not be condusive to 
countercyclical fiscal policies. On the contrary, we find formal institutions that impose 
restraints on the executive branch to be the key factor explaining why democracies can 
smooth business cycles better than autocracies. The policy implication is that the recent 
wave of democratisation constitutes a positive development because it provides countries 
with the opportunity to avoid procyclical policy. Competitive elections are important. 
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But, taken alone, they do not guarantee changes in the cyclical properties of fiscal policy. 
Promoting and accelerating the introduction of domestic effective restraints on the 
executive branch, which prove to be more sustainable than foreign-led constraints, would 
probably increase the likelihood of adopting countercyclical fiscal policies.  
 
Overall, the conclusive findings of the empirical investigation conducted in all the 
three chapters should not obscure the importance of dealing effectively with variable 
definition problems. All the empirical results in Chapter I are based on a definition of 
poverty that relies on the fifth poorest quintile. Future research would gain from 
considering alternative measures of poverty as there has been significant progress in 
collecting household surveys in recent years. Also in the same chapter, we revert to 
political institution variables as proxies for institutions because we could not get time-
varying indicators of institutions such as those generated by ICRG71. Again, addressing 
such a shortcoming would be of great interest. The same also holds true for the indicator 
for inequality since we use income Gini coefficient instead of an indicator that captures 
the distribution of assets.  
  
In addition to variable definition problems, some substantive questions require 
further exploration. Chapter II finds a strong evidence for a positive relationship between 
real exchange rate and public spending stability and growth. The experience of African 
countries suggests that stable real exchange rate and public spending are exceptions 
                                                 
71
 International Country Risk Guide index is based on underlying numerical evaluations with respect to the 
expropriation risk, corruption, the rule of law, and government repudiation of contracts.  
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rather than the rules. Then, the question of what motives push governments to pursue 
such policies may require further investigation. Finally, Chapter III substantiates the view 
that a move toward democratic systems is favourable to countercyclical fiscal policy, 
especially if checks and balances are in place. This analysis is arguably general because it 
does not account for the variety of electoral rules and forms of governments. In other 
words, the view might be seen as falling under the trap of “One size fits all”. Perhaps one 
of the greatest payoffs for future research on the relationship between the cyclical 
properties of fiscal policies and democracy is likely to be obtained by considering the 
wide range of political systems across democracies.  
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Résumé 
 
Cette thèse est un recueil de trois essais,  chacun correspondant à un chapitre. Le premier chapitre procède à l’analyse des 
causes de la faible croissance de l’Afrique en s’appuyant sur l’argument dit « des politiques ». C’est ainsi qu’il convoque la littérature 
mettant l’accent sur le rôle de l’instabilité des politiques et utilise le modèle de l’économie dépendante comme fondement théorique. 
Le chapitre explore les effets potentiels de l’instabilité des dépenses publiques et du  taux de change réel sur la dynamique de 
croissance ainsi que les canaux de transmission à travers lesquels ces effets prennent corps. Les résultats de l’analyse empirique 
révèlent que l’instabilité des dépenses publiques exacerbe l’instabilité du taux de change réel,  qui, en retour, exerce un effet négatif 
tant sur l’investissement que sur la productivité globale des facteurs.  Par ailleurs, l’analyse empirique indique, en partie, que 
l’appréciation du taux de change réel contribue au déclin des secteurs à forte externalités positives, contribuant ainsi à des pertes 
continues  de productivité et à une croissance économique atone. Ces résultats impliquent que la stabilité des dépenses publiques et du 
taux de change réel est cruciale pour la croissance économique à long-terme du continent.   
 Le second chapitre s’intéresse à la problématique politiques économiques et pauvreté et s’appuie, également, sur le modèle 
de l’économie dépendante. Le chapitre part des dépenses publiques et, dans une large mesure,  du taux de change réel et explore les 
liens entre ces deux variables et la pauvreté. L’analyse empirique, reposant sur un échantillon de pays africains et non-africains, 
montre que la dépréciation du taux de change réel favorise les pauvres, à condition que les inégalités de revenus ne soient pas criardes 
et que les institutions fonctionnent adéquatement. Il découle de ces résultats empiriques que la dépréciation du taux de change réel 
peut être un puissant outil au service de la réduction de la pauvreté si elle est complémentée par d’autres politiques. Ces politiques 
comprennent entre autres : faciliter l’accès des pauvres aux facteurs de production et améliorer la qualité des institutions.  
 S’inscrivant dans la droite ligne de la littérature liant les choix de politiques aux régimes politiques, le troisième et dernier 
chapitre porte un regard sur les implications du processus de démocratisation enclenché en Afrique sur les propriétés cycliques  de la 
politique budgétaire.  La principale question à laquelle essaie de répondre ce chapitre est de savoir si les institutions démocratiques ont 
facilité l’adoption de politiques budgétaires contra-cycliques sur le continent.   L’analyse empirique y répond en montrant une 
corrélation positive entre institutions démocratiques et politiques budgétaires contra-cycliques. De plus, et ce point est sans doute le 
plus important, les institutions formelles ayant pour vocation de contrebalancer le poids de l’exécutif s’avèrent être le principal facteur 
qui explique pourquoi  les démocraties lissent mieux les cycles économiques que les autocraties.   
 
Numéros de Classification JEL : C23, E32, E6, I3, F41, O4, O55, P16 
 
Mots Clés: Modèles avec des données de panels, Fluctuations/Cycles Economiques, Formulation de Politique Macroéconomique, 
Pauvreté, Macroéconomie en Economie Ouverte, Croissance Economique, Afrique, Economie Politique. 
 
 
Executive Summary 
 
This thesis is a collection of three essays, each corresponding to a chapter. The first chapter investigates the causes of 
Africa’s poor growth performance along the line of the policy argument. It therefore focuses on the strand of literature that highlights 
the role of policy instability and uses the dependent economy model as the main theoretical framework. It explores the potential 
effects of real exchange rate and public spending instabilities on growth dynamics as well as the transmission channels through which 
these effects unfold. Results from the empirical analysis indicate that public spending instability increases real exchange rate 
instability, which in turn exerts a negative impact on both investment and total factor productivity. In addition, the empirical 
investigation suggests partially that real exchange rate appreciation contributes to the decline of sectors with important positive 
externalities, thereby leading to persistent productivity losses and weak economic growth.  These results can be interpreted as 
indicating that the stability of public spending and real exchange rate are keys to the region’s long-term economic growth.  
The second chapter explores the relationships between economies policies and poverty, using again the dependent 
economy model as the main theoretical construct. Accordingly, it focuses on public spending and real exchange rate, with more 
emphasis on real exchange rate, and explores the links between these two variables and poverty. The empirical analysis, which is 
based on a sample of African and non-African countries, shows that real exchange rate depreciation favours the poor, provided that 
income is fairly distributed and institutions are sound. The main policy implication of this finding is that real exchange rate 
depreciation could be a powerful tool for poverty reduction if complemented by other policies. Such policies include facilitating the 
access of the poor to production factors and improving the quality of institutions.  
In line with the literature that links policy choices to political regimes, the third and last chapter looks into the implications 
of the democratisation process in Africa on the cyclical properties of fiscal policy in the continent. In particular, the main question that 
is investigated is whether democratic institutions have been conducive to more countercyclical fiscal policies in the region. The 
empirical investigation uncovers a positive association between democratic institutions and countercyclical fiscal policies. More 
importantly, formal institutions that impose restraints on the executive branch are found to be the key factor that explains why 
democracies can smooth business cycles better than autocracies.  
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